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INTRODUCTION
Global recessions, international hostilities, fluctuations in the world's finan
cial markets, and poor business management have caused, and will continue
to cause, the insolvency of many multinational companies. When a multina-
tional company becomes insolvent, insolvency proceedings will often be com.
menced in every country in which it does business or has assets. In such cases,
it would clearly be in the best interests of businesses and nations worldwide
to make agreements that would promote the equitable treatment of creditors
and debtors involved in cross-border insolvencies.
Nevertheless, one of the glaring omissions in private international law has
been the failure of nations to reach accord about transnational insolvency.
*Copyright 01992 by Charles D. Booth. All rights reserved. This article incorporates, updates, and
substantially expands upon my earlier work, Recognition of Foreign Bankrtupcies in a Transnational Setting:
An Analysis of the Laws of the United States, chapter 18 in TEa LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL Busnass Th.ANSAC-
TIONS (Ved P. Nanda ed. July 1988, rev. October 1989).
"Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong. B.A., Yale University, 1981; J.D., Har-
vard Law School, 1984.
'See Louis JACQUEs BLoM-CoOPEP, BANimtowcy IN PIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4 (1954). However,
many attempts have been made to reach an accord. For example, in 1963 the members of the European Eco-
nomic Community started working on a bankruptcy convention whereby a bankruptcy adjudication in one
member's country would be respected by all other members. Kurt H. Nadelmann, Discrimination in Foreign
Bankruptcy Laws Against Non-Domestic Claims, 47 Am. BANMi. LJ. 147, 147-48 (1973) [hereinafter Dis,
crimination in Foreign Bankruptcy Laws]; Kurt H. Nadelmann, A Reflection on BankruptcyJurisdiction: News
from the European Common Market, the United States, and Canada, 27 McGui LJ. 541 (1982). More than
a quarter century later an accord has not yet been reached. As one commentator puts it, interest in this
convention "has quietly expired." PHiUp S. SM Ar, CRoss-BORDER INSOLvENcY 265 (1991). Other attempts
to draft bankruptcy conventions for international application have also failed. Nadelmann, Discrimination
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Historically, there has been little formal cooperation among bankruptcy courts
worldwide. Most countries have long responded to the problem of what effect
to give to foreign bankruptcies by protecting domestic interests and local
creditors, and at times even discriminating against foreign creditors. 2 This
nationalistic approach to bankruptcy laws has often resulted in full liquida-
tion proceedings in every country in which the assets of a debtor are located.
It has also caused duplication of expenses and litigation, inequitable distri-
butions to creditors worldwide, and instability in the climate for international
trade.
This article discusses U.S. law- and the inconsistent application of that
law-regarding the recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings. Part I
describes the historical development of that law prior to the enactment of
the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "U.S. Bankruptcy Code").3 Part II
examines the current statutory provisions (§§ 303(b)(4), 304, and 305)4 and
the case law regarding the recognition of foreign bankruptcies and
the options available to a foreign representative for protecting the assets
of a foreign debtor in the United States. This part of the article concentrates
on § 304 (the section that provides for cases in the United States
ancillary to foreign proceedings) and analyzes and critiques the important
decisions that have applied and interpreted § 304. This critique highlights the
inconsistent approaches taken by U.S. courts in determining whether to recog-
nize and assist foreign bankruptcies and suggests criteria to guide the courts
in making these decisions.
in Foreign Bankruptcy Laws, supra, at 148.
At present there appears to be renewed interest in reaching agreement, and some attempts are
currently progressing. See Council of Europe, European Convention on Certain International Aspects
of Bankruptcy (Opened for Signature in Istanbul on 5 June 1990), Appendix II in CROss-BORDER IN-
sOLVENCY: COMPAATIVE DIMENSIONs 297-308 (Ian F. Fletcher ed. 1990); Section of Business Law
(CommitteJ) of the International Bar Association, Proposal for Consultative Draft of Model International
Insolvency Co-operation Act for Adoption by Domestic Legislation With or Without Modification, 17 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 323-27 (1989). For an example of an accord that was established, see The Inter Nordic
Insolvency Estate Convention (Den Nordiske Konkurskonvention), 1934, Denmark-NorwaySweden-
FinlandIceland.
2Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1442-43, 1445 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Prof. Kurt H. Nadelmann). See also Kurt H. Nadelmann, Legal Treatment of Foreign and Domestic Creditors,
11 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROBs. 696 (1946).
3Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in 11 U.S.C.A.
(West 1991), in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A. (West 1991) and in scattered sections of other titles).
Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this article to "section" will be to the applicable section of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
In this article the term "bankruptcy" is used as in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and includes insolvency
proceedings (both liquidations and reorganizations) of individual debtors, partnerships, and corporations.
411 U.S.C.A. §§ 303(b)(4), 304, 305 (West 1991).
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I. U.S. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies Prior to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code5
A study of the historical development of U.S. case law regarding the recog-
nition of foreign bankruptcies is helpful, if not necessary, in understanding §
304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and other applicable provisions of U.S.
bankruptcy law. First of all, many of the principles relied upon by U.S. courts
for the past two centuries, often in the absence of statutory guidance, have
been codified in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Secondly, bankruptcy courts
frequently invoke and rely on these older cases when adjudicating disputes
under current law.
Historically, there have been two different approaches used to resolve trans-
national bankruptcy problems: the "personalist," "unity," or "universality"
approach (which I will refer to as the "universality" approach) and the "real-
ist:' "plurality," or "territoriality" approach (which I will refer to as the "ter-
ritoriality" approach). The universality approach presumes "that bankruptcy
attaches to the [bankruptj person and follows the bankrupt... everywhere
as his 'skin and bones"' 6 Under this theory, a central bankruptcy proceeding
sFor a more detailed analysis of the historical development of the U.S. law regarding the recognition
of foreign bankruptcies, see Charles D. Booth, A History of the Transnationa Aspects of United States Bankruptcy
Law Prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 9 B.U. Lrr' LJ. 1 (1991). For further, at times conflicting,
interpretations of this history, see Douglass G. Boshkoff, United States Judicial Assistance in Cross-Border
Insolvencies, 36 INT'L & Cows. L.Q. 729, 732-38 (1987) [hereinafter U.S. Judicial Assistance]; Michael S.
Fischer, Note, In the Matter of Toga Mfg. Ltd.: A Step in the Wrong Direction for International Bankruptcy,
2 INT'L PRop. INVESTmENmJ. 633, 639-41, 645-49 (1986); Brian J. Gallagher & John Hartje, The Effective-
ness of§ 304 in Achieving Efficient and Economic Equity in Transnational Insolvency, 1983 ANN. SuRv. BANut.
L. 1, 10-11, 15-16 (1983); Richard A. Gitlin, Evan D. Flaschen & David M. Grimes, American Reports-
United States Treatment of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings, chapter 4(b) in CRoss-BoRiDEE INsowENcY: CON-
PARATm DIMaNSiONS, supra note 1, at 69-71; John D. Honsberger, Conjlict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Rform
Act of 1978, 30 CAsE W. REs. L. RLav. 631, 635-36, 663-64, 667-69 (1980); Stacy Allen Morales & Bar-
bara Ann Deutcsh, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and US. Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies:-The Tyranny
of Comity, 39 Bus. LAw. 1573, 1575-83 (1984); Kurt H. Nadelmarm, Codification of Conflicts Rules for
Bankruptcy, 30 ANN. SuissE DR. INT. 57, 84-85 (1974) [hereinafter Conflicts Rules For Bankruptcy]; Kurt
H. Nadelmann, The Bankruptcy Rejfn Act and Conflict of Laws: Trial-and-Error, 29 I-hv. IN' L.J. 27,
28-33, 35, 44, 45, 47 (1988) [hereinafter The Bankruptcy Reform Act]; Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Lure in
'International Bankruptcies'of Assets Located Abroad, 33 INT'L & CoiMP. L.Q. 431, 435-36 (1984); Kurt H.
Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflt of Laws, 59 HtAv. L. Ray. 1025,1035-39,1043-45
(1946) [hereinafter The National Bankruptcy Act]; Anne Norby Nielsen, Note, Section 304 of the Bankruptcy
Code: Has It Fostered the Development of an 'International Bankruptcy System'?, 22 Cotm. J. TIRANsNATL
L. 541, 544-49 (1984); Alexander L. Paskay, Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on Foreign Debt-
ors and Creditors, 12 STETSoN L. Rav. 321, 322-36 (1983); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Status of Foreign Adminis-
trators of Insolvent Estates: A Comparative Survey, 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 288, 290-296 (1976); Barbara K.
Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies, 19 INT'L LAw. 1153, 1155-1167 (1985).
6L.J. BLoM-CooPER, supra note 1, at 11. In cases of intestacy, it has long been presumed that the intestates
movables, which "have no locality independent of his person, should be brought home, and distnlruted accord-
ing to the law of his domicil.JosPN SToRY, Co MsMsUES ON nm COsucr oF LAws § 405 (8th. ed. 1883).
In bankruptcy, movables have often been treated under the universality approach. Id. §§ 405-423(g); LJ.
BLoM-CoOPER, supra note 1, at 11.
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occurs in the jurisdiction in which the debtor is domiciled or where the debt-
or's principal place of business is located. Since this central proceeding is
intended to settle all the claims against the debtor's estate, a trustee is appointed
to collect all assets of the debtor worldwide and to seek the turnover of all
such assets to the central proceeding. All countries in which assets of the for-
eign debtor are located apply the substantive laws of the country in which the
central proceeding occurs and then order the turnover of all local assets to the
central proceeding. All creditors worldwide must submit claims in the central
proceeding, and the final adjudication is to be respected by all other nations.7
The advantages of the universality approach are that all creditors will share
equally, since their claims will be administered by the same court and under
the same law; that distributions will be higher and the administration of claims
more efficient (since duplicative proceedings and litigation will be avoided);
and that increased cooperation among bankruptcy courts worldwide will result.
The disadvantages of this approach are that local creditors might suffer incon-
venience and hardship by being forced to participate in a foreign proceeding
in which the applicable procedural and substantive laws may differ from those
of their home jurisdiction. Moreover, the universal approach needs universal,
or at least bilateral, acceptance to succeed over time.8
The contrasting territoriality approach presumes that a bankruptcy adju-
dication is limited to the res or property within the jurisdiction and does not
have extraterritorial effect. Under this approach, each country sets forth
bankruptcy laws to administer all property within its borders and will not recog-
nize the extraterritorial effect of bankruptcies adjudicated elsewhere. This lack
of cooperation leads to a full bankruptcy adjudication in every country in which
the debtor's assets are located. 9
Any advantages of this approach are generally limited to local creditors
who benefit from local preferences and do not suffer the inconvenience and
hardship of proving their claims abroad under foreign law. The primary disad-
vantage of the territoriality approach is that "it rejects, if not contravenes, the
principle of creditor equality and encourages the race to the courthouse,"'0 and
thus enables local creditors to benefit at the expense of other creditors world-
wide. The resulting multiple administrations also lead to greater costs and ineffi-
ciency in the administration of assets, and create instability for companies
engaging in international business transactions.
7Unger, supra note 5, at 1154; LJ. BLoM-COOPER, supra note 1, at 11; Honsberger, supra note 5, at 633.
See J. STORY, supra note 6, §§ 403-09.
8Honsberger, supra note 5, at 633-34; Unger, supra note 5, at 1154-55.
9Honsberger, supra note 5, at 634-35; Unger, supra note 5, at 1155. See also LJ. BLOM-CooPmR, supra
note 1, at 11; J. STORY, supra note 6, §§ 410-423(f). In bankruptcy, real property and other immovables
historically were generally treated under the territoriality approach. LJ. BLoM.COOPER, supra note 1, at
11; J. STORY, supra note 6, §§ 424-463(a).
'
0Honsberger, supra note 5, at 635. See also Unger, supra note 5, at 1155.
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Although no country adopts either approach in its pure form, these two
approaches serve as a helpful starting point from which to begin an investiga-
tion of the transnational aspects of U.S. bankruptcy law. The battle between
the territoriality and universality approaches, which is now being fought on
the international front, has long been waged in the United States. Early on,
U.S. courts rejected the universality approach in favor of the territoriality
approach, and were generally hostile toward the claims of foreign representa,
tives to local assets when they conflicted with the interests of local creditors."
For example, in Harrison v. Sterry' 2 Chief Justice Marshall held that "the bank-
rupt[cyl law of a foreign country is incapable of operating a legal transfer of
property in the United States" 3 and upheld the liens of attaching creditors
over the subsequent claim of British assignees in bankruptcy. Other courts
upheld the rights of local creditors against foreign representatives even when
the local attachments were made after the foreign bankruptcy decree.' 4
Justice Joseph Story believed that U.S. courts deciding these early cases
upheld local attachments against foreign representatives to protect the rights
of U.S. citizens from the prejudice of foreign courts. In his writings, Story tem-
pered the harsh territoriality language of Harrison by urging that problems
related to transnational insolvency would be better decided on principles of
comity, but "only so far as may be done without impairing the remedies, or les,
sening the securities, which our laws have provided for our own citizens" 16
Story was not abandoning the territoriality approach; rather, he was soften-
ing its effect by proposing that, if the interests of U.S. citizens are adequately
protected, a U.S. court should recognize the title of foreign representatives to
property in the United States.
Story's territoriality-based view of comity as the basis for the recognition
of foreign bankruptcy adjudications was followed in In re Accounting of Waite.!7
In this case, the New York Court of Appeals ordered that the funds of a partner
"lSee J. STORY, supra note 6, §§ 410-423(a); John Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments
for Creditors, I HAgv. L. Rav. 259, 260 (1888); Honsberger, supra note 5, at 635; Riesenfeld, supra note
5, at 290; Unger, supra note 5, at 1156. See, e.g., Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809).
129 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809).
"3Id. at 302. See also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Riesenfeld, supra note 5, at
292-94 (narrower reading of the nonrecognition principle in Ogden).
'4Nadelmann, Conflicts Rules for Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 84 n.161 (citing J. SToRY, supra note 6,
§§ 415 et seq. (2d. ed. 1841)); Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935) (involving dispute arising at state,
rather than international, level)). Contra Martyne v. American Union Fire Ins. Co., 216 N.Y. 183 (1915)
(also involving dispute arising at state level; affirming an order to set aside a post-dissolution attachment
by a local creditor against property claimed by an out-of-state statutory liquidator).
1SJ. STORY, supra note 6, §§ 410,414; Kurt H. Nadelmann, Solomons v. Ross and International Bankruptcy
Law, 9 MOD. L. REv. 154, 164 (1946) (discussing Story).
'6J. STORY, supra note 6, § 414. See also id. § 349; Honsberger, supra note 5, at 635; Paskay, supra note
5, at 324; Riesenfeld, supra note 5, at 293. For a discussion of Story's interpretation of comity in the non-
insolvency context, see Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARv. INT' LJ. 1, 19-24 (1991).
1799 N.Y. 433, 450 (1885).
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of a firm adjudged bankrupt in England be turned over to an English trustee
for distribution in England, but only after finding that all U.S. creditors had
previously been paid out of other assets and thus did not have a stake in the
outcome. In reaching its decision the court applied the rule that a foreign trustees
title should be recognized and enforced if it were "without injustice to our own
citizens, and without prejudice to the rights of creditors pursuing their reme-
dies here under our statutes:' and if such title were "not in conflict with the
laws or the public policy of [New York]."'8 The Waite decision was thus primarily
based on a lack of harm to U.S. creditors under the territoriality approach.
The first major case espousing the application of comity in a transnational
bankruptcy setting to the detriment of the interests of U.S. creditors was
Canada Southern Railway v. Gebhard.j9 In this case New York bondholders
brought actions in New York to recover on the bonds of a Canadian railroad
corporation undergoing reorganization in Canada. The U.S. Supreme Court
ruled against the bondholders, and held that they were bound by the Cana-
dian reorganization even though they had never assented to the scheme rati,
fied in the reorganization. Although the Canadian reorganization changed the
contractual rights of the U.S. bondholders, the court rejected the territorial-
ity contention that it would be unfair and inconvenient to force the bondholders
to assert their claims in Canada. Rather, the court claimed "that every person
who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly [sic] subjects himself to such
laws of the foreign government, affecting the powers and obligations of the cor-
poration with which he voluntarily contracts, as the known and established
policy [as] that government authorizes.2 ° In reaching its decision, the court
also relied on principles of equality and on a more universality-based view of
comity. By recognizing the validity of the Canadian reorganization scheme, the
court assured that all creditors would be treated equally.21
The principle of equality of distribution was furthered by the writings of
Judge John Lowell.22 Lowell urged courts to apply the principle of equality of
distribution, and one of his recommendations-to make presence of assets in
the United States a basis for jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases 23 -was adopted
'
8Waite, 99 N.Y. at 448. The court also noted that the partner, who was a U.S. citizen, had "invoked
and submitted to the jurisdiction of the [English] Bankruptcy Court.' Id. at 439, 449. See Unger, supra note
5, at 1157 n.17. The decision in Waite to allow a foreign representative to remove personal property not
attached by local creditors was consistent with other cases dating from that time. See Lowell, supra note
11, at 261; Nadelmann, Conflicts Rules for Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 84-85.
i9109 U.S. 527 (1883).
°10d. at 537.
1id. at 539.
22Nadelmann, Conflicts Rules for Bankruptcy, supra note 5, at 75-76, 84; Hearings, supra note 2, at 1503.
See Lowell, supra note 11.
2'Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act, supra note 5, at 1036-37 (discussing § 106 of the Lowell
Bill, S. 1382, 47th Cong., 2d Sess. (1882)).
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in the United States Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the "U.S. Bankruptcy Act"). 24
This change enabled creditors or a foreign debtor itself (but not a foreign
representative) to commence a bankruptcy case against a foreign debtor with
assets in the United States, and thereby to secure equal distribution of those
assets (which include, most importantly; voidable preferences that could not
have been set aside under nonbankruptcy law).25
However, even as Lowell's reforms were being considered, the U.S. Supreme
Court narrowed the principle of comity espoused in Gebhard. In 1895, in the
renowned case of Hilton v. Guyot,26 the Supreme Court refused to grant comity
to a French judgment on the ground of "the want of reciprocity, on the part
of France, as to the effect to be given to the judgments of this and other for-
eign countries."27 The court noted that "Itihe extent to which the law of one
nation ... shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation,
depends upon what our greatest jurists have been content to call 'the comity
of nations' "28 and espoused the now famous definition of comity:
'Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judi-
cial acts of another nation, having due regard both to inter-
national duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws.29
Thirteen years after Hilton, the U.S. Supreme Court again interpreted
comity quite narrowly, this time in a case, Disconto Gessellschaft v. Umbreit,30
involving the garnishment by a local creditor. In this case the court upheld
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision to satisfy the claims of its own
24U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) thereinafter the "U.S. Bankruptcy Act"]
(repealed 1978). Section 2(a)(1) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act vested U.S. bankruptcy courts with jurisdic-
tion, inter alia, to "[a]djudge persons bankrupt... who do not have their principal place of business, reside,
or have their domicile within the United States, but have property within their jurisdiction: 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(1)
(1970) (emphasis added).
2sSee Hearings, supra note 2, at 1443 (statement of Prof. Kurt H. Nadelmann). Earlier federal bankruptcy
laws in force from 1800 to 1803, 1841 to 1843, and 1867 to 1878 did not provide for jurisdiction over non-
resident foreign debtors. Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803); Act of Aug. 19, 1841,
ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, §§ 11, 39, 14 Stat. 517, 521,536 (repealed
1878). Kurt H. Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and Com,
pany, 52 N.YU.L. Rav. 1, 11 (1977) [hereinafter Lessons Taught by Herstatt]; Paskay, supra note 5, at 322.
26159 U.S. 113 (1895).
27Id. at 210.
281d. at 163.
291d. at 163-64.
30208 U.S. 570 (1908).
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citizens before turning over the remainder of the local assets to the foreign cred-
itor, even though the Wisconsin creditor made its garnishment after the for-
eign creditor.31
In In re Stoddard & Norske Lloyd Insurance Co. ("Norske Lloyd") 32 the New
York Court of Appeals continued to apply a territoriality-based definition of
comity, but also injected some universality notions into its analysis. In this case
the court ordered that the remaining assets of an insolvent foreign insurance
company, which had not been attached by U.S. creditors, be turned over to
the primary receiver from Norway to be administered in the foreign proceed-
ing, rather than be paid to remaining local creditors. 33 In making its decision
the Norske Lloyd court applied a territorialitybased notion of comity. Since the
case did not involve a dispute between a foreign receiver and local lien holders,
the court found that there was no "principle of equity, comity or public policy
which authorizes the application of the funds in the hands of the Superinten-
dent to payment in full of local creditors before transmission of any surplus to
the primary or domiciliary receiver."34 By basing its decision on the principle
of equality of distribution among creditors of the same class and on the ancil-
lary nature of the New York proceeding, the court also applied some elements
of the universality approach. 35
In In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll ("Kreuger & Toll"), 36 the Southern Dis-
trict of New York also applied universality notions of equality of distibution.
However, unlike the court in Norske Lloyd, this court avoided the issue of what
notion of comity it was applying. After Swedish liquidation proceedings had
3MAccord Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935) (involving dispute arising at state, rather than interna-
tional, level). Contra Martyne v. American Union Fire Ins. Co., 216 N.Y. 183 (1915) (also involving dis-
pute arising at state level; affirming an order to set aside a post-dissolution attachment by a local creditor
against property claimed by an out-of-state statutory liquidator).
If bankruptcy proceedings have not been commenced, the Disconto Gesellschaft decision "leaves each
state free to decide what, if any, type of co-operation will be forthcoming when a cross-border insolvency
occurs:' Boshkoff, US. Judicial Assistance, supra note 5, at 733. Since the federal courts must apply state
law and state choice of law rules where the court's jurisdiction is based on diversity of the parties' citizen-
ship, the recognition of foreign bankruptcies and notions of comity are matters of state law in such cases.
Id. See also EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 24.35, at 964 (1982).
32242 N.Y. 148 (1926).
33But see In re Estate of Delahanty, 11 Ariz. 366 (1908) (assistance to foreign representative not extended
to land).
34Norske Lloyd, 242 N.Y. at 163.
3"Id. at 164-65. In structuring the turnover order, the Norske Lloyd court also considered the interests
of local creditors. The court stated that the turnover of local assets would not be made "ifthere is any dan-
ger that the.., distribution thereofwill be made in a manner unfair to the domestic creditors" Id. at 167.
Therefore, since many of the domestic claims were too small to justify incurring the expenses of presenta-
tion and proof abroad, the court conditioned the transmittal of the funds to Norway on the Norwegian
court allowing local creditors the opportunity to prove and defend their claims in the United States. Id.
at 167-68.
3620 F. Supp. 964 (s.D.N.Y 1937), aff'd, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938).
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been commenced against Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll ("Kreuger & Toll"), U.S.
creditors commenced a full bankruptcy proceeding against Kreuger & Toll in
the Southern District of New York. Operating on the premise that "any action
taken by this court will be taken with a view to the most earnest cooperation with
the authorities in Sweden in the interest of all creditors'37 the court recognized
a Swedish judgment that negatively affected the rights of U.S. debenture
holders. Among the factors noted by the court in its decision were that the
Swedish proceedings had treated all creditors equally, fairly, and impartially;
that the U.S. trustee for the debenture holders had invoked the jurisdiction
of the Swedish court; and that ruling in favor of the U.S. debenture holders
would prefer them at the expense of all other creditors of Kreuger & Toll. 38 Thus,
universality principles, including equality of distribution and a more flexible
application of comity, led the court to recognize the Swedish judgment.
Into the 1970's, although territoriality-based "interests of local credi-
tors" terminology continued to appear in the decisions, many courts began to
cooperate more willingly with foreign bankruptcies and to adopt a more
universalityoriented, pro-recognition comity approach. 39 However, in the mid-
1970's before most of these pro-recognition comity decisions had been decided,
the rudimentary status and inconsistent approaches of U.S. law regarding the
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings became especially critical as U.S.
courts attempted to grapple with the insolvency of three large multinational
financial corporations40-Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt K.G.a.A. ("Herstatt"), Israel-
British Bank (London) Ltd. ("IBB"), and Banque de Financement, S.A.
("Finabank").
The Herstatt case was unreported and settled out of court.41 Herstatt,
a major West German commercial bank, suffered large foreign exchange losses
37Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. at 965 (emphasis in original) (quoting Judge Mack).
381d. at 969-70. The Norske Lloyd and Kreuger & Toll approaches should be contrasted with the
territoriality-oriented approach in Waite and early non-bankruptcy cases in which local creditors had not
attached property sought by foreign representatives. See text accompanying supra notes 17 and 18; Lowell,
supra note 11, at 261.
39See, e.g., Waxman v. Kealoha, 296 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Haw. 1969) (in recognizing right of Canadian
trustee in bankruptcy to bring action to recover debts from stockholders of bankrupt corporation, court
stated the test in terms of territoriality language but did not strictly apply the test); compare Clarkson Co.
v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976) (in recognizing right of Canadian trustee in bankruptcy to obtain
records located in the New York offices of bankrupt corporations, the court noted that exceptions to grant-
ing comity "are construed especially narrowly when the alien jurisdiction is, like Canada, a sister common
law jurisdiction, with procedures akin to [those of the United States]" id. at 629-30, and that assertions
of fraud "must be pleaded 'with particularity." Id. at 630). See also Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Serv-
ices, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255 ($.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979), discussed in note 235 infra.40See Unger, supra note 5, at 1163.
4
'For a description and analysis of the Herstatt case, see Joseph D. Becker, International Insolvency: The
Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A. J. 1290 (1976) [hereinafter The Case of Herstart]; Joseph D. Becker, Transna-
tional Insolvency Transformed, 29 Am. J. Coupn. L. 706, 707-10 (1981); Nadelmann, Lessons Taught by Her-
start, supra note 25, at 1-10, 12-14, 24.
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in connection with currency fluctuations following the 1973 oil embargo. In
June, 1974 the West German banking authorities ordered Herstatt to be liqui,
dated. Herstatt did not do business in the United States, but had millions
of dollars of its funds on deposit there with its correspondents, including
approximately $150 million with Chase Manhattan Bank. When Herstatt's
correspondents refused to honor drafts presented against the Herstatt accounts,
creditors in the United States began attaching the funds. These attachments,
in turn, were placed in jeopardy when an involuntary bankruptcy petition was
filed against Herstatt in the Southern District of New York. The attaching
creditors immediately began challenging the right of the petitioners to main-
tain the involuntary proceeding on the ground that Herstatt was a banking
corporation and that § 4(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act excluded banking cor-
porations from involuntary bankruptcy.42 The issue that the district court had
to decide was whether the exclusion of foreign banks from the juris-
diction of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act applied to foreign banks such as Herstatt
that were not engaged in the banking business in the United States.43 The
uncertainty over the resolution of this issue and the anticipated lengthy delay
led all of the involved parties to reach an agreement, and the bankruptcy case
42Section 4(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act provided that, "[a]ny natural person, except a wage earner
or farmer, and any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, except a building and loan association,
a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, owing debts to the amount of $1,000 or over, may
be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt." U.S. Bankruptcy Act, § 4(b), 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1970).
43This issue has been resolved in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Section 109(b)(3) provides that "[a) per-
son may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title only if such person is not ... (3) a foreign insurance com-
pany, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan association, building and loan association,
homestead association, or credit union, engaged in such business in the United States" 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(b)(3)
(West 1991). Such banking institutions and insurance companies are also excluded from chapter 11 under
section 109(d). Id. § 109(d). These banking institutions and insurance companies are excluded because there
are alternative provisions for their liquidation under various state and federal regulatory laws. H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 318-19, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6275-76; S. REp. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5817. Conversely, foreign banks or insur-
ance companies not engaged in such business in the United States are subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
since there are not alternative procedures for their liquidation under state and federal regulatory laws. Id.
Such institutions not engaged in such business in the United States may commence a voluntary case under
chapter 7 or chapter 11, but involuntary proceedings may only be commenced against a foreign bank that
is not engaged in such business in the United States only under chapter 7 and only if a foreign proceeding
concerning such bank is pending. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301, 303(k) (West 1991). This special protection is neces-
sary "to prevent creditors from effectively closing down a foreign bank by the commencement of an involuntary
bankruptcy case in [the United States] unless that bank is involved in a proceeding under foreign law." H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6280; S. REP. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821. One commentator correctly notes
that an inconsistency that needs to be corrected is that § 303(k) provides that the special protection for
involuntary cases applies only to "foreign banks" not engaged in such business in the United States, but
that § 109(b)(3) provides that other banking and insurance entities not engaged in such business in the
United States, in addition to foreign banks not engaged in the banking business, are eligible to be debtors.
Unger, supra note 5, at 1168-69.
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in the United States was disnissed.44
This issue of whether a foreign bank not doing business in the United States
can be the subject of bankruptcy proceedings under the U.S. Bankruptcy
Act was resolved, however, in the case involving the insolvency of IBB.45
IBB was a British bank that voluntarily commenced windingup proceedings
in England, and soon thereafter filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition in
the Southern District of New York to avoid preferential attachments and
to "insure that its assets in the United States would become available for
all general creditors and distributed amongst them equally."46 The Second Cir-
cuit upheld the bankruptcy court's ruling that the exclusion of "banking
corporations" from the U.S. Bankruptcy Act did not apply to foreign banks
not doing business in the United States.47 In reaching its decision, the Second
Circuit followed a universality approach and stressed the theme of equality
of distribution.48
Soon thereafter, the Second Circuit again followed the universality approach
in the case involving Finabank, a Swiss bank which, like Herstatt and IBB, did
not do business in the United States but did have assets on deposit there. Fina-
bank, another victim of currency speculation, was forced to seek protection
and filed a petition for relief under Swiss law. Finabank then filed a petition
in the Southern District of New York for an arrangement under Chapter XI
to avoid preferential attachments of U.S. creditors.49 The U.S. bankruptcy court
dismissed the case under § 2(a)(22)50 and Bankruptcy Rule 119, 51 but the
44Becker, Transnational Insolvency Transformed, supra note 41, at 708-09; Nadelmann, Lessons Taught
by Herstatt, supra note 25, at 8-11; Unger, supra note 5, at 1165.
43In re Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 536 F.2d 509, 512-15 (2d Cir.
1976) [hereinafter IBB], cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
"In re Israel.British Bank (London) Ltd., No. 74-B-1322 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978), Findings of
Facts, 15 (Jan. 5, 1978), reprinted in Kurt H. Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd.: Yet Another
Trans-Atlantic Crossing, 52 AM. BANm. LJ. 369, 375 (1978) [hereinafter Israel.British Bank).
47IBB, 536 F.2d at 512-15.
481d. at 513.
49In re Banque de Financement, S.A., 568 F.2d 911, 917 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Finabani.
5OEnacted under the 1962 Amendment to the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, former § 2(a)(22) authorized a
bankruptcy court to "[e]xercise, withhold, or suspend the exercise ofjurisdiction, having regard to the rights
or convenience of local creditors and to all other relevant circumstances, where a bankrupt has been adjudged
bankrupt by a court of competent jurisdiction without the United States." 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(22) (1976).
-"Adopted in 1973, former Bankruptcy Rule 119 provided:
When a proceeding for the purpose of the liquidation or rehabilitation of his estate
has been commenced by or against a bankrupt in a court of competent jurisdiction
without the United States, the court of bankruptcy may, after hearing on notice to
the petitioner or petitioners and such other persons as it may direct, having regard
to the rights and convenience of local creditors and other relevant circumstances,
dismiss a case or suspend the proceedings therein under such terms as may be
appropriate.
11 U.S.C. app. rule 119 (1976).
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Second Circuit reversed that decision after reasoning that § 2(a)(1) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Act, "by providing a jurisdictional underpinning in property located
in this country, fosters in international situations one of the basic purposes of
the [U.S. Bankruptcy] Act, i.e. equal distribution among creditors. "52
In the Second Circuit's universality approach analysis, equality of
distribution outweighed parochial protection of U.S. creditors and justified
the U.S. segment of an international proceeding functioning "essentially as
an instrument to set aside preferences " ' To foster that purpose, the court
explicitly rejected the bankruptcy court's contention (and reliance on
Disconto Gesellschaft) that the preferential attachments of U.S. creditors were
"rights" to be protected by the U.S. courts.5 4 Rather, the Second Circuit
stressed that local creditors were only to be protected against being forced
"to participate in foreign proceedings in which their claims [would] be treated
in some manner inimical to this country's policy of equality."55
The bankruptcy judge in IBB (which was still an active case when the
Second Circuit issued its decision in Finabank) relied heavily on the Second
Circuit's opinion in Finabank in his decision to suspend the U.S. proceedings
and order the transfer of assets in the United States to the English liquidators
to be administered by them in the English proceedings for the benefit of all cred-
itors of IBB. The primary legal justifications for the bankruptcy court's
universalitybased decision were to further equality of distribution, to cooperate
with the English courts, and to avoid duplication of efforts.56 The bankruptcy
judge concluded that his decision "would have regard to the rights and
convenience of local creditors."57
The bankruptcy court's turnover orders in IBB,- based on the Second
Circuit's universality approach in both IBB and Finabank, epitomize the
extent to which the territoriality approach set forth in Harrison had given
way to greater cooperation among U.S. and foreign bankruptcy courts
by the time that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code was enacted. Under the IBB
and Finabank approach, the interests of U.S. creditors were still to be
protected, but within the framework of ensuring equality of distribution.
52Finabank, 568 F.2d at 918.
"Id. at 918-19.
1Id. at 921.
"Id. The court also stressed the importance of cooperation in the cross-border insolvency context, id.
at 918-19, and the need to avoid duplication of efforts. Id. at 921.
_'In re Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd., No. 74-B-1322 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978), Conclusions
of Law, 2-5 (Jan. 5, 1978) [hereinafter IBB, Conclusions], reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank,
supra note 46, at 380-81.
57IBB, Conclusions, supra note 56, 6, reprinted in Nadelmann, Israel-British Bank supra note 46, at 381.
5SIBB, Order (Jan. 5, 1978); IBB, Order Authorizing Trustee to Turn Over Funds to U.K. Liquidators
and to Pay Administration Claims (Dec. 19, 1978) [hereinafter "IBB Turnover Orders"].
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But this is not to say that the universality approach had completely replaced
the territoriality approach. As the following discussion of§ 304 demonstrates,
the debate continues.
II. Current Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies and the Options Available
to a Foreign Representative for Protecting the Assets of a Foreign Debtor
in the United States
Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code a foreign representative 59 has three
options available for protecting the assets of a foreign debtor that are located
in the United States: (1) filing a petition under § 304 to commence a case ancil-
lary to a foreign proceeding; (2) filing a petition under § 303(b)(4) to commence
an involuntary case against the foreign debtor under chapter 7 (liquidation)
or chapter 11 (reorganization);60 or (3) seeking dismissal of a case or suspen-
sion of all proceedings under § 305(a)(2). 61
39Section 101(24) defines "foreign representative" as a "duly selected trustee, administrator, or other
representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(24) (West 1991). Section 101(23),
in turn, defines "foreign proceeding" as a "proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and whether or
not under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place
of business, or principal assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of
liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization7
Id. § 101(23).
60A foreign debtor may also file a petition under § 301 to commence a voluntary case under chapter
7 or chapter 11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1991). See In re Florida Peach Corp. of America, Int., 63 B.R.
833 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986). Also, under § 303, creditors may commence an involuntary case against a
foreign debtor under chaper 7 or chapter 11. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West 1991) (restrictions are included in
§ 303(k). Id. § 303(k). See supra note 43). However, under the hotchpot rule in § 508, any distribution that
a creditor receives in a U.S. bankruptcy case must take into account any payment received by that creditor
in a foreign proceeding. 11 U.S.C.A. § 508(a) (West 1991).
In addition, a foreign trustee who is the exclusive representative of a foreign bankrupt debtor and
its creditors is a "creditor" under § 101(10) entitled to file the sole proof of claim on behalf of the foreign
debtor and its creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and need not bring
a § 304 ancillary proceeding to submit such a claim. In re Enercons Virginia, Inc., 812 F.2d 1469
(4th Cir. 1987); 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10) (West 1991). However, a foreign debtor's creditors might be
able to act independently of the foreign representative if the foreign law "did not clearly confer a privi-
leged status on the foreign representative" to act as the sole representative of the foreign debtor's estate.
Douglass G. Boshkoff, American Reports-The American Judicial System and Cross-Border Insolvencies,
chapter 4(a) in CRoss-BorDEER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE DiaNsioNs, supra note 1, at 66 [hereinafter
American Reports].
611l U.S.C.A. §§ 305(a)(2), (b) (West 1991). See In re Axona International Credit & Commerce Ltd.,
88 B.R. 597, 606 (Bankr. S.D.NY. 1988), aff'd, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d
31 (2d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Axona].
Rather than seeking relief under § 304, the foreign representative may choose to vacate local attach-
ments under state law and seek the granting of comity. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs.
AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Salen 1J; Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825
F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Salen II].
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A. SECTION 304 (CASES ANCILLARY TO FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS)6 2
1. Background
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 304 provides as foll6ws:
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by
the filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under this
section by a foreign representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section,
if a party in interest does not timely controvert the petition,
or after trial, the court may-
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of-
(A) any action against-
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such
foreign proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor
with respect to such property, or any act or the commence-
ment or continuation of any judicial proceeding to create
or enforce a lien against the property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the pro-
ceeds of such property, to such foreign representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection
(b) of this section, the court shall be guided by what will best
assure an economical and expeditious administration of such
estate, consistent with-
62For articles that discuss § 304 and related matters in some detail, see Boshkoff, U.S.Judicial Assistance,
supra note 5, at 739-50; Boshkoff, American Reports, supra note 60; Terri P. Finister, 1988 Developments
and the Conflicts Arising Under Section 304, 6 BANKR. DEv. J. 345 (1989); Fischer, supra note 5, at 640-51;
Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 3-21; Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The International Void
in the Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAw. 307, 315-22 (1987); Gitlin, Flaschen, & Crimes,
supra note 5, at 71-88; Thomas C. Given & Victor A. Vilaplana, Comity Reisited: Multinational Bankruptcy
Cases Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 1983 Asuz. ST. .J. 325, 329-40 (1983); Daniel M. Glos-
band & Christopher T. Katucki, Current Developments in International Insolvency Law and Practice, 45 Bus.
LAW. 2273 (1990) [hereinafter Current Developments]; L.F.E. Goldie, The Challenge ofTransnational Expec-
tations and the Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Decrees-The United States Adjustment, 58 BRIT. YB. INT'L
L. 303, 308-23, 329-39 (1987); Eric W. Lam, Bankruptcy Code Section 304(b)(3): "Other Appropriate Relief"
for Multinational Bankruptcy, 16 BRooKLYN J. INr'L L. 479 (1990); Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 5, at
1583-97; Nadelmann, The Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 5, at 35-46; Nielsen, supra note 5, at 549-73;
Timothy E. Powers & Rona R. Mears, Protecting a U.S. Debtor's Assets in International Bankruptcy: A Sur-
vey and Proposal for Reciprocity, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COm. REo. 303, 341-46 (1985); Pauline M. Stevens,
The Interpenetration of Foreign Bankruptcy Laws in Domestic Proceedings Under H.R. 8200, 52 AM. BAsqsmt.
LJ. 61 (1978); Donald T Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29 HARv. INT'L
LJ. 49 (1988); Unger, supra note 5, at 1167-78.
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(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or
interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States
against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of
claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions
of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially
in accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a
fresh start for the individual that such foreign proceed-
ing concerns.63
Authorizing a foreign representative to commence a case ancillary to a foreign
proceeding was an innovation of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 intended
to address the problems caused by the insolvencies of Herstatt, Finabank, and
IBB in the 1970's.64 Section 304 attempts to facilitate the cooperation of
bankruptcy courts worldwide by creating a mechanism that enables U.S.
bankruptcy courts "to accommodate the special needs of [foreign] representa-
tives... charged with the responsibility of securing the debtor's United States
assets for the benefit of all creditors.' 6-The drafters of this innovation believed
that, 'fr]ecognition accorded a foreign trustee or representative pursuant
to subdivisions (b) and (c) [of§ 4-103, a predecessor draft provision of §§ 304
and 305]66 should enhance the likelihood that a trustee of an estate appointed
6311 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West 1991).
64Paskay, supra note 5, at 334-36; Unger, supra note 5, at 1167. See, also, Reisenfeld, supra note 5, at
288-89; Nielsen, supra note 5, at 547-48. See generally Becker, The Case of Herstatt, supra note 41; Becker,
Transnational Insolvency Transformed, supra note 41; Nadelmann, Lessons Taught by Herstatt, supra note 25.
See also 2 CorL.um ON BA NmtIWPTY, 304.01 at 304-5 (Lawrence P. King ed. 15th ed. 1992); 2 COLLmER
BANuWPTCY PRACTICE GUME, 19.02 at 19-5 to -6 (Asa S. Herzog & Lawrence P. King eds. 1992). For
a discussion of Herstatt, Finabank, and IBB, see text accompanying supra notes 40 to 58.
632 CoLiER ON BANKOtcrUY, supra note 64, 304.01 at 304-4.
6Section 4-103, entitled Administration of Debtors' Estates Involving More Than One Country, was a
section of the draft bill completed in 1978 by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.
REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BAta tRuTcY LAws oF TM UN TD STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pts. 1-2 (1973) [hereinafter "CommSSoN REPoRT"1. Section 4-103 provided as follows:
(a) Complaint by Debtor or Creditor to Obtain Dismissal or Suspension of Case When
a Foreign Proceeding is Pending. When a proceeding for the purpose of the liquida-
tion or rehabilitation of his estate has been commenced in a court of competent juris-
diction in another country by or against a debtor who is also a debtor in a case filed
under this Act, the debtor or a creditor may file a complaint in the bankruptcy court
seeking dismissal or suspension of the case commenced under this Act.
(b) Petition or Complaint by a Foreign Trustee or Administrator. A trustee, adminis-
trator, or other representative of a debtor's estate appointed in a proceeding in a court
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or elected in this country [would] be accorded respect when he sue[d] to recover
property located abroad."'67
There was no provision comparable to § 304 in the U.S. Bankruptcy Act.68
Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Act, a foreign representative could not commence
a bankruptcy case in the United States.69 However, as a matter of comity,
of competent jurisdiction in another country for the purpose of its liquidation or
rehabilitation may file any of the following pleadings in the bankruptcy court:
(1) a petition as a creditor pursuant to section 4-205 of this Act if the debtor
is subject to involuntary relief as provided in section 4-204;
(2) a complaint seeking dismissal or suspension of a case commenced under
this Act by or against the debtor;
(3) a complaint seeking an injunction to stay the commencement or continu-
ation of any action against the debtor, or the enforcement of any judgment
against him, or of any act or the commencement or continuation of any court
proceeding to create or enforce any lien against his property; or
(4) a complaint seeking delivery of the property of the debtor's estate or its
proceeds.
(c) Power and Discretion of the Court. After a hearing on notice issued pursuant to
the filing of a complaint under subdivision (a) or clause (1) or (2) of subdivision (b),
the bankruptcy court may dismiss, suspend, or continue the case commenced under
this Act on such terms as may be appropriate. In addition, the court may issue injunc-
tions, turnover orders, and other appropriate relief in a proceeding under this sec-
tion, whether or not a petition has been filed by or against the debtor under this Act. In
exercising its discretion under this section, the court shall be guided by a considera-
tion of what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of the
debtor's estate consistent with the objectives of fair and equitable treatment for all
creditors, the protection of local creditors against prejudice and inconvenience in the
processing of their claims, the avoidance of preferential and fraudulent dispositions
of the debtor's property, the distribution of proceeds substantially in accord with
the order prescribed by this Act, and, where appropriate, the provision of an oppor-
tunity for a fresh start for the debtor.
Id., § 4-103 (emphasis in original).
The provisions of§ 4-103 of the CoMMassIoN REPORT remain in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, but have
been incorporated into different sections. All provisions relating to the dismissal or suspension of a case
are now included in § 305, which governs abstention; § 4-103(b)(1), which permitted the foreign represen,
tative to commence an involuntary case, has been incorporated into § 303, which governs involuntary peti-
tions; and all provisions regarding ancillary relief have been incorporated into § 304. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 303,
304, 305 (West Supp. 1991).
67CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 66, § 4-103 n.2.
It should be noted that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code adopts the universality approach towards the for-
eign assets of a U.S. debtor. Under § 541(a), the estate is comprised of property "wherever located and by
whomever held." 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). This continues the policy that
was made explicit in the 1952 amendment to § 70 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act. Pub. L. No. 82-456, 66
Stat. 420 (1952) (repealed 1978). See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Revision of Conflicts Provisions in the American
Bankruptcy Act, 1 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 484, 484-86 (1952); Honsberger, supra note 5, at 659-660.
682 COLLIER BANKRuPTcy PRAcTcE GuImE, supra note 64, 19.06 at 19-11. See also id., 19.02 at 19-6,
19.08 at 19-15. See 2 COLLIER ON BAsNRup'rcY, supra note 64, 304.01 at 304-4 to -5.
612 COLLIER ON BANiruuTrcy, supra note 64, 304.01 at 304-4 to -5. Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Act,
only the debtor or its creditors could initiate insolvency proceedings in U.S. bankruptcy courts. Hearings,
supra note 2, at 1443 (statement of Prof. Kurt H. Nadelmann).
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U.S. courts often recognized claims asserted by foreign representatives and
deferred to foreign insolvency administrations. 70 Congress enacted § 304 "to
implement the long standing policy of this country in extending comity to for,
eign bankruptcy proceedings' 71
There is no full and conventional bankruptcy case under § 304.72 More-
over, the foreign representative need not commence a fluil bankruptcy case under
another section of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to make use of § 304.73 Rather,
an ancillary case is commenced in the United States in aid of the principal insol-
vency proceeding abroad.74 The more limited purposes of the ancillary case
are "to administer assets located in this country, to prevent dismemberment
by local creditors of assets located here, or for other appropriate relief."7
2. Commencement of the § 304 Case and Threshold Requirements-
Eligibility for Relief Jurisdiction, and Venue
A foreign representative commences a case ancillary to a foreign proceed-
ing under § 304 by filing a verified petition 76 with the bankruptcy court. 77
702 COLLER oN BaNumwrcY, supra note 64, 304.01 at 304-5. See generally text in Part I supra.
71In re Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674, 676 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); accord Salen II, 825 F.2d at 713-14. See H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281; S. RaP. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821.
72In addition, a separate estate is not created under § 541, because that section omits any reference
to § 304. Boshkoff, American Reports, supra note 60, at 77. Section 541(a) provides that "[t]he commence,
ment of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate" 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a) (West
Supp. 1991).
73See H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281; S.
RaP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821.
74Axona, 88 B.R. at 606; In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 130 B.R. 705, 710 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991) [hereinafter Koreag].
7'H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281; S. RaP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821.
76The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require the verification by the debtor of all petitions and
accompanying papers. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1008 (West 1991). See also id. 9011. Section 1746 of title 28 of the
United States Code [hereinafter "U.S.C."] provides that:
[w]herever, under any law of the United States or under any rule... made pursuant
to law, any matter is required or permitted to be... proved by the sworn... verifi-
cation... in writing of the person making the same... such'matter may, with like
force and effect, be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by the unsworn decla-
ration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing of such person which is sub-
scribed by him, as true under penalty of perjury.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1746 (West Supp. 1991).
711 U.S.C.A. § 304(a) (West Supp. 1991).
Section 1334(a) of title 28 of the U.S.C. provides that "the district courts shall have original and exclu-
sive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11" 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(a) (West 1991). Section 1334(b) provides
that "the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction ofall civil proceedings arising under
title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11" Id. § 1334(b). Section 1410 places venue in the appropri-
ate district court. Id. § 1410. Section 157(a) of title 28 permits district courts to refer "any or all cases under
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The foreign representative should file the petition with the clerk,78 and on fil-
ing, "the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons for service... on the parties
against whom relief is sought pursuant to § 304(b) ... and on such other par-
ties as the court may direct."79
The filing of a petition under § 304 does not guarantee that relief will be
ordered, and § 304(b) provides that a "party in interest" may controvert the
petition.80 Controverted "petitions are governed in general by the procedural
title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 ... to
the bankruptcy judges for the district." Id. § 157(a). And § 151 of title 28 designates bankruptcy judges
in regular active service as a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court and provides
that each bankruptcy judge "may exercise the authority conferred under this chapter with respect to any
action, suit, or proceeding.' Id. § 151.
Sections 301, 302, 303, and 304 provide that cases under the respective section are commenced by fil-
ing the petition with the bankruptcy court, rather than with the district court. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301, 302,
303, 304 (West 1991).
When the foreign representative petitions for ancillary relief, the representative receives no substan-
tive rights with respect to the foreign debtor's property located in the United States-the foreign represen-
tative is merely given standing to seek discretionary relief. Hearings, supra note 2, at 1510 (statement of
Prof. Stefan A. Riesenfeld).
Section 306 provides that "[a]n appearance in a bankruptcy court by a foreign representative in con-
nection with a petition or request under section 303, 304, or 305... does not submit such foreign represen-
tative to the jurisdiction of any court in the United States for any other purpose." 11 U.S.C.A. § 306 (West
1991). However, the bankruptcy court is permitted under § 306 to "condition any order under section 303,
304, or 305... on compliance by such foreign representative with the orders of such bankruptcy court."
Id. This section was designed to enable the bankruptcy court to enforce its orders that are necessary under
§ 303, 304, or 305. H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325-26, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6282; S. RaP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5822.
Although an appearance in a bankruptcy court by a foreign representative in connection with a § 304
petition does not submit the foreign representative to the court's jurisdiction for any other purpose, actions
in furtherance ofgranted § 304 relief could subject the foreign representative to such jurisdiction. See Seid-
man & Seidman v. Gee, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7503 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1989), where plaintiff, an accounting
firm for a defunct Cayman Island's company, sued Gee (the liquidator of the company) for breach of con-
tract and fraud. The liquidator, who had earlier petitioned for and received § 304 relief, argued inter alia
that the court lacked jurisdiction over his person. The court rejected this argument, and reasoned as fol-
lows: "Putting aside activities arguably required by his appearance in the bankruptcy proceedings in New
York which may be excluded from consideration under 11 U.S.C. [§] 306, Gee engaged in other New York
activities which make him amenable to process in this case. These included his employment of New York
attorneys in connection with his prospective suit against Seidman and his negotiation and execution of the
April 21, 1986 tolling agreement" Id. at 4-5.
78Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1002 (West 1991).
79Id. 1010 (this rule also provides for the manner of service).
8011 U.S.C.A. § 304(b) (West 1991). "Party in interest" is not defined in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The legislative history, however, states that:
the phrase "on request of a party in interest" ... is used in connection with an action
that the court may take in various sections of the [U.S. Bankruptcy] Code. The phrase
is intended to restrict the court from acting sua sponte. Rules of bankruptcy proce-
dure or court decisions will determine who is a party in interest for the particular
purposes of the provision in question.
124 CoNO. REc. H11,090 (Sept. 28, 1978); id. S17,407 (Oct. 6,1978). A party in interest includes the debtor.
2 COLLIER ON BANRupTcy, supra note 64, 1 304.06 at 304-14.
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procedural rules applicable to involuntary petitions, including the provisions
for summary relief, notwithstanding the provision in § 304(b) for relief 'after
trial"' 8' Acceptable grounds for such a challenge include matters related to the
eligibility of the debtor for relief, jurisdiction, venue, or the failure of the for-
eign proceeding to satisfy the § 304(c) factors,s2 all of which are discussed below.
The foreign representative must establish that a foreign proceeding involving
the debtor has been commenced,8 3 and that she has been duly appointed in
the standard manner for the foreign proceeding.8 4 The U.S. bankruptcy court
should defer to the laws of the foreign country that determine the legitimacy
of a foreign proceeding or the appointment of a foreign representative.8
The definition of "foreign proceeding" as a "proceeding, whether judicial
or administrative,"86 leaves in doubt the status of both the private appointment
of a receiver under a floating charge and the private appointment of a trustee
under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. These issues have not
been raised in any reported § 304 case.87 The Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide
states that "[tjhe definition of a 'foreign representative' would not appear to
be broad enough to include the private appointment of a receiver and manager
upon crystallization of a floating charge under Canadian or English law."88
Another commentator, John D. Honsberger, agrees.8 9
However, a contrasting view is offered by Professor Douglass G. Boshkoff.
He argues that a receiver privately appointed under a floating charge should
be permitted to commence a § 304 proceeding: "No American bankruptcy
policy will be advanced by refusing to do so. Once this type of receiver has
been appointed, liquidation will take place and American courts, in one
way or another, need to consider whether comity will be extended to the
foreign activity."90 Boshkoff's position is supported by the more persuasive policy
argument. At the technical level, his argument is further bolstered by the
fact that the word "or" in § 101(23) is not exclusive, 91 and therefore the ab-
sence of any reference in § 101(23) to the private appointment of a receiver
812 Coaiea oN BAituPTrcy, supra note 64, 304.06 at 304-14; In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621,624 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982). See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1018 (West 1991).82See Powers & Mears, supra note 62, at 343; Given & Vlaplana, supra note 62, at 331.
83See supra note 59.
84Honsberger, supra note 5, at 651. See supra note 59.
852 Cou.mi BAsxtwrcy PRAcncE GumE, supra note 64, 19.05f1] at 19-10; Gallagher & Hartje, supra
note 5, at 3-4.
8611 U.S.C.A. § 101(23) (West 1991).
"
7Compare In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 129 B.R. 147 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (granting § 304 relief in
a case ancillary to a court ordered receivership of a Canadian corporation).
882 CoLLR BAmmutRcY PFACTICE GumE, supra note 64, 19.04[1] at 19-9.
8gHonsberger, supra note 5, at 652 (also noting that the private appointment of a trustee under a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors would be excluded).
90Boshkoff, US. Judicial Assistance, supra note 5, at 742-43.
9111 U.S.C.A. § 102(5) (West 1991) (rules of construction).
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under a floating charge or the private appointment of a trustee under a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors does not necessarily exclude such types
of proceedings. In any case, an amendment to § 101(23), incorporating the pri-
vate appointment of a receiver (or a receiver and manager) under a floating
charge and the private appointment of a trustee under a general assignment
for the benefit of creditors into the definition of "foreign proceeding" would
correct the present uncertainty under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. It would also
explicitly signal to other jurisdictions that, to be recognized for purposes of a
§ 304 proceeding, a foreign proceeding need not be identical to a U.S. proceeding.
However, even if this amendment is made, a privately appointed receiver or
trustee would still have to comply with the criteria for obtaining relief under
§ 304(c). Since such a receiver often protects the interests of only one credi-
tor, which conflict with the interests of other creditors, such a foreign proceeding
may violate the just treatment of creditors requirement contained in § 304(c)(1).
If so, this would likely cause the U.S. bankruptcy court to deny relief.92
The next issue that arises is what connection the foreign debtor must have
with the foreign country. Section 101(23) requires that the foreign proceeding
be "in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place
of business, or principal assets were located at the commencement of such
proceeding. 93 Professor Donald T. Trautman approaches this section from a
choice of law perspective and rightly argues as follows:
It makes sense that the foreign proceeding entitled to defer-
ence under section 304 should be the foreign proceeding which
would have control under a universalist approach to bank-
ruptcy. Under that approach, there would be a unique juris-
diction where all assets would be collected and to which all
creditors would go for their distributions. It is almost univer-
sally agreed that the jurisdiction for a business enterprise is
its principal place of business. All conventions use that choice-
of-law test to determine the appropriate place for a single
proceeding that is to adjudicate bankruptcy. 94
Under current law (although such a case has not yet arisen), it is possible for
two foreign representatives -one from the country in which the debtor's prin-
92But see Boshkoff, U.S. Judicial Assistance, supra note 5, at 742-43 n.64 (citing two non-§ 304 cases,
Clarkson Co. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 441 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1977) and Hammond Screw Machinery
Co. v. Sullivan, 580 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Im1. 1984), in which the respective U.S. courts recognized a receiver
appointed under a floating charge).
9311 U.S.C.A. § 101(23) (West 1991).
94Trautman, supra note 62, at 55. But see the English approach. In England the primary test is the place
of incorporation. P. SmART, supra note 1, at 110. Trautman correctly observes that the choice of law issue
has received little attention in the cases and § 304 guidelines. See Trautman, supra note 62, at 51. See also
Given & Vilaplana, supra note 62, at 338-39 (also raising the choice of law issue).
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cipal place of business is located, and another from the country in which the
debtor's principal assets are located, to come to the United States and seek
§ 304 relief. To avoid this possible conflict, Professor Trautman recommends
that the term "principal assets" be deleted from § 101(23) 9- "and that, for an
incorporated debtor, the appropriate test [be] the principal place of business."96
He also proposes that the appropriate location for an individual in bankruptcy
be the individual's domicile. 97 These proposals for restricting the appropriate
"foreign proceeding" would increase the likelihood that relief would be granted
under § 304 to a foreign representative from the appropriate jurisdiction.
Although not expressly mandated, another eligibility requirement should
be that the foreign law authorizes the foreign representative to come to the
United States and attempt to protect and recover the foreign debtor's prop-
erty.98 Moreover, if the foreign representative seeks the application in the United
States of the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction, she should also prove
that the foreign law is intended to have effect abroad.99 Some § 304 cases have
discussed these matters. 0
One of the most important preliminary issues is whether in a case com-
menced under section 304 the foreign debtor must be a "debtor" as defined
in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or need only qualify for insolvency administra-
95lautman, supra note 62, at 55 n.34.
91M. at 57 n.43. Trautman notes that "[t]his statement presupposes that the enterprise has an obvious
center of its activities in one country." Id. at 56 n.37. In cases where there is no obvious center, the court's
choice, of course, would be more difficult. See infra note 244.
9rllautman, supra note 62, at 57 n.43.
9SThe authority of the foreign representative could be proved by reference to provisions under foreign
law. This is the rule in England. See P. S MsT, supra note 1, at 139. Such authority could also possibly be
proved by reference to judicial authorization, such as a court order. See also Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes, supra
note 5, at 78.
991 am indebted to Philip Smart for stressing the importance of these two points. If a U.S. court applied
the substantive law of a foreign country that was not intended to have effect abroad, this would lead to
the incongruous universal application of a law intended to have only territorial effect.
10°See, e.g., In re Goerg, 844 .2d 1562, 1563 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting that the West German court
had (1) held that the debtor's bankrupt estate included the debtor's property located abroad and (2) authorized
the German bankruptcy trustee to take possession of that property), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989);
Koreag, 130 B.R. at 711-12 (noting that under Swiss law the foreign debtor had property in the United
States); In re Lines, 81 B.R. 267, 272-74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting, in discussing whether the foreign
representatives acting on behalf of a debtor being wound up in Bermuda had authority to deal with
property located in the United States, that "section 174 [of the Bermuda Companies Act] provides for
a liquidator to take custody of or control all property to which the company 'is or may be entitled*" Id.
at 272 (quoting § 174 (1) Bermuda Companies Act)); In re A. Tarricone, Inc., 80 B.R. 21, 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1987) (finding that "the foreign representative ha[d] not pleaded any substantive foreign law which would
support his claim" for recovering a fraudulent transfer in the United States under German law); Metzeler,
78 B.R. at 677 (foreign representative from Germany was vested with avoidance powers under foreign
law that were applicable abroad); In re Toga Mfg., 28 B.R. 165, 167 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.) (under Canadian
bankruptcy law money located in the United States was considered property of the Canadian debtor's
estate).
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tion under foreign law. In re Goerg'01 is the first case that directly addressed
this important question. This case arose when a foreign representative filed
a § 304 petition on behalf of the estate of an insolvent West German decedent.
The foreign representative requested the U.S. bankruptcy court to order that
the decedent's estate's assets located in Georgia be turned over to him for dis-
tribution in the West German bankruptcy proceeding. The bankruptcy court
concluded that, although eligible for relief under West German law, an insol-
vent decedent's estate is not eligible for relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The district court affirmed. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
however, and held that a foreign decedent's estate may qualify for administra
tion under § 304j02
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, although the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's
definition of "person," and therefore its definition of "debtor," excludes insol-
vent decedents' estates,0 3 this exclusion did not apply in the context of a case
ancillary to a foreign proceeding under § 304. The court viewed this conclu-
sion as a sensible resolution of an anomaly in the definition of "foreign proceed-
ing." On the one hand, the definition of "foreign proceeding" makes reference
to "the debtor,"04 thereby suggesting "that the subject of the foreign proceed-
ing must qualify as a 'debtor' under United States bankruptcy law."105 On the
other hand, the definition of "foreign proceeding" states that "foreign proceeding"
means "'proceeding. .. whether or not under bankruptcy law ... for the
purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension,
or discharge, or effecting a reorganization,"' 0 6 thereby providing "that the
foreign proceeding need not even be a bankruptcy proceeding, either under
1-0844 F.2d 1562 (lth Cit. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989).
'°
2Goerg, 844 F.2d at 1568.
103More specifically, the court reasoned as follows-§ 101(13) defines "debtor" as a "person or munici-
pality." 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(13) (West 1991). Under section 101(41) the term "person" "includes individual,
partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental unit.' 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(41) (West 1991).
However, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code did not exclude decedents' estates from the definition of "person";
the word "includes" in the definition of"person" is not limiting. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 102(3) (West 1991) (rules
of construction). Nevertheless, Congress intended to exclude insolvent decedents' estates from the defini
tion of "person." First, Congress listed "person" and "estate" separately in the definition of "entity." 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 101(15) (West 1991). Second, the legislative history states that "[tlhe definition [of person] does not include
an estate or trust.' H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 313, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6270; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5811. And lastly,
U.S. courts have uniformly agreed that insolvent decedents' estates are ineligible for relief under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. Goerg, 844 F.2d at 1565-66. The Goerg court failed to mention that under § 109(a) "only
a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States, or a municipal-
ity, may be a debtor under [title 111." 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West 1991) (emphasis added).
0-411 U.S.C.A. § 101(23) (West 1991). See supra note 59.
l°5Goerg, 844 F.2d at 1566.
0 61d. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (Supp. IV 1986), now 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(23) (West 1991) (empha-
sis added by court)).
(Vol. 66
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN BANKRUPTCIES
foreign or United States law. 107 In addition, "'foreign proceeding' includes a
proceeding 'for the purpose of liquidating an estate," even though a decedents
estate does not qualify as a "debtor" under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 08
The court resolved this anomaly by examining the purposes behind § 304.
The court reasoned that Congress enacted § 304 to improve the efficiency of
foreign insolvency proceedings involving assets in the United States. Since §
304 was intended to make ancillary administrations available in aid of foreign
proceedings and not to require the commencement of fil bankruptcy adminis-
trations, "it would make little sense to require that the subject of the foreign
proceeding qualify as a 'debtor' under United States bankruptcy law."19 There-
fore, the court concluded that:
the debtor in a section 304 proceeding need not qualify as a
'debtor' under the [U.S. Bankruptcy] Codes definition of that
term. Rather, the debtor need only be properly subject, under
applicable foreign law, to a proceeding commenced 'for the pur-
pose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition,
extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization" 0
This conclusion rightly furthers the use of § 304 as a procedural device to assist
primary foreign proceedings,"' and increases the likelihood that U.S. courts
will defer to foreign proceedings that are somewhat different from their U.S.
counterparts (assuming, of course, that the other criteria for granting relief have
been met). 12
After it is determined that the foreign debtor need only qualify for insol-
vency administration under foreign law to proceed under § 304, the next issue
that arises is whether a foreign debtor must fulfill the other eligibility require-
ments that a debtor must satisfy in a full case under chapter 7 or 11; in short,
whether a foreign debtor need only comply with the requirements of§ 109(a),
or must also comply with the requirements of§ 109(b) or (d), as the case may be.
Section 109(a) provides that "fn]otwithstanding any other provision of this sec-
tion, only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property
1071d. at 1566-67.
1081d. at 1567 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(22) (Supp. IV 1986), now 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(23) (West 1991)).
109d. at 1568.
"Old. Implicit in the court's conclusion is that the foreign debtor also need not qualify as a "person"
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's definition of that term.
"'Boshkoff, US. Judicial Assistance, supra note 5, at 740-41. See also Gallagher & Hartje, supra note
5, at 4.
'
1 2See Boshkoff, U.S.Judidal Assistance, supra note 5, at 740-43. The Goerg court asserted that "it would
make eminent sense for Congress to define expansively the class of foreign insolvency proceedings for which
ancillary assistance is available." Goerg, 844 F.2d at 1568. Congressional action certainly could resolve the
confusion in this area.
After the foreign representative in Goerg filed an amended and restated § 304 petition, the bankruptcy
court "entered an order abstaining from or, alternatively, dismissing jurisdiction pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
305." In re Goerg, 930 F.2d 1563, 1565 (11th Cir. 1991).
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in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under [title 11]."113
Section 109(b)(3) provides that a person may be a debtor under chapter 7 (or
under chapter 11, pursuant to § 109(d)14) only if such a person is not "a for-
eign insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan
association, building and loan association, homestead association, or credit
union, engaged in such business in the United States." 1 The courts in In re
Gee 1 6 and In re Lines, 7 held that the foreign debtor need only comply with
§ 109(a), since a § 304 case is not a case under chapter 7 or 11."1s Two other
courts, in In re Culmer 9 and Angulo v. Kedzep Ltd.' 120 however, have required
that the foreign debtor also fulfill the requirements of§ 109(b).121 Of these two
approaches, the Gee and Lines approach is the more sensible one, and is con-
sistent with the approach taken by the Goerg court. By filing a petition under
§ 304, the foreign representative seeks the assistance of a U.S. bankruptcy court
in aid of a primary proceeding abroad, and not the commencement of a full case
under chapter 7 or 11 and the related protections of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
and therefore the criteria contained in § 109(b) or (d) should not apply.'2 2 Also,
for the purposes of satisfying § 109(a), some courts have held that the foreign
debtor's assets may include assets allegedly fraudulently transferred to third
parties. 23
The courts in a number of§ 304 cases have further required that to qualify
for § 304 relief the foreign debtor must meet the jurisdictional requirement
n311 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West 1991).
141d. § 109(d).
1151d. § 109(b)(3).
11653 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
11781 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
l'Gee, 53 B.R. at 900 ("since a [section] 304 case is one which does not administer an estate as such
but simply aids a foreign bankruptcy, there is little reason to exclude a debtor ineligible for chapter 11 relief
from being the subject of a case under section 304"); Lines, 81 B.R. at 271 ("[a]n ancillary proceeding under
§ 304 is not a Chapter 7 proceeding or a Chapter 11 proceeding; nor is it a full scale bankruptcy proceed-
ing. Thus, sections 109(b) and (d), by their terms, simply do not apply"). See also 2 COLusR ON BANKuwrrcy,
supra note 64, 109.01 at 109-4; Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 62, at 317, 319.
11925 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
12029 B.R. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
121Culmer, 25 B.R. at 624, where creditors filed a motion to dismiss the § 304 petition on the ground
that the debtor did not comply with the requirements of§ 109(b)(3). The court denied the motion on fimd-
ing that the debtor complied with § 109(b)(3). In Angulo, 29 B.R. at 418, the court indicated that owning
assets in the United States and qualifying as a debtor under Chapter 11 were necessary to meet the "threshold
prerequisites for application of section 304".
122Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 62, at 319; Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes, supra note 5, at 87.
123See Metzeler, 78 B.R. at 678-80 (a foreign representative may bring a § 304 petition based on foreign
substantive law to recover property located in the United States); Tarricone, 80 B.R. at 23 (the fact that
the foreign debtor has no property in the United States other than "funds allegedly transferred to defen-
dants here does not detract from the foreign representative's right to look to section 304 to recover these
funds"); In re Stuppel, 17 B.R. 413, 415 (S.D. Fla. 1981) [hereinafter Stuppel III (an allegation of a fraudu-
lent transfer of property in the United States satisfies "the Section 304 requirement of property 'involved
in' the foreign proceeding'). See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy, supra note 64, 304.02, at 304-6 to -7.
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of having property within the appropriate judicial district in the United States. 4
Moreover, when conducting this "jurisdictional analysis, the laws in the
foreign proceeding are determinative of whether the foreign bankrupt has assets
located in the district in which the § 304 petition was filed " 125
Because § 304 cases generally involve an in rem proceeding limited to
the debtor's assets in the United States,12 6 such a jurisdictional require-
ment will rarely create an obstacle for a foreign representative. However,
such an obstacle arose in Gee-the foreign representative-sought discovery
of parties (including access to corporate books and records and the testi-
mony of corporate officials) in the Southern District of New York, but the
foreign debtor did not have any assets in the district.2 7 In turning to § 109(a),
the Gee court correctly read § 109(a)'s listing of "a place of business, or
property" in the disjunctive 28 Although the foreign debtor did not have
assets in Lhe United States, it did have a place of business in the United
States and therefore satisfied the threshold requirements of § 109(a)' 2 9
The Gee decision is a flexible response under § 304 that accommodates
the interests of the foreign proceeding. In light of the holding in Gee, fulfilling
any one of the alternatives in § 109(a) should satisfy the prerequisites of that
section 0
In sum, to meet the threshold requirements for relief under § 304(a), the
foreign representative must establish that: (1) a foreign proceeding has been
commenced in the appropriate jurisdiction; (2) the petitioner has been duly
appointed in the foreign proceeding; (3) the foreign debtor qualifies as a debtor
under foreign law; (4) the foreign representative is authorized under foreign
law to commence proceedings in the United States regarding the foreign debtor's
property or the administration of the foreign debtor's estate and, if need be,
the foreign substantive law has extra-territorial effect; (5) the foreign debtor
has complied with at least one of the § 109(a) criteria; and (6) if need be, the
debtor has assets in the relevant district.'3
124See Goerg, 844 F.2d at 1568, n.14; Koreag, 130 B.R. at 711; In re Trakman, 33 B.R. 780,783 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983); Toga, 28 B.R. at 167; Stuppel II, 17 B.R. at 415.1 5'Koreag, 130 B.R. at 711 (citing Toga, 28 B.R. at 167).
126See 2 CoLumP, oN BANRuwTcy, supra note 64, 304.05[1], at 304-12.
127No jurisdictional issue appears to have been raised in Angulo, an earlier case involving a § 304 peti-
tion requesting discovery. In that case, citing Stuppel II, the court stated that the debtor had assets in the
United States and therefore met the threshold requirements for the application of§ 304; but "[t]he court
did not hold that the presence of assets was mandatory." Gee, 53 B.R. at 898 (citing Angulo, 29 B.R. at
418) (emphasis added).
12811 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West 1991). Gee, 53 B.R. at 899, 900. See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 62,
at 319; Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes, supra note 5, at 87.
129Gee, 53 B.R. at 899, 900.130Gitin & Flaschen supra note 62, at 319; Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes, supra note 5, at 87.
'31See Gitlin &Flaschen, supra note 62, at 319 (noting three of these factors); Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes,
supra note 5, at 87 (noting four of these factors).
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In addition to satisfying these criteria, the foreign representative must com-
mence the § 304 case in the proper district to satisfy the venue requirements
contained in § 1410 of title 28 of the United States Code. 32 If the foreign
representative seeks to enjoin the commencement or continuation of an action
or proceeding, or the enforcement of a judgment, the case may be commenced
only in the district in which the action or proceeding against which the injunc-
tion is sought is pending. 33 If the foreign representative seeks to enjoin the
enforcement of a lien against the property of a foreign debtor, or to require the
turnover of property of the foreign debtor's estate, the case may be commenced
only in the district in which such property is found. 34 A case in which the
foreign representative seeks any other relief may be commenced only in the
district in which is located the foreign debtor's principal place of business or
principal assets in the United States.'3 '
It appears from § 1410 of title 28 that, if the foreign representative wants
to protect the assets of the foreign debtor that are located in more than one
district, then the foreign representative must commence a § 304 case in each
district in which such property is located. 36 The foreign representative could
then move "in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties" under
§ 1412 of title 28 to consolidate the cases in one district.3 7
3. Form of Relief
The venue requirements discussed above in effect require the foreign
representative to specify in the petition the form of relief sought under
13228 U.S.C.A. § 1410 (West 1991).
1331d. § 1410(a). See, e.g., In re Officina Conti, S.R.L., 118 B.R. 392, 394 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989) (an active
dispute between the debtor and one of its creditors about the enforcement and collection of the creditor's
unsatisfied judgment constitutes a pending "action or proceeding" satisfying the requirements of § 1410(a));
In re Banco de Descuento, 78 B.R. 337, 338 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987) ("28 U.S.C. § 1410(a) provides that
an 11 U.S.C. § 304 petition may be heard in the District in which an action against which an injunction
is sought is pending"); Culmer, 25 B.R. at 634.
.3428 U.S.C.A. § 1410(b) (West 1991). See, e.g., Offcina Conti, 118 B.R. at 394 (seeking the turnover
of cash from a South Carolina creditor in South Carolina would support venue under 11 U.S.C. § 1410(b));
Banco de Descuento, 78 B.R. at 338; Culmer, 25 B.R. at 634.
13M28 U.S.C.A. § 1410(c) (West 1991).
1361 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 64, 3.02[31[b] at 3-151 to -152; Boshkoff, U.S. Judicial
Assistance, supra note 5, at 744. However, an argument could be made, consistent with the statement in
Culmer that a "[c]ourt is free to broadly mold relief in near blank check fashion," Culmer, 25 B.R. at 624,
that the court in a single § 304 case has the power to enjoin actions against the foreign debtor's property
throughout the United States. See Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 5. In fact, some courts have ordered
nationwide § 304 relief, although they did not directly address this issue. See In re Banco Nacional de Obras
y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C., 91 B.R. 661, 662 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter Banobras]; Lineas Aereas
de Nicaragua S.A., 10 B.R. 790, 791 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) thereinafter Lineas 1]. If ordering such relief,
the bankruptcy court, however, probably could not enjoin another court, and should "make recommenda-
tions to the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)" 1 COLLIER ON BANRUP'rCY, supra note 64, 3.01181[b]
at 3-119.
M728 U.S.C.A. § 1412 (West 1991); Boshkoff, U.S. Judicial Assistance, supra note 5, at 744.
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§ 304.38 Section 304(b) sets forth the types of relief, some procedural and some
substantive, that a court may order under § 304. This section provides that
the court may enter injunctions, order a turnover, or order other appropriate
relief. 39 Since the connecting word "or" does not imply exclusivity as to choice, °40
the foreign representative, in her petition for ancillary relief, may request any
combination of remedies under § 304(b).
Section 304(b)(1) authorizes the bankruptcy court to enter interim or
permanent relief. In determining what relief, if any, is to be granted, "the
court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious
administration of [the] estate, consistent with [the six factors enumerated
in § 304(c)]."141 If these criteria have been satisfied, the court may enjoin the
commencement or continuation of the following: (1) any action against
a foreign debtor with respect to property involved in the foreign proceeding; 142
(2) any action against such property itself;143 (3) the enforcement of any
judgment against the foreign debtor with respect to such property; 44 or
(4) any act or any judicial proceeding to create or enforce a lien against
property of the foreign debtor's estate. 4 This wide range of injunctive relief
enables the courts to resolve the problems caused by creditors attempting
to seize assets of the foreign debtor located in the United States after
insolvency proceedings against the foreign debtor have been commenced
abroad.46
The automatic stay of § 362 does not apply to an ancillary proceeding
under § 304, since such a proceeding does not commence a full bankruptcy
case.47 To prevent local creditors from dismembering the foreign debtor's
assets in the United States, the foreign representative should apply for injunctive
relief (either for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction)
138Powers &Mears, supra note 62, at 343; Given & Vilaplana, supra note 62, at 329-30. See 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1410 (West 1991).
.3911 U.S.C.A. § 304(b) (West 1991).
140Id. § 102(5) (rule of construction).
14'Id. § 304(c). See text in Part II.A.4 infra.
14211 U.S.C.A. § 304(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 1991). See, e.g., In re Gercke, 122 B.R. 621,625; (Bankr. D.D.C.
1991); Lines, 81 B.R. at 268, 274; Banco de Descuentro, 78 B.R. at 340; Culmer, 25 B.R. at 634.
14311 U.S.C.A. § 304(b)(1)(A)(ii) (West 1991). See, e.g., Lines, 81 B.R. at 268,274; Banco deDescuento,
78 B.R. at 340; Culmer, 25 B.R. at 634.
14411 U.S.C.A. § 304(b)(1)(B) (West 1991). See, e.g., Lines, 81 B.R. at 268,274; Culmer, 25 B.R. at 634.
14311 U.S.C.A. § 304(b)(1)(B) (West 1991). See, e.g., Lines, 81 B.R. at 268, 274; Culmer, 25 B.R. at 634.
146Salen 1, 773 P.2d at 455.
147lnterpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freight ofthe M/VS Venture Star, 878 F.2d 111, 112 (3d Cir. 1989) ("It]he
filing of a section 304 petition by a foreign representative does not trigger the automatic stay; instead, the
foreign representative must affirmatively request injunctive or other available relief."); Banobras, 91 B.R.
at 664; Goerg, 844 .2d at 1568; Gee, 53 B.R. at 896. See also Given & Vilaplana, supra note 62, at 330;
Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 6; Power & Mears, supra note 62, at 343. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West
1991).
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under § 304(b)148 or under § 105.49 Once granted, such relief may later be
modified.5 0
Under § 304(b)(2) the bankruptcy court may order the turnover of the
assets of the foreign debtor's estate, or the proceeds of such assets, to the for-
eign representative to be administered in the foreign proceeding.'5' The court
may also order the turnover of books and records for the purposes of discov-
ery. 52 As a condition to the issuance of the turnover, the court may impose
conditions to minimize possible prejudice or inconvenience to U.S. creditors.
For instance, one court has required that the foreign representative compile
and file with the court an inventory of all of the assets of the debtor located
in the United States,5 3 and another court has permitted two creditors to retain
assets held by them in the United States pending determination of the credi-
tors' rights under the foreign law by the foreign court. 54 Likewise, a court should
be able to condition a turnover order on allowing creditors with small claims
(who may be prejudiced by being forced to prove their claims abroad) to prove
their claims in the United States instead.'"s However, although a court has held
to the contrary, 56 a court should not be permitted to condition a turnover order
on the foreign representative's representations that none of the assets will be
removed from the United States and that the assets will "be applied primarily
to satisfy the debts owing to the U.S. creditors.' 7 The effect of the turnover
14sSee, e.g., Banobras, 91 B.R. at 664 (granting "broad injunctive relief, which is specifically permitted
and so typically granted in a section 304 case, [and) is not unlike the injunction which is automatic in a
chapter 7 or 11 case pursuant to section 362 of the [U.S. Bankruptcy) Code"); Lines, 81 B.R. at 268. See
also 2 COLLIER ON BANKctu'rcy, supra note 64, 304.03[2] at 304-8; Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5,
at 7; Given & Vilaplana, supra note 62, at 331; Powers & Mears, supra note 62, at 343.
149See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 105.02 at 105-5; Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7065 (West 1991); Given &
Vilaplana, supra note 62, at 331; Powers & Mears, supra note 62, at 343.
Section 105 sets forth the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court. This section provides in part: "(a)
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the pro-
visions of this title.... (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, a court may not appoint a receiver
in a case under this title." 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West 1991).
"50 See Banobras, 91 B.R. at 664.
's111 U.S.C.A. § 304(b)(2) (West 1991). Koreag, 130 B.R. at 716; Banco de Descuento, 78 B.R. at 340;
Culmer, 25 B.R. at 634. Compare Lineas 1, 10 B.R. at 791 (turnover granted, upon the condition that none
of the assets would be removed from the United States).
As noted by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 'The authorization for
a turnover order at the behest of a foreign trustee or other representative extends a rule developed in this
country in cases involving the administration of decedents' estates and receiverships." CowmMssioN REPORT,
supra note 66, section 4-103 n.2.
"52Gee, 53 B.R. at 905.
153Lineas 1, 10 B.R. at 791.
154Culmer, 25 B.R. at 634. In non-section 304 cases, bankruptcy courts have conditioned such turno-
ver orders on prepaying administrative expenses and priority claims and providing for the payment of reasonable
disbursements to be incurred in the ancillary proceeding. See IBB Turnover Orders, supra note 58; Axona,
88 B.R. at 618.
15 5See the earlier non-§ 304 case, Norske Lloyd, 242 N.Y. at 167-68. See also Lam, supra note 62, at 490.1
-
6Lineas 1, 10 B.R. 790.
117Id. at 791.
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order should be to enable the foreign jurisdiction to administer and distribute
the assets under foreign law and to further the principle of equality of distri-
bution, rather than to benefit local creditors under U.S. law. 8
Section 304(b)(3) authorizes the bankruptcy court to "order other equita-
ble relief."'1 9 This catchall provision is consistent with the congressional intent
to provide bankruptcy courts with "maximum flexibility in handling ancillary
cases."'60 One court has relied on these legislative comments to claim that a
court in a § 304 case "is free to broadly mold appropriate relief in near blank
check fashion."' 6' Courts have ordered a variety of relief under this section.
For instance, the court handling an ancillary case involving a Nicaraguan
company 62 authorized the foreign representative to operate the debtor's busi-
ness in the United States 163 (although a foreign representative does not have
the status of a trustee or debtor in possession under § 304(b)(3)) and appointed
a "cotrustee whose authority and responsibility [did] not extend beyond the
debtor's assets and affairs in [the United States."'164 Unfortunately, this court
relied on the reference to "maximum flexibility" in the legislative history as
authority for issuing these orders to protect the interests of U.S. creditors
engaged in a dispute with the foreign representative, rather than to protect
all creditors in general. However, the court did acknowledge some limitations
on its authority under § 304 and noted that, since a foreign representative
derives his authority from the foreign court, a U.S. bankruptcy court may not
remove or replace a foreign representative in a § 304 case. 65
In other applications of § 304(b)(3), courts have allowed foreign represen-
tatives to conduct discovery 166 or to seek relief from the automatic stay in a
chapter 11 case; 67 enjoined an action in a U.S. court to reduce a claim to judg-
ment and allowed a foreign court to decide when and where the claim of a U.S.
creditor should be adjudicated (thereby refusing to enforce a choice of forum
clause in a contract between the debtor and a U.S. creditor); 68 and allowed
a foreign court to interpret a contract under U.S. law. 69 As one commen,
15 8See Koreag, 130 B.R. at 713-14; Culmer, 25 B.R. at 632; Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes, supra note 5, at 80.
15911 U.S.C.A. § 304(b)(3) (West 1991).
160See H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281; S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821.
16'Culmer, 25 B.R. at 624.
162Lineas 1, 10 B.R. 790; In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, S.A., 13 B.R. 779, 780 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981)
[hereinafter Lineas III.16 3Lineas 1, 10 B.R. at 791.
164Lineas 1!, 13 B.R. at 780.
165Id. at 780.
166Gee, 53 B.R. at 899, 905; Angulo, 29 B.R. at 419. See also Honsberger, supra note 5, at 654; 2 CoL-
UzE BAmmRUPTcY PRACnCE GumE, supra note 64, 19.09[3] at 19-19.
167Tarricone, 80 B.R. 21.
16OGercke, 122 B.R. at 626, 632, 634.
169Id. at 632-33; Lines, 81 B.R. at 273.
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tator has argued, § 304(b)(3) should also authorize a court to enjoin a debtor
from interfering with the foreign representative's administration of a § 304
proceeding.170
One of the major conflicts under § 304(b)(3) is what, if any, avoidance
powers are available to the foreign representative in an ancillary case. A minority
view is that under § 304 the foreign representative may not exercise avoidance
powers. This view derives some support from comments in the legislative his-
tory and by a few commentators.' 71
The case law on point, however, rejects this narrow view of section 304
and supports the proposition that an avoidance action may be brought in
an ancillary proceeding. 72 For example, in In re Culmer'" the court stated in
dicta that "it has always been contemplated that United States ancillary
proceedings might be used by foreign liquidators to avoid American preferences
and protect assets for foreign administration."' 74 Once a bankruptcy court has
determined that an ancillary proceeding meets the statutory criteria in § 304(c):
Creditors who purport to obtain liens on the property of a
foreign debtor prior to his representative's filing of an ancillary
petition are no longer entitled to have those liens, which are
inherently preferential, exist free of the claims of other credi-
tors similarly situated merely because the domiciliary
bankruptcy proceeding is foreign and they have been able to
beat the 'foreign representatives' in a race to an American
courthouse. 75
17 Lam, supra note 62, at 490.
1718ection 4-103(b) (a predecessor draft provision of § 304) "does not override the general American
rule of conflict of laws that foreign trustees may not defeat rights acquired by local creditors through levy
on local assets.' CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 66, section 4-103 n.3; 2 CoIXusR BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE
GUDE, supra note 64, 19.1014] at 19-20 to -21 (citing id.).
172 &ee Tarricone, 80 B.R. at 23-24; Metzeler, 78 B.R. at 676-79; In re Egeria Societa per Azioni de Navigazi-
one, 26 B.R. 494, 497 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983) [hereinafter Egeria Il], rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ciel
y Cia. S.A. v. Nereide Societa di Navigazione per Azioni, 28 B.R. 378 (E.D. Va. 1983), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Ciel y Cia. S.A. v. Commissioner of Egeria Societa di Navigazione per Azioni, 723 F.2d 900 (4th
Cir. 1983); Gee, 53 B.R. at 898-99; Culmer, 25 B.R. at 633; In re Comstat Consulting Servs. Ltd., 10 B.R.
134, 135 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) [hereinafter Comstat]. See also Florida Peach Corp., 63 B.R. at 836 (in this
chapter 11 case the court discussed an avoidance action brought in an earlier related ancillary case); Axona,
88 B.R. at 600-01 (foreign representatives' U.S. counsel believed that a foreign representative could not
exercise a trustees avoidance powers under U.S. law in a § 304 case, and therefore recommended that the
foreign representatives commence a full case under § 303(b)(4)).
.7325 B.R. 621 (Bankr. s.D.N.Y 1982).
17Id. at 633 (citing Finabank, 568 E2d 911). It should be noted, however, that neither Culrer nor Fima
bank involve the issue of whether §§ 547 and 548 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code or their predecessor provi-
sions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Act apply to ancillary bankruptcy proceedings under U.S. law. Metzeler, 78
B.R. at 676-77 n.2.
175Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 14.
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If § 304 is to be useful to foreign representatives it is imperative that foreign
representatives be allowed to avoid preferences and fraudulent transfers in ancil-
lary proceedings under § 304.
However, there is some disagreement about which avoidance powers the
foreign representative should be allowed to exercise. Two early § 304 cases
applied the avoidance powers provided in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.76 One
court approved a consensual agreement to apply U.S. avoidance powers and
claimed "that the 'petition' specified in § 547 is the petition filed in this court
under § 304' 177 The other court applied § 547 in determining whether prefer-
ences existed, and relied on the reference to "preferential or fraudulent dispo-
sitions of property of such estate" in § 304(c)(3) as authority to do s0P8 This
approach, which applies U.S. avoidance powers in § 304 cases, is misguided.
To treat creditors equally worldwide, foreign representatives in section 304
cases should exercise the avoidance powers under foreign law, and not the avoid-
ance powers contained in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code:
With respect to the exercise of avoidance powers, the for-
eign representative should be limited to the powers available
under the laws of the state where the foreign proceeding is
pending. The section 304 court's task should be to assist
implementation of the foreign court's decrees (when not con-
trary to fundamental domestic policies), not to provide the for-
eign representative with the benefit of American avoidance
powers, which may be better (from a debtor's perspective) than
those available in the foreign court 79
176Sec 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West 1991) (strong arm powers as hypothetical lien creditor or bona fide
purchaser); id. § 544(b) (trustee as successor to certain actual unsecured creditors); id. § 545 (statutory
liens); id. § 546 (limitations on avoidance powers); id. § 547 (preferences); id. § 548 (fraudulent transfers);
id. § 549 (postpetition transfers).
77Comstat, 10 B.R. at 135.
'17 Egeria If, 26 B.R. at 497. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(3) (West 1991). See also In re Papeleras Reunidas,
S.A., 92 B.R. 584, 591-93 (Bankr. E.D.NY. 1988) [hereinafter Papeleras] (considering the possibility that
fraudulent conveyances and preferences would result under US. law if the court deferred to foreign
proceedings).
179Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 62, at 319. However, by including the proviso "when not contrary to
fundamental domestic policies," Gitlin and Flaschen leave open the possibility that a U.S. court should not
apply foreign avoidance powers if such powers do not exist under U.S. law. Id. at 321. Such a proviso is
inappropriate. Rather, the proviso should read "unless fundamentally unfair: See Trautman, supra note 62,
at 56. The benchmark should not be whether the foreign avoidance powers are different from those in the
United States, but rather whether such powers deviate from the principle of equality of treatment. See id.
Other commentators agree:
The application of American preference rules to a foreign bankruptcy carries with
it the inherent possibility of a transaction being a preference in one place and not
another (similar transactions being treated differently by reason of the application
of different law). Thus, there is an inherent inequality of distribution of the type that
[section] 304 is designed to avoid.
Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 18.
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The court in In re Metzelers ° held that "a foreign representative may assert, under
§ 304, only those avoiding powers vested in him by the law applicable to
the foreign estate."18 (A related case also adopted this approach, s2 and two other
cases implicitly support such an approach. 83) In reaching its decision to allow a
West German foreign representative to bring an avoidance action, as permitted
under the West German Bankruptcy Act, the Metzeler court noted that "neither
§ 547 nor § 548 contains any indication that the avoidance powers contained
therein are to be vested in a foreign representative.' 8 4 Moreover, the
assertion of such powers would be "inconsistent with the overall purpose of
§ 304: to afford comity through ancillary administration.' 8 -5 Next, the court
ascertained that West German bankruptcy law had transnational effect and
vested the West German liquidator with the power to avoid transactions abroad.8 6
The Metzeler approach is correct. Once a U.S. court ascertains that a for-
eign bankruptcy should be recognized and assisted by an ancillary administra-
tion in the United States, creditors worldwide will be treated most fairly if the
avoidance law of the primary administration (if by its own terms it is applicable
to the property in the United States) is applied in the ancillary administration. 8 7
18078 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1987).
1SlId. at 677.
182Tarricone, 80 B.R. at 23-24.
'
5 3Gee, 53 B.R. at 898-99. The Gee court rejected the notion that a foreign representative could exer-
cise the avoidance powers under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in a § 304 case, id. at 896, and there is some
language in the decision that indicates that the court rejected the application of all avoidance powers in
the § 304 context. Id. However, elsewhere in the decision the court noted that one of the reasons why
the foreign representative wanted to conduct discovery was to ascertain whether certain "assets may be
in New York or may have been fraudulently transferred out of New York.' Id. at 894. It is doubtful that
the court would have permitted discovery to ascertain whether fraudulent transfers had occurred, if it was
not also willing to allow the foreign representative to avoid such transfers. See Metzeler, 78 B.R. at 678.
The application of avoidance powers under foreign law would therefore be consistent with the Gee deci-
sion, given that the court rejected the application of such powers under U.S. law. Compare Angulo, 29 B.R.
at 419 (this case, in which discovery was also granted, would be consistent with the application of avoid
ance powers under either U.S. or foreign law).
Lastly, although the Culmer court did not address the issue of which avoidance law to apply, by order-
ing that the foreign debtor's property in the United States be turned over to the foreign liquidators and
be administered in the foreign courts under foreign law, Culmer supports an approach in which the law
of the foreign jurisdiction is applied. Thus, Gallagher and Hartje (who represented the foreign representa
tive in that case) claim that Culmer "negated the idea that an American creditor was entitled to have his
claim resolved by American law." Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 14.
'
5 4Metzeler, 78 B.R. at 677.
1'5 Id.
'S6Among the provisions cited by the court were sections 36 and 37(1) of the Konkursordnung [the
"West German Bankruptcy Act"). Section 36 provides that "'authority to exercise the right of avoidance
lies with the Trustee"' and section 37 "provides that 'everything alienated, given away or surrendered by
the avoidable act from the property of the bankruptcy estate shall be restored to the bankrupts estate'"
Id. at 677 (citing §§ 36, 37(1) West German Bankruptcy Act).
17See text accompanying infra note 303. See also Tarricone, 80 B.R. at 23-24, where the court stated
that "[a] foreign representative may bring a section 304 petition based on foreign substantive law to recover
property located in this country," but the court went on to find that "the foreign representative ha[d] not
pleaded any substantive foreign law which would [have] support[ed] his claim." Id. at 24.
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Moreover, the Metzeler approach to avoidance actions should be extended
to the applications of other substantive laws under § 304(b)(3). A few com-
mentators are correct in proposing that all substantive law to be applied-
including the rules relating to the distribution of the debtor's assets, to priori-
ties among creditors, and to the effects of an adjudication of bankruptcy-should
be governed by the law of the primary proceeding. 88 This proposition, which
furthers the equal treatment of creditors, flows naturally from the idea that
an ancillary proceeding under § 304 is intended to assist the primary proceed-
ing abroad.
4. Criteria for Granting Relief under § 304
Before issuing an injunction, turnover order, or other relief under § 304(b),
the bankruptcy court must consider the factors listed in § 304(c). Section 304(c)
mandates that the court "shall be guided by what will best assure an econom-
ical and expeditious administration!' of the foreign debtor's estate consistent
with six factors:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests
in such estate; 8 9
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in such
foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of
property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in
accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh
start for the individual that such foreign proceeding concerns.Y0
The legislative history openly states:
These guidelines are designed to give the court the maximum
flexibility in handling ancillary cases. Principles of international
comity and respect for the judgments and laws of other nations
suggest that the court be permitted to make the appropriate
188Trautman, supra note 62, at 58, 56-57; Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 15, 19. Of course, appli-
cation of the foreign substantive law would first have to satisfy the § 304(c) criteria. See infra note 303
and accompanying text.
as9Many commentators have emphasized this factor. See, e.g., Lowell, supra note 11, at 264. Professor
Kurt H. Nadelmann, one of the twentieth century's primary advocates for equality of distribution in trans-
national bankruptcies, repeats throughout his writings the themes of equal treatment for all creditors world-
wide and the need to prevent discrimination against foreign creditors vis-a-vis local creditors. See, e.g.,
Nadelmann, Discrimination in Foreign Bankruptcy Laws, supra note 1; Nadelmann, Legal Treatment of For,
eign and Domestic Creditors, supra note 2. See also Culmer, 25 B.R. at 628.
1-11 US.C.A. § 304(c) (West 1991).
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orders under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than
being provided with inflexible rules.' 9 '
The factors listed in § 304(c) are an attempt to balance territoriality concerns
against universality concerns. They enable a U.S. court to recognize the extrater-
ritorial effect of foreign bankruptcy laws and proceedings, but only after ensuring
that U.S. creditors have received certain minimum protection. These six fac-
tors are also historically rooted and build on the principles elucidated by U.S.
courts in transnational insolvency cases over the past two centuries. 92
Factors (1) and (3) are universality factors since they envision a single
distribution of the debtor's assets that would benefit all creditors worldwide.
Factors (2), (4), and (6), on the other hand, are territoriality factors. Factor
(2) requires protection of U.S. creditors, and factors (4) and (6) require that
the foreign law satisfies certain requirements that exist under U.S. law. 93
Comity, the fifth factor, might be either a universality or a territoriality
factor, depending on the interpretation given by the court. 94 Thus, even a
court following a universality approach to § 304 would have to consider the
991H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281; S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821.
192See text accompanying supra notes 11 to 58.
'
93But see Unger, supra note 5, at 1172 (the "fourth factor... reflect[s] the universalist approach").
19'But see id. at 1173 (comity is "more consistent with the territorial notions of bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion"). The starting point for the definition of comity is in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), which
is discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 26 to 29. Comity, in the insolvency context, involves
balancing the advantages of a single bankruptcy proceeding against protection of local creditors. The Cul-
mer court asserted that "tall of the factors listed in [s]ection 304(c) have historically been considered within
a court's determination whether to afford comity to a proceeding in a foreign nation' Culmer, 25 B.R. at
629. But see Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 5, at 1593, where the court stated; "[t]he Culmer court misap-
prehended the role of comity in the interplay between factors to be considered under section 304(c). The
decision goes so far as to equate section 304(c) with the comity doctrine itself, to render comity the only
controlling criterion:' Accord Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 62, at 321 ("'Ic]omity' is only one of the six
criteria listed in section 304(c) to guide the court in determining whether to grant the requested relief; to
promote principles of comity above the remaining five criteria would be to ignore the literal terms of the
statute").
Federal notions of comity apply under §§ 304 and 305. See Boshkoff, U.S.Judicial Assistance, supra note
5, at 733; Boshkoff, American Reports, supra note 60, at 63; Goldie, supra note 62, at 330-31. However,
there is confusion as to what these notions are, and as will be seen in the discussion infra, the courts adjudicat-
ing matters under §§ 304 and 305 have interpreted comity inconsistently (compare, e.g., Culmer, 25 B.R.
at 631, and Toga, 28 B.R. at 167). As one commentator has noted, perhaps the "interpretation of comity
in Hilton v. Guyot, the individual states' interpretations, or some combination of the two, is to be applied
[under section 304(c)(5)]. On the other hand, the provision could also be read as an invitation to the
bankruptcy courts to mould a uniform federal common or decisional law: Goldie, supra note 62, at 330-31.
The latter interpretation is surely preferable. See id. at 631; Boshkoff, American Reports, supra note 60,
at 63; E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 31, § 24.35 n.5. Applying a uniform federal rule of comity that was
universalitybased would give the courts "maximum flexibility" in deciding § 304 issues and lead to greater
consistency in results. Such an approach would also be preferable in non-§ 304 cases. See Goldie, supra note
62, at 346-47; Boshkoff, American Reports, supra note 60, at 63. But see supra note 31 for a discussion
of the rule at present.
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territoriality factors. Likewise, a court following a territoriality approach would
have to consider the universality factors.
Commentators have recommended other factors to assist the courts in §
304 cases. For instance, John D. Honsberger suggests that the following fac-
tors should favor granting a foreign representative's petition:
(1) where the failure to grant an order in an ancillary proceed-
ing will require a local bankruptcy to protect local assets, neces-
sitating concurrent bankruptcies and higher administrative
costs;
(2) where the foreign bankruptcy law is similar to that of the
United States;
(3) where the relative ease of access to the foreign country
and relative ease of communication with the foreign creditors
facilitates a convenient proceeding... ; land]
(4) where more creditors and a greater part of the estate of
the debtor are located in the foreign country.95
Also, Timothy E. Powers and Rona R. Mears have suggested that a reciprocity
requirement be added to § 304 96 They conclude that "[a] demand for reciprocity
by U.S. bankruptcy courts in section 304 proceedings may be necessary to
provide the catalyst to initiate legislation instituting ancillary bankruptcy pro-
cedures in foreign jurisdictions."'197 However, including a reciprocity require-
ment, "while encouraging the use of similar procedures, may exacerbate exist
ing differences and lead to increased tensions and political stalemate rather than
increased international cooperation.' s98 For example, given that the United
States and Canada, sister common law jurisdictions, have not been able to
finalize a bankruptcy treaty, a reciprocity requirement would likely further
detract from, rather than improve creditor equality. 99 Introducing a reciprocity
requirement into § 304 would also openly reject the growing tendency by U.S.
19 5Honsberger, supra note 5, at 656.
196Powers & Mears, supra note 62, at 346-51. Important commentators made similar proposals when
Congress debated changing the U.S. Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 350 n.285 (citing Hearings, supra note 2, at
1516 (statement of Prof. Stefan A. Riesenfeld); id. at 1445[-46] (statement of Prof. Kurt H. Nadelmann,
supporting a provision giving the executive branch the power to demand reciprocity and objecting to Prof.
Riesenfeld's proposal for a reciprocity provision that provided for automatic retaliation); Nadelmann, Les-
sons Taught by Herstatt, supra note 25, at 34). See also Nadelmann, The Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note
5, at 38-39.
197Powers & Mears, supra note 62, at 351.
'
98Nielsen, supra note 5, at 556. See also Trautman, supra note 62, at 52 ("While comity at times con-
notes reciprocity, there is wide agreement that the section [3041 applies without regard to the existence
of similar provisions in the foreign law. Nor would reciprocity be appropriate here.')
199See Nielsen, supra note 5, at 557.
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courts to cooperate in cross-border insolvencies. 200 Congress should consider
including a reciprocity requirement in § 304(c) only as a means of last resort
after all other attempts by the United States to convince other countries to
enact ancillary bankruptcy procedures and to recognize U.S. bankruptcy proce-
dures have failed. Given the relative youth of § 304, that moment has not yet
arrived.
The following section discusses in detail and critiques the different
approaches that the courts have been following in interpreting and applying
the criteria for granting relief under § 304(c).
5. Section 304 and Related Cases
Since the enactment of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the number
of reported § 304 cases has been steadily increasing, 20' although most of
2°°The debate about reciprocity has a long history. A few early cases interpreted Hilton as meaning
"that the principle of comity is extended by the courts of [the United States] to the judgments of the courts
of a foreign country to the same extent that courts in the foreign country extend the principle to judgments
of the courts of [the United States].' Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. 964, 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd on other
grounds, 96 F.2d 768. However, the Kreuger & Toll court, in extending comity to the judgment of a Swedish
court, observed that in a later case Judge Learned Hand stated that the Supreme Court in Hilton "certainly
did not mean to hold that an American court was to recognize no obligations or duties arising elsewhere
until it appeared that the sovereign of the locus reciprocally recognized similar obligations existing here.
That doctrine I am happy to say is not a part of American jurisprudence" Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. at 969
(emphasis added by court) (quoting Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp., 300 F. 741,
747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), aff V, 267 U.S. 22 (1925)). Modern courts generally follow Hand's interpretation of
Hilton and recognize that "while reciprocity may in some circumstances be considered a relevant factor,
proof of reciprocity is not essential for the granting of comity." Salen 1, 773 F.2d at 460; accord Cornfeld
v. Investors Overseas Servs., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir.
1979) (extending comity to a Canadian liquidation proceeding). Compare Remington Rand Corp.-Del. v.
Business Sys., 830 F.2d 1260, 1273 (3d Cir. 1987) (directing the district court not to recognize the order
of a Dutch bankruptcy court unless the Dutch court recognized a related U.S. judgment in its proceedings:
'Although reciprocity is no longer an absolute condition precedent to comity, it is always a permissible con-
sideration, and here we believe it to be a consideration of extreme importance.) (citations omitted).
2
0'See Koreag, 130 B.R. 705 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 129 B.R. 147 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1991); In re Gercke, 122 B.R. 621 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991); In re Officina Conti, S.R.L., 118 B.R.
392 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989); Papeleras, 92 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988); Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights
of M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (D.NJ. 1988), appeal dismissed, 878 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1989); Banobras,
91 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989);
Lines, 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Banco de Descuento,
78 B.R. 337 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Trakman, 33 B.R. 780
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Angulo v. Kedzep Ltd., 29 B.R. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Toga, 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1983); Egeria II, 26 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Ciel y Cia. S.A. v. Nereide
Societa di Navigazione per Azioni, 28 B.R. 378 (E.D. Va. 1983), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ciel y Cia. S.A.
v. Commissioner of Egeria Societa di Navigazione per Azioni, 723 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1983); Culmer, 25
B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Egeria Societa per Azioni di Navigazione, 20 B.R. 625 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1982) [hereinafter Egeria I], rev'd sub nom. Ciel y Cia. S.A. v. Nereide Societa di Navigazione per Azi-
oni, 28 B.R. 378 (E.D. Va. 1983), appeal dismissed sub nonm. Ciel y Cia. S.A. v. Commissioner of Egena
Societa di Navigazione per Azioni, 723 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1983); Stuppel, 17 B.R. 413 (S.D. Fla. 1981); In
re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, S.A., 13 B.R. 779 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) [hereinafter Lineas II]; In re Lineas
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these have primarily decided requests for preliminary relief or issues relat-
ing to jurisdictional or eligibility questions. 202 In enacting § 304, Congress
Aereas de Nicaragua S.A., 10 B.R. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) [hereinafter Lineas IJ; In re Comstat Con-
sulting Servs., 10 B.R. 134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Stuppel, 7 B.R. 341 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) [here,
inafter Stuppel 11.
Although not controlling, § 304 is discussed at length or relied on by analogy, in several other cases.
See, e.g., Ma v. Continental Bank N.A., 1990 U.S. App. Lexis 10017 (7th Cir. June 21, 1990); Tarricone,
80 B.R. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Remington Rand Corp.-Del. v. Business Sys., 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir.
1987); In re Enercons Virginia, Inc., 812 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir. 1987); Salen II, 65 B.R. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd, 825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985);
Salen 1, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Florida Peach Corp. of America, nt., 63 B.R. 833 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1986); Norton, Lilly & Co. v. Cape Lines, Ltd., 75 B.R. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); RBS Fabrics Ltd. v. G. Beckers
& Le Hanne, 24 B.R. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs. 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), affd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Refco F/X Assocs. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., 108 B.R. 29
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (plaintiff's motion to confirm an attachment would be granted unless defendant commenced
a § 304 case).
The court in Axona, 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 115 B.R. 442 (s.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal
dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991), also discussed § 304 and applicable case law in its decision under
§ 305 in ordering the suspension ofa U.S. chapter7case and a turnover of U.S. assets to Hong Kong liquidators.
Several other cases, although not discussing § 304, have raised related transnational insolvency issues.
Many of these cases involved the application of comity. See, e.g., Caddel v. Clairton Corp., 105 B.R. 366
(N.D. Tex. 1989) (plaintiffs pursued claims in the United States against a Canadian debtor undergoing iq,
uidation in Canada without obtaining permission to do so from the Canadian court; the U.S. court dismissed
plaintiffs' claims and granted comity to the stay in the Canadian proceedings); Overseas Inns S.A. P.A.
v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (a Luxembourg corporation commenced suit in the
United States seeking the granting of comity to a Luxembourgjudgment and reorganization plan that would
have enabled the foreign corporate taxpayer to satisfy its U.S. income tax obligation by paying roughly 25%
of the taxes owed; the U.S. court declined to accord comity for reasons of public policy); Kenner Prods.
Co. v. Soci6t6 Fonciere et Financier AgacheWillot, 532 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (granting comity to
French bankruptcy and dismissing the suit brought in the United States by plaintiff to collect on a guar,
anty from the French debtor).
For a discussion of many of the foregoing cases, see Boshkoff, US. Judicial Assistance, supra note 5, at
740-41, 745-49; Finister, supra note 62, at 353-70; Fischer, supra note 5, at 641-49; Gallagher & Hartje,
supra note 5, at 11-21; Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 62, at 315-22; Given & Vilaplana, supra note 62,
at 333, 337, 339-40; Glosband & Katucki, Current Developments, supra note 62; Goldie, supra note 62,
at 311-22, 326-35; Lam, supra note 62; Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 5, at 1588-94; Nielsen, supra note
5, at 562-70; Powers & Mears, supra note 62, at 344-:46; Trautman, supra note 62, at 54-55; Unger, supra
note 5, at 1174-80.
As is apparent from the aforementioned cases, the Southern District of New York has been involved
in more § 304 cases than any other district in the country. Moreover, the Southern District of New York
and the Second Circuit have adopted the universality approach. See, e.g., Koreag, 130 B.R. 705 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991); Banobras, 91 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Axona, 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.NY. 1988), aff'd,
115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991); Lines, 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988); Tarricone, 80 B.R. 21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Merzeler, 78 B.R. 674 (Bankr. S.D.NY.); Salen II, 825
F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987), aff'g 65 B.R. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Salen 1, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'g 49
B.R. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); Culmer, 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1982); Corafeld, 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Israel-British
Bank (London) Ltd., No. 74-B-1322 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978); Finabank, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977);
IBB, 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
202See e.g., Ernst & Young, 129 B.R. 147; Offidna Conti, 118 B.R. 392; Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562; Lines,
81 B.R. 267; Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674; Banco de Descuento, 78 B.R. 337; Gee, 53 B.R. 891; Trakraan, 33 B.R.
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demonstrated "a desire for greater international cooperation in transnational
insolvencies"2o3 Nevertheless, judicial reaction has been mixed-the courts have
interpreted § 304 inconsistently 2 4 and have sometimes failed to follow the legis-
lative intent that produced it.
Two distinct approaches, represented by the cases of In re Culmer205 and
In re Toga Manufacturing Ltd.20 6 have emerged. 207 Under the Culmer approach,
some courts have emphasized the universality factors in § 304, recognized the
substantive laws of foreign jurisdictions, and granted the requested section 304
relief.2°s In contrast, other courts have adopted the Toga approach, which empha-
sizes the territoriality factors in § 304(c), and have applied the substantive laws
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and refused to recognize foreign laws. 2°9
Recently, several complex § 304 cases have arisen in which the courts have
further confronted the important and difficult question of how to strike a proper
balance among the § 304 factors-in other words, what protection U.S. credi-
tors must receive in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding before a U.S. court should
grant ancillary assistance under § 304 to that foreign proceeding. Two of these
cases adopted the territoriality approach in resolving the issue of what notice
and treatment U.S. creditors must receive in a foreign bankruptcy.210 However,
the third followed the universality approach in deciding whether a U.S. or foreign
court should adjudicate questions arising in a § 304 case that relate to the
interpretation of a U.S. collective bargaining agreement. 21'
a. Culmer and the Universality Approach
Of all § 304 cases, Culmer most completely adopts the universality approach
and most comprehensively analyzes all of the factors listed in § 304(c).21 2 Un-
der the Culmer court's flexible approach, "the [clourt is free to broadly mold
780; Angulo, 29 B.R. 417; Egeria 11, 26 B.R. 494; Egeria 1, 20 B.R. 625; Stuppel 11, 17 B.R. 413; Lineas 11,
13 B.R. 779; Lineas 1, 10 B.R. 790; Comstat, 10 B.R. 134; Stuppel 1, 7 B.R. 341. See Powers & Mears, supra
note 62, at 345.
203Honsberger, supra note 5, at 670; Trautman, supra note 62, at 50 (quoting Honsberger, supra, at id.).
204See, e.g., Powers & Mears, supra note 62, at 344-45; Trautman, supra note 62, at 54.
20525 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
20628 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
207See, e.g., Powers & Mears, supra note 62, at 344-45; Trautman, supra note 62, at 54.
208See, e.g., Culmer, 25 B.R. 621; Koreag, 130 B.R. 705; Gercke, 122 B.R. 621 (granting partial relief);
Banobras, 91 B.R. 661 (granting partial relief); Lines, 81 B.R. 267; Metzeler, 78 B.R. 674; Banco de Des
cuento, 78 B.R. 337; Gee, 53 B.R. 891; Angulo, 29 B.R. 417. See also Caddel, 105 B.R. 366; Salen II, 825
F.2d 709; Enercons, 812 F.2d 1469; Salen 1, 773 F.2d 452 (non-§ 304 cases). See also Axona, 88 B.R. 597
(§ 303(b)(4) case).
209See, e.g., Toga, 28 B.R. 165; Papeleras, 92 B.R. 584; Interpool, 102 B.R. 373; Egeria If, 26 B.R. 494;
Egeria 1, 20 B.R. 625; Lineas 11, 13 B.R. 779; Lineas 1, 10 B.R. 790; Comstat, 10 B.R. 134.
21°Papeleras, 92 B.R. 584; Interpool, 102 B.R. 373.
21"Banobras, 91 B.R. 661.
2 12ee Gee, 53 B.R. at 901.
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appropriate relief in near blank check fashion"213 The § 304 proceeding involved
in Culmer was ancillary to the liquidation of Banco Ambrosiano Overseas
Limited ("BAOL') occurring in the Bahamas. BAOL, a banking company
organized and licensed under Bahamian law, was engaged in the banking busi-
ness in the Bahamas until the Bahamas Ministry of Finance suspended its license
in July 1982. A month later, pursuant to a resolution of the BAOL shareholders
in compliance with the Companies Act of the Bahamas: (i) BAOL began volun-
tary winding-up proceedings; (ii) joint liquidators were appointed (the "Baha-
mian liquidators"); and (iii) BAOL obtained an order directing that the voluntary
liquidation of BAOL continue, subject to the supervision of the Bahamas
Supreme Court.
At the time of the commencement of the BAOL liquidation in the Bahamas,
BAOL did not do business in the United States, but (similar to Herstatt,
Finabank, and IBB) maintained accounts at U.S. banks and financial insti-
tutions. The Bahamian liquidators filed a § 304 petition in the Southern
District of New York in response to the attempts of U.S. creditors to attach
these accounts. The petition sought a variety of injunctive relief, as well as
an order that property in the United States be turned over to the Bahamas
for administration in the Bahamian liquidation proceeding in accordance with
Bahamian law.
The Culmer court began its analysis by noting that the issue of whether
to grant a turnover order under § 304 was "one of first impression in this
Circuit" 214 and then turned to the legislative history of§ 304 for guidance. The
bankruptcy court noted that Congress had intended that the courts have "'max-
imum flexibility in handling ancillary cases"' 21 .5 to enable courts to arrive at
a fair result in each case.216
Next, the court responded to certain territorialitybased objections raised
by creditors under § 304(c)(1), (2), (3), and (4), including their attempt "to cast
doubt on the ability of the Bahamian liquidation proceeding to ensure just treat-
ment of holders of claims.' 217 The court found that the creditors had failed to
support such assertions-they had "submitted no concrete evidence of any
wrongdoing or propensity for wrongdoing on the part of the [Bahamian L]iqui-
dators... land] no concrete facts were ever elicited tending to impugn the
impartiality of the [Bahamian Lliquidators or the regularity with which the
Bahamian liquidation twals proceeding '218
21'Culmer, 25 B.R. at 624.
214d. at 627.
215d. at 628 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6281; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 US.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821).
2161d. at 627-28.
217d. at 628.
2181d. See also id. at 233.
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After disposing of the creditors' unsupported assertions, the court stated
that the "central examination" to be made under § 304 is whether the relief
sought would "afford equality of distribution of the available assets."2' 9 After
finding that the Bahamian liquidation proceedings complied with this equal-
ity of distribution principle, the Culmer court found that the Bahamas Supreme
Court could "'best assure an economical and expeditious administration of [the
BAOL] estate."220 Among the factors considered by the court were that the
debtor's records, preliquidation employees, and the Bahamian liquidators and
their staff were all in the Bahamas; that the Bahamian liquidators were bound
to comply with Bahamian law and the orders of the Bahamas Supreme Court;
and that the Bahamian court could most efficiently deal with all of the debt-
or's creditors, both American and worldwide.21
Next, the Culmer court pointed out that the Bahamas had the greatest
interest in the debtor's liquidation, neither the United States nor New York
had any public interest in the matter,222 and two creditors, each holding a claim
greater than all of the claims controverting the § 304 petition, supported the
Bahamian liquidation.223 The court found that a ruling in favor of the object-
ing creditors would grant them preferences under both Bahamian and U.S. law,
and that to "protect the positions of [such] fast-moving American and foreign
attachment creditors" would violate the "policy favoring uniform administra-
tion in a foreign court. '" 224
The court next turned to an analysis of comity and offered its oft-quoted
observation that "ta~ll of the factors listed in [slection 304(c) have historically
been considered within a court's determination whether to afford comity to
a proceeding in a foreign nation."225 The Culmer court was not ignoring the
other criteria in § 304(c); rather it was observing that, historically, U.S. courts
have considered the other § 304(c) factors when deciding whether or not
to accord comity to a foreign proceeding (an accurate statement, with the
possible exception of the sixth factor regarding a fresh start).226 In the Culmer
court's view, to apply the factor of comity requires a court to consider all of
2191d. at 628. See also Banco de Descuento, 78 B.R. at 340 (quoting Culmer, 25 B.R. at 628).
22
°Culmer, 25 B.R. at 628 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1982), now 11 U.S.C.A. § 304(c) (West 1991)).
22 1 1d.
2221d. at 628-29. Trautman observes that the Culmer case was decided "on the basis of the unstated
[choice of law] premise" that the Bahamas, the jurisdiction in which BAOL had its principal place of busi
ness, was the "one appropriate forum" whose law should apply to the insolvency of BAOL. Trautnian, supra
note 62, at 55.
223Culmer, 25 B.R. at 629.
2241d.
225Id. Other § 304 cases have adopted the Culmer interpretation of comity as the "most significant fac-
tor.' See Koreag, 130 B.R. at 712, Metzeler, 78 B.R. at 677; Gee, 53 B.R. at 901.
226See cases discussed in supra Part I. It is not clear that any pre.Cu/ner cases considered the sixth factor.
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the other factors within § 304(c).227 The court did just that, and satisfied itself
that the Bahamian liquidation proceeding fulfilled the criteria of § 304(c)(1),
(2), (3), and (4).228 In applying § 304(c)(1), the court noted that "the Baha-
mian Companies Act, like our own bankruptcy laws, provides a comprehen-
sive procedure for the orderly and equitable distribution of [the debtor's]
assets' 229 including requiring supervision of the liquidators by the Bahamian
courts; forbidding creditors from suing the debtor, except with the prior con-
sent of the court, and limiting creditors to claims in the liquidation; voiding
all post-petition transfers, attachments, and executions; avoiding preferences
and fraudulent conveyances; requiring court approval for the liquidators to make
payments to any creditor or class of creditors; and not preferring the claims
of Bahamian citizens.230 In other words, Bahamian bankruptcy procedures, like
U.S. bankruptcy procedures, ensure equality of distribution.
The court next asserted that the territorialitybased § 304(c)(2) factor was
satisfied in that Bahamian law and procedure would adequately protect U.S.
creditors "against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of their claims
in the Bahamian liquidation proceeding."231 Among the factors noted by the
court were that Bahamian procedure requires adequate notice, liquidators are
required to report quarterly to the creditors and the court, creditors may prove
their claims by affidavits that may be submitted by mail, creditors had been
given more than three months to submit claims, liquidators have to provide
a written statement of the grounds for rejection to all creditors whose claims
are rejected, creditors whose claims are rejected have a right of appeal, and
the cost to the objecting U.S. creditors in processing their claims in the Bahamas
was de minimis.232 In applying § 304(c)(2), the court should have also repeated
its earlier finding that the objecting creditors had not substantiated charges
of fraud or impropriety regarding the Bahamian proceedings.
The court next found that § 304(c)(3) was satisfied, because Bahamian
liquidation prohibits preferential or fraudulent transfers of property, and lastly
that § 304(c)(4) was fulfilled since "the distribution of BAOEs estate in the
Bahamas w[ould] be substantially in accord with the order and priorities
prescribed by [the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 233
After finding that the Bahamian liquidation proceedings satisfied the § 304(c)
227Compare Koreag, 130 B.R. at 712 (when considering comity, all of the other § 304(c) factors, with
the exception of the sixth factor, are "inherently taken into account"). But see Morales and Deutcsh, supra
note 5, at 1593; Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 62, at 321. See supra note 194.
22SCulmer, 25 B.R. at 629-31. Because this case involved the liquidation of a company, the sixth factor
was not applicable.
229jd. at 629.
23Id. at 629-30.
2311d. at 630.
232J.
2331d. at 630-31.
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criteria, the court stated that affording comity to the Bahamian proceedings:
would not violate American law or public policy. Whether or
not Bahamian law is identical in application to American law,
there is nothing inherently vicious, wicked, immoral or shock-
ing to the prevailing American moral sense in the Bahamian
laws outlined above. Indeed, it has been shown that these
Bahamian laws are not repugnant to our ideas of justice. 234
The Culmer court then reviewed some of the pre-U.S. Bankruptcy Code
case law to support its decision further. The court relied on the application
of comity to the liquidation laws of Canada by the district court in Cornfeld
v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd.,235 and noted that what Cornfeld had artic-
ulated about the "substantial similarity between American and Canadian
bankruptcy laws may equally be said of the similarity between American and
Bahamian bankruptcy law ... [since the] English Companies Act forms the
basis for both the Canadian and Bahamian liquidation rules."236 Next, the court
noted Gebhard and its claim that creditors who deal with foreign companies
are on notice that they implicitly subject themselves to the foreign laws of the
country of the corporation:
[Like the Canadian Southern bondholders, the BAOL's cred-
itors' rights are subject to foreign laws and every BAOL cred-
itor must be required to pursue its remedies in the Bahamian
liquidation. One who invests in a foreign corporation subjects
his investment to foreign law and may not seek to obtain
2341d. at 631 (citations omitted).
235471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y 1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979). This case, decided by a
non-bankruptcy court after § 304 was enacted but before it became effective, continued the trend of
greater recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings and followed a universality approach. Cornfeld,
a former officer and director of a Canadian corporation undergoing liquidation in Canada, brought an
indemnity action against the corporation. The court relegated Cornfeld's claims to the Canadian court
and stated that "[c]omity is to be accorded a decision of a foreign court as long as that court is a court
of competent jurisdiction and as long as the laws and public policy of the forum state and the rights
of its residents are not violated. Id. at 1259. It noted that "New York has narrowly construed the excep-
tions to the comity doctrine: '[F]oreign-based rights should be enforced unless the judicial enforcement
of such a [right] would be the approval of a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral,
and shocking to the prevailing moral sense:" Id. (citations omitted). In applying comity the court gave
significant weight to the fact that the foreign country involved was Canada and that the "'well-settled
policy' in New York [was] that judgments of the Canadia courts [were] to be given effect under princi-
ples of comity ... Canada is 'a sister common law jurisdiction with procedures akin to our own:" Id.
(quoting Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624,630 (2d Cir. 1976) (other citation omitted)). The Cornfeld
court also relied on Gebhard, which the court claimed was virtually indistinguishable from the case at
bar, and referred to newly enacted §§ 304 and 305 as supporting its application of the principle of comity.
Id. at 1260.
236Culmer, 25 B.R. at 631.
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greater rights than his co-creditors by suing in an American
court.
2 37
The extensive relief granted by the Culmer court included: (1) enjoining
all persons and entities from creating, obtaining, perfecting, or enforcing any
setoff, restraint, lien attachment, or judgment against any asset of BAOL or
of the Bahamian liquidators located in the district without the prior approval
of the Bahamas Supreme Court; (2) enjoining all persons and entities from com-
mencing or prosecuting any other action against or affecting any assets of BAOL
or of the Bahamian liquidators located in the district, without the prior approval
of the Bahamas Supreme Court; and (3) ordering the turnover of all funds and
assets of BAOL located in the district (with the exception of an amount of
approximately $380,000 that two creditors were permitted to retain, pending
determination by the Bahamas Supreme Court of their respective rights under
Bahamian law to set off this sum against debts owed to them by BAOL) to
the Bahamian liquidators for administration in the foreign proceeding; and (4)
directing U.S. claimants to the Bahamian liquidation proceedings for resolu-
tion of the substantive issues involved in the administration of their claims.2 s
The Culmer decision has been heralded by many commentators as exem-
plifying how § 304 should be applied.239 By granting the relief requested by
the Bahamian liquidators, and thereby ordering the turnover of assets to the
Bahamian proceedings, the court furthered the universality approach and helped
foster cooperation in cross-border insolvencies.
How one interprets Culmer ultimately depends on whether one believes
that in a § 304 case the law to be applied is the law of the foreign proceeding.
As mentioned earlier, Professor Thautman correctly argues that, in a § 304 case,
the law to be applied is the law of the jurisdiction "which would have control
under a universalist approach to bankruptcy," which for a business enterprise
would be the law where the debtor has its principal place of business24O (assum-
ing, of course, that the § 304(c) criteria have been met). I agree. This premise
is implicit in Culmer, as can be seen by the court's discussion of which juris-
diction has the greatest interest in the proceedings, as well as its reliance on
Gebhard.24' However, as Professor Trautman points out, this premise should
be explicitly acknowledged.242
2371d. at 632. The court also relied on Norske Lloyd, 242 N.Y. 148, and even quoted from Lowells 1888
law review article. Culmer, 25 B.R. at 632-33.238Culmer, 25 B.IL at 634.
239See, e.g., Powers & Mears, supra note 62, at 345; Given & Vlaplana, supra note 62, at 339-40; Gal-
lagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 13-16. But see Morales and Deutcsh, supra note 5, at 1593; Gitlin & Flaschen,
supra note 62, at 321. See also supra note 194.
2'rlautman, supra note 62, at 55. See text accompanying supra notes 94 to 97.
241See text accompanying supra notes 222, 237; Trautman, supra note 62, at 55.
2427rautman, supra note 62, at 55.
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After finding that the foreign forum is the appropriate forum, the court
should ascertain whether the other threshold requirements are met. This is
the weakest part of the Culmer opinion. As noted earlier, the Culmer court
wrongly required the foreign debtor to fulfill the requirements of § 109(b). 243
Also, the court failed to mention whether the Bahamian liquidators had
authority to come to the United States to seek the protection and turnover
of the foreign debtor's assets.
After addressing these preliminary issues, the court should then apply the
§ 304 criteria and determine whether relief should be granted. In my view, the
court may do so by analyzing the factors in § 304 under a comity approach
as did the Culmer court, or independently of comity analysis. (In my opinion,
the former approach is preferable.) In either case, the court should first ascer-
tain whether the foreign proceeding provides for the equitable and orderly treat-
ment of creditors and applies the preeminent bankruptcy principle of equality
of distribution, as the Culmer court did. Although it is not explicit in the court's
decision, this inquiry is fulfilled by ensuring that the factors in § 304(c)(1) and
(3) are satisfied. In determining whether the foreign law treats creditors justly,
the court should also consider whether the foreign jurisdiction is a sister com-
mon law jurisdiction.
A universality approach under § 304 must consider the § 304(c) territori-
ality factors, as well. Therefore, the court should next ascertain whether the
foreign proceedings prejudice or discriminate against U.S. creditors. This inquiry
should be conducted under the territoriality-based factors in § 304(c)(2) and
(c)(4), either independently or as part of comity analysis under § 304(c)(5).
To ensure that U.S. creditors are satisfactorily protected in the foreign proceed-
ing, the court should consider the overall fairness of the foreign proceeding's
law and procedure. As Professor Trautman argues:
[U]nfairness should consist only of matters such as discrimina-
tory treatment of foreign creditors or other unfair procedures,
rather than a different rule of priority or preference among
creditors. Thus, it should require a strong showing by an
American creditor that the substantive law of the foreign juris-
diction was not simply different from that of the United States
bankruptcy code, but was fundamentally unfair, before the
creditor could successfully resist transfer of the assets to the
foreign proceeding. 244
243See text accompanying notes 113 to 122 supra.
2 44Id. at 56 (emphasis added). But see Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 5, at 1595-96 (asserting that
the foreign representative should have the burden of proving that the foreign law does not prejudice U.S.
creditors). The application of the § 304(c)(6) factor, as appropriate in cases involving the bankruptcy of
individuals, should also be considered when ascertaining the overall fairness of the foreign proceeding.
Trautman rightly notes that "where the business of the enterprise is substantially related to several
countries, arguments about expectations and fairness of course lose some of their force" Trautman, supra
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The Culmer court followed a similar approach. It required that creditors pro-
duce "concrete evidence" or "concrete facts" in support of their allegations of
irregularities in the Bahamian proceedings or of the partiality of the Bahamian
liquidators. 24s The Culmer court also examined many of the provisions of Baha-
mian insolvency law before concluding that "[wihether or not Bahamian law
is identical in application to American law, there is nothing inherently vicious,
wicked, immoral or shocking to the prevailing moral sense in the Bahamian
laws .... Indeed, it has been shown that these Bahamian laws are not repug-
nant to our ideas of justice.' 246
In protecting the interests of local creditors, the court must also ascertain
whether such creditors will be inconvenienced in being forced to prove their
claims abroad. In making this decision, the court should apply the earlier noted
principle from Gebhard,247 as did the Culmer court. 248 However, this should
not be an absolute rule: inconvenience in proving a claim abroad should be deter-
mined in reference to the size of the creditor's claim-a creditor with a large
claim is less likely to be inconvenienced than a creditor holding a small claim.249
Lastly, in determining whether or not to grant the requested relief, the court
should consider whether deferring to the foreign proceeding will "best assure
an economical and expeditious administration" of the debtor's estate. The Cul,
mer court also considered this factor.
Although the Culmer court's analysis of the threshold requirements could
have been better and the court could have been more explicit in setting forth
some of the principles underlying its § 304 analysis, these are relatively minor
weaknesses in an otherwise soundly reasoned opinion. The decision is the
benchmark among cases that firther the universality approach and acknowledge
the importance of granting ancillary assistance to bankruptcy proceedings
abroad.
Several other cases have built on the principles from Culmer and have
followed the universality approach. 2so Perhaps the most important is the
non-§ 304 case of Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB251 ("Salen
I"). In this case the debtor Salen Reefer Services, A.B. ("Salen Reefer"), a Swed-
ish company, commenced a bankruptcy proceeding in Sweden on December
19, 1984. An interim administrator was appointed and actions by creditors
note 62, at 56 n.37. Thus, in cases where the debtor's business is "substantially related" to the United
States, the court might well retain control over, and apply U.S. law regarding, certain aspects of the § 304
proceeding (see Banobras, 91 B.R. at 667-68), or if necessary, even decide that a full plenary case under
U.S. law is preferable.
245Culmer, 25 B.R. at 629.
2461d. at 631.
247See text accompanying supra note 237.
24SCulme, 25 B.R. at 631-32.
2491d. at 630.
250See supra note 208.
251773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'g 49 B.R. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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against Salen Reefer were suspended. However, on January 9, 1985, an Eng-
lish creditor, Cunard Steamship Company, Ltd. ("Cunard") obtained an order
of attachment, which Salen Reefer moved to dissolve, against some of Salen
Reefer's assets in the United States. The District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, relying on principles of comity, deferred to the Swedish
bankruptcy proceeding and vacated the attachment. Cunard appealed the deci-
sion and in its appeal, inter alia, contended that the district court's order con-
travened the policies underlying § 304. Thus, in the appellate decision, in which
the Second Circuit rejected this contention and upheld the district court's exten-
sion of comity to the Swedish adjudication (and its vacating of Cunard's attach-
ment), there is a lengthy discussion of § 304.
In its discussion of comity the Second Circuit relied on some pre-U.S.
Bankruptcy Code cases, including Gebhard, Finabank, and IBB. It also followed
a comity approach similar to that of Culmer, and noted that 'American courts
have consistently recognized the interest of foreign courts in liquidating or wind-
ing up the affairs of their own domestic business entities."252 Moreover, the
court cited Culmer in support of the proposition that "the modem trend has
been toward a more flexible approach which allows the assets to be distributed
equitably in the foreign proceeding."2 3 The Salen I court also noted that "cred-
itors of an insolvent foreign corporation may be required to assert their claims
against a foreign bankrupt before a duly convened foreign tribunal."254
If the case had been filed under § 304, the same result would most cer-
tainly have been reached, given that the case did not involve the claims of any
U.S. creditors. Moreover, although the court in its comity analysis did not
specifically cite to the factors in § 304(c), it fully discussed all of them (except
for the sixth factor, which was inapplicable), and thus lent some credence to
the contention of the Culmer court that all of the § 304(c) factors may be con-
sidered under a comity analysis. First, the court found that recognizing the
Swedish bankruptcy proceedings would "'facilitatle] the orderly and systematic
2521d. at 458.
2
-
31d. (citing Culmer, 25 B.R. at 629) (other citations omitted).
2 11d. at 458-59. See also Salen 11, 65 B.R. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Salen Dry Cargo A.B. ["Salen Dry Cargo"]
the debtor in Salen II, and Salen Reefer, the debtor in Salen I, were related business entities established
under the laws of Sweden. Both companies filed for bankruptcy on December 19, 1984. Factually, Salen
I and Salen I were indistinguishable, except for the existence of an English judgment against Salen Dry
Cargo. Id. at 468. In Salen 11, another non-§ 304 case, the district court"look[ed] to section 304, not because
it govern[ed the] proceeding [at bar], but because it provide[d] the best index of how a domestic judgment
would be treated if enforcement were sought against a foreign bankrupt: Id. at 469. The district court
reasoned that, since a domestic judgment would not be enforced by a court applying § 304, the foreign
judgment at bar should likewise not be enforced. Id. at 470. The court also noted that the Panamanian
creditor's efforts to enforce the English judgment were an "attempt to effect an end run around the Swed-
ish bankruptcy proceeding" Id. The Salen I court also noted that in Salen I "[t]he Second Circuit ha[d]
already dictated that comity be extended to Swedish bankruptcy proceedings. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed.
825 F.2d 709.
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distribution of the assets of Salen [Reefer"'255 and that under Swedish law
"it]here is no indication that Cunard [would] be treated in any manner inimi-
cal to our policy of equality.256 This finding would have fulfilled the require-
ment of§ 304(c)(1). Similarly, the fact that the Swedish court "has the power
to issue orders preventing the debtor from dissipating or absconding with
assets" 257 and that Cunard would receive a preference if its attachment were
upheld would have satisfied § 304(c)(3). The factors in § 304(c)(2) and (4) would
have been fulfilled by the court's finding that "Itihe principles of Swedish
bankruptcy law are not dissimilar to those of [the U.S.] Bankruptcy Code '258
and that "there is no indication that Cunard [wouldi be prejudiced or treated
unjustly if it were to participate in the Swedish bankruptcy proceedings "259
In addition, by relying on Gebhard the Salen I court also rejected the argument
that Cunard would be inconvenienced or prejudiced by being forced to prove
its claim abroad. It is also implicit in the Salen I decision that deferring to the
Swedish proceedings would "best assure an economical and expeditious adminis-
tration" of the debtor's estate.
The Salen I decision is especially important because it further defines the
notions of what protection local creditors should receive before a court grants
comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding. Cunard had contended that the
district court's grant of comity to the Swedish bankruptcy proceeding was inap-
propriate because the Swedish court lacked "in personam jurisdiction over
Cunard and in rem jurisdiction over the attached property."260 The Salen I court
rejected these contentions and instead upheld the debtor's contention that juris-
diction over the debtor was the necessary criterion. In so doing, the court con-
trasted the rationale for granting comity to a final foreign judgment with the
rationale for granting comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding:
The rationale underlying the granting of comity to a final
foreign judgment is that litigation should end after the parties
have had an opportunity to present their cases fully and fairly
to a court of competent jurisdiction. The extending of comity
to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, by staying or enjoining the
commencement or continuation of an action against a debtor
or its property, has a somewhat different rationale. The grant-
ing of comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding enables the
assets of a debtor to be dispersed in an equitable, orderly, and
systematic manner, rather than in a haphazard, erratic or piece-
253Salen 1, 773 F.2d at 459 (citation omitted).
216Id. at 459-60.
257d. at 459.
2581d.
259kd.
201d. at 457.
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meal fashion. Consequently, American courts have consis-
tently recognized the interest of foreign courts in liquidating
or winding up the affairs of their own domestic business
entities. 261
This distinction is very important, because it sets forth the proposition that
U.S. courts can grant comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding although it
might be inappropriate to grant comity to a foreign money judgment on simi-
lar facts. Thus, the Salen I court noted that, although a U.S. court would not
grant comity to a foreign court's award of a money judgment against a defen-
dant over whom the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction, a U.S.
court could grant comity to a foreign country's bankruptcy proceeding over
the objection of a U.S. creditor although the foreign court did not have per-
sonal jurisdiction over such creditor.262 The Salen I court pointed out that the
Gebhard court did just that, and then cited the principle from Gebhard "that
'every person who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly [sic) subjects him-
self to such laws of the foreign government, affecting the powers and obliga-
tions of the corporation with which he voluntarily contracts, as the known
and established policy [as] that government authorizes'"263 The court concluded
that therefore "creditors of an insolvent foreign corporation may be required
to assert their claims against a foreign bankrupt before a duly convened foreign
bankruptcy tribunal."264
Thus, as in Gebhard and Culmer, the court in Salen I granted comity to
a foreign bankruptcy proceeding over the objection of a creditor, after finding
that the creditor would not be prejudiced, that the foreign proceeding was fun-
damentally fair, and that the foreign law facilitated equality of distribution.265
26 1Id. at 457-58 (emphasis added).
2621d. at 458 (citing Culmer, 25 B.R. at 628-29). It is assumed, of course, that the foreign court had
jurisdiction over the debtor and was the appropriate forum for the debtor's bankruptcy.
2631d. (quoting Gebhard, 109 U.S. at 537).
2641d. at 458-59.
26 5For further discusson of the minimum safeguards creditors are entitled to receive before a U.S. court
grants comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, see, e.g., In re Enercons Virginia, Inc., 812 F.2d 1469
(4th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Enercons] and Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877 (2d
Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Drexel]. In Enercons the Fourth Circuit upheld a lower court's decision to grant comity
to an Italian court's order of appointment of a trustee of a bankrupt Italian company, even though the Ital-
ian court clarified the rights of the trustee in an ex parte order at a proceeding to which objecting creditors
had received "no notice or opportunity to be heard until the time for appeal of the [olrder had passed" Enercons,
812 F.2d at 1473. The Fourth Circuit claimed that "the Italian proceedings were sufficiently analogous to
our fundamental concepts of justice as to warrant our extension of comity to them:' Id. Implicit in the deci-
sion is the notion that creditors need not receive notice and an opportunity to be heard at all hearings relating
to the powers of a trustee, as long as the original appointment is fundamentally fair.
In Drexel, in comparison, the Second Circuit refused to grant comity to liquidation proceedings in
Dubai after concluding that further inquiry into the fairness of the Dubai procedures was necessary. The
court claimed that the Dubai liquidation decree (which established a committee of receivers to liquidate
the debtor's assets and set forth the general guidelines for the liquidation) "appear[ed] to be Dubai's first
attempt to frame an insolvency law," Drexel, 777 F.2d at 881, and that Drexel Burnham Lambert Group [here-
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The decision in In re Gee266 followed the broad Culmer approach, and con-
tinued to build on many of the notions set forth in Salen I. Gee involved the
conflict in the U.S. courts between Universal Casualty & Surety Company
Ltd. ("Universal"), a Cayman Islands reinsurance company undergoing liqui
dation in the Cayman Islands, and its court appointed liquidator, Allan Gee
("Gee"). The facts of this case, described by the Gee court as an "international
chess game' 267 are rather confusing and most details need not be repeated here.
In short, Gee filed a petition seeking relief under § 304 to assist the primary
liquidation in the Cayman Islands. He sought discovery of persons and enti-
ties in the Southern District of New York regarding Universal and the adminis
tration of Universal's estate in the Cayman Islands, as well as the issuance of
preliminary injunctions to prevent certain individuals from disposing of Univer-
sal's assets, books and records located in the Southern District. Universal filed
a chapter 11 petition to block the actions of Gee, whom it claimed was biased
against it.
The Gee court dismissed Universals chapter 11 petition and granted Gee's
§ 304 petition. In reaching its holding that it was appropriate "to allow a
[§] 304 petition solely for the purposes of discovery [even though] there [was]
no property in the United States involved in the foreign proceeding,"268
the Gee court relied on the principle from Culmer that "the court 'is free
to broadly mold appropriate relief in near blank check fashion."' 269 The Gee
court also relied on the principles from Salen I that "!American courts have
consistently recognized the interest of foreign courts in liquidating or winding
up the affairs of their own domestic business entities' (citation omitted),
and that 'the modern trend has been toward a more flexible approach which
allows the assets to be distributed equitably in the foreign proceeding"' 270
The Gee court added that "[i]f creditors of a foreign bankrupt, including Ameri
inafter "Drexel"] "should have been afforded reasonable discovery and an evidentiary hearing" Id. The aspects
of the Dubai proceedings that troubled the Second Circuit included the following: Drexel had asserted that
the committee of receivers was to function as both a bankruptcy trustee and bankruptcy court and that
there would be limited appellate review of the committee's actions; Drexel had contended that Dubai law
did not provide for the meeting of creditors or for the notice of sale of the debtor's property; and "Drexel
[had] met with a stone wall in its efforts to establish the facts through the ordinary process of discovery
and fact finding." Id. at 880. Specifically, the committee of receivers had refused to answer Drexers inter-
rogatories or to produce the debtor for deposition, with the result that "Drexel never was afforded even
the barest opportunity to determine the fairness of the proposed Dubai proceeding. This Court also was
thwarted in its efforts to discover the facts." Id. at 880-81. However, on remand and after discovery and
an evidentiary hearing, the district court deferred to the Dubai bankruptcy proceedings. Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group v. Galadari, 1987 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5030 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1987).
26653 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
2671d. at 892.
268d. at 899. The court also noted that the debtor had satisfied the § 109(a) threshold eligibility require,
ments. Id. at 900. See discussion accompanying supra notes 127 to 130.
269Id. at 897 (quoting Culmer, 25 B.R. at 624).
2751d. at 901 (citing Salen 1, 773 E2d at 458).
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cans, may be required under principles of comity to have their claims adjudi-
cated by a foreign tribunal, then so, too, may the shareholders."271
In considering the § 304(c) criteria, the Gee court followed Culmer in not-
ing that comity was the "most significant" factor of the six. 272 In affording comity
to the order of the Cayman Islands court, the Gee court also relied on the notion
from Salen I that "[flor comity to be extended, it is necessary only that the
foreign court abide by fundamental standards of procedural fairness."273 In evalu-
ating the Cayman Islands' insolvency law, the court noted that the Cayman
Islands Companies Law was similar to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the
debtor had "shown nothing to this court to persuade it that fundamental stan-
dards of fairness were abridged by the Cayman Islands tribunal when it ordered
Universal wound up."274
The court found that all of the other applicable § 304(c) factors were like-
wise satisfied. Section 304(c)(1) was met because there were no provisions in
the Cayman Islands insolvency law that would treat the debtor's creditors
unjustly; § 304(c)(2) was satisfied because Cayman Islands' insolvency law does
not prejudice U.S. claimants or prefer the claims of Cayman Island citizens;
§ 304(c)(3) was satisfied because the Cayman Islands' insolvency law voids
fraudulent preferences; and § 304(c)(4) was satisfied since the distribution of
proceeds of the estate under Cayman Islands law is "generally in harmony with
the [U.S. Bankruptcy] Code"275 Lastly, the court found that the Cayman Islands
proceeding would "best assure an economical and expeditious administration
of [the debtor's] estate."276 After finding it appropriate to grant the relief
requested by the foreign representative, the court cited Culmer for the propo-
sition that "lilt is not necessary that the [Cayman Islands] Companies Law
be a carbon copy of the [U.S.] Bankruptcy Code; rather, it must be of a nature
that is not repugnant to the American laws and policies-and clearly it is not " 277
b. Toga and the Territoriality Approach
Other recent cases, however, have rejected the Culmer approach in favor
2711d
,
272Id.
2731d. at 902 (citing Salen 1, 773 F.2d at 457).
2741d
,
275Id. at 904.
2761d.
27d. (citing Culmer, 25 B.R. at 621). The court in Axona, in suspending a § 303(b)(4) case and order-
ing a turnover under § 305, further expanded the approach enunciated in Culmer, Salen I, Salen II, and
Gee and offered the most comprehensive analysis to date of prior case law and of the interconnectedness
of the various provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code regarding foreign bankruptcies. For a discussion of
Axona, see text accompanying infra notes 456 to 492. For a more recent case that also developed the univer-
sality approach in its decision granting § 304(c) relief and ordering the turnover of assets abroad, see Koreag,
130 B.R. 705. See also the other cases listed in note 208 supra.
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of a narrower view of comity and more limited recognition of foreign bankrupt-
cies.278 Rather than recognizing the laws of a foreign proceeding and ordering
a turnover of assets to the foreign jurisdiction, these courts simply have applied
U.S. law. This restrictive approach to comity is exemplified by the court in
Toga.279
In March 1977 and December 1978, Toga Manufacturing Limited ('Toga"),
a Canadian corporation, and Peter T Hesse Enterprises, Inc. ("Hesse"), a Michi,
gan corporation, contracted to make Hesse the exclusive sales representative
for Toga in charge of procuring orders for automotive parts from Volkswagen,
its subsidiaries, General Motors Corporation ("General Motors"), and Ford
Motor Company ("Ford"). The contracts provided for alleged breaches of the
contracts to be submitted to the American Arbitration Association ('AAA").
In 1980, Hesse asserted that Toga had wrongly withheld commissions owed
to it from sales to companies located outside the United States and filed an
arbitration claim with the AAA in Michigan. In February 1982, the arbitra-
tion panel entered an arbitration award in favor of Hesse in the amount of
$196,978. In March 1982, Hesse filed a petition in the Wayne County Cir-
cuit Court in Michigan to enforce its arbitration award. Toga responded with
a motion to vacate the award on the ground that Toga was not represented
at the February arbitration hearing.
On April 1, 1982, Toga agreed to a partial settlement by entry of a con-
sent judgment in the amount of $60,750 (the "consent judgment"), for amounts
owed to Hesse from sales to customers located in the United States. The con-
sent judgment also provided for resubmission to arbitration of issues relating
to commissions from foreign sales.
Meanwhile, Togas financial difficulties had worsened and on April 29, 1982,
Toga executed a consensual default agreement with its largest secured creditor,
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce ("CIBC"). Under the agreement CIBC
took control of the operation and assets of Toga and appointed Peat Marwick,
Ltd. as its receiver (the "Canadian receiver") to continue operating Toga.
Arbitration on the foreign sales commissions commenced on May 3, 1982,
and around that time the Canadian receiver repudiated the consent judgment.
On May 13, 1982, an arbitration award in favor of Hesse was entered,
and on May 21, 1982, confirmed by judgment by the Wayne County Circuit
Court.
Hesse reacted to the repudiation of the consent judgment by serving writs
of garnishment on Volkswagen, General Motors, and Ford. On May 13, 1982,
CIBC intervened in this Wayne County garnishment action and alleged
278See supra note 209.
27928 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983). The facts of the case as discussed in the text above are set
out in id. at 165-67.
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that it held a perfected security interest in Toga's accounts receivable that was
superior to Hesse's judgment lien. On May 20, 1982, the Wayne County Cir-
cuit Court ordered the garnishee defendants to pay the garnished funds to the
clerk of the court pending resolution of the priority dispute. On July 9, 1982
the court found CIBC's security interest to be superior to Hesse's judgment
lien and directed that the funds be paid to the Canadian receiver. Hesse
appealed, and this case was pending at the time of the Toga § 304 decision.
On October 18, 1982 an unsecured creditor of Toga commenced an involun-
tary bankruptcy proceeding against Toga in Ontario, Canada. On November
16, 1982, the Supreme Court of Ontario granted the petition and appointed
Peat Marwick, Ltd. as trustee of Toga's estate (the "Canadian trustee"). On
December 14, 1982, the Canadian trustee filed a petition in the Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan to commence a section 304 ancil-
lary proceeding and requested the following: (1) an injunction against all of Toga's
creditors from commencing or continuing actions against Toga or its assets, and
(2) an order directing the Wayne County Circuit Court clerk to turn over the
$215,000 garnishment fund to the Canadian trustee.280 The Canadian trustee
satisfied all of the § 304 threshold requirements, including proving that under
Canadian bankruptcy law the debtor's property in the United States was con,
sidered property of the debtor's estate.28 '
However, the Toga court denied the Canadian trustees request for injunctive
relief and for the turnover order, and thereby allowed Hesse's claim to continue
to be litigated in Michigan courts under Michigan law. 282 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Toga court followed a territoriality-based approach to both comity and
the criteria in § 304.
The Toga court, like the Culmer court, focused on comity, but unlike the
Culmer court the Toga court interpreted comity quite narrowly and relied on
early U.S. cases that followed the territoriality approach. Thus, the Toga court
cited Harrison and Ogden to support its conclusion that, "[hlistoricaly, the
bankruptcy laws of our country have been hostile towards claims asserted by
foreign trustees in bankruptcy against alleged estate property located in the
United States."283 Although it is true that early U.S. cases were hostile to such
claims, the Toga opinion ignored later cases, such as Gebhard and Culmer, that
280Id. at 167.
2S'More specifically, the Toga court noted that section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, Revised Statutes of
Canada, 1970, Chapter B-3, as amended (the "Canadian Bankruptcy Act") defines "property" as includ-
ing "'money... whether situated in Canada or elsewhere."' Id. The court also observed that § 47(c) of
the Canadian Bankruptcy Act "defines property of the estate to include 'all property wherever situated
of the bankrupt at the date of his bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on him before his dis-
charge."' Toga, 28 B.R. at 167.
2S2Toga, 28 B.R. at 170-71.
2S31d. at 167.
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adopted a more universality-based approach to comity. More importantly,
although Toga involved a petition brought by a foreign representative from
Canada, the Toga court even failed to discuss Cornfeld,284 a case that had noted
the substantial similarity of U.S. and Canadian bankruptcy law and had granted
comity to a Canadian liquidation proceeding.2s5
The Toga court also emphasized territorial protections for U.S. creditors
in its discussion of § 304. Although the court began its § 304 analysis by
conceding that "[siection 304 ... embodies the universal theory of conflicts
of laws with some qualifications,2s 6 the court cursorily discussed the univer-
sality factors in § 304(c). Indeed, the court's analysis primarily focused on
§ 304(c)(4) and (5), and the discussion of the other § 304 criteria totaled merely
five sentences in the opinion. In those five sentences the court acknowledged
the following: that "Hesse would receive just treatment of its claim against Toga
in the Canadian courts"287 and that Canadian law provides for equality of
distribution 28 8 (which would have satisfied § 304(c)(1)); and that "Hesse would
suffer no inconvenience if it were forced to litigate its claim in Canada"28 9 (which
would have satisfied § 304(c)(2)). 290
However, in the court's view, these findings were outweighed by the fact
that the treatment of Hesse's claim by the Canadian courts would not satisfy
§ 304(c)(4). More specifically, the court noted that under U.S. law, since Hesse
had perfected its judgment by serving writs of garnishment on several of Toga's
creditors, it was a lien creditor291 entitled to be recognized as holding a secured
claim to the extent of its perfected interest. 292 Therefore, under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code Hesse would have been one of the first creditors to re-
ceive payment. 293 However, in the court's opinion, under Canadian law Hesse
would most likely have been considered an "ordinary creditor" with a lower
284471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979).
28'See supra note 235. The Toga court did, however, mention that the Second Circuit had granted comity
to a Canadian insolvency proceeding in Clarkson, 544 F.2d 624, but the Toga court relied on language from
Clarkson requiring the protection of local citizens and local policies, Toga, 28 B.R. at 170, and failed to men-
tion the universality parts of the Clarkson opinion.
286Toga, 28 B.R. at 167-68.
287Id. at 168.
2881d. at 167 n.2. (the court mentioned "equality of distribution among debtors:' but the court must
certainly have meant equality of distribution among creditors).
2s9Id. at 168.
29 0The court also stated that Canadian law provides for a fresh start for debtors. Id. at 167. This would
have satisfied § 304(c)(6), if that section had been applicable.
29'The Uniform Commercial Code defines a "lien creditor" as "a creditor who has acquired a lien on
the property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for benefit of creditors from
the time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition or a receiver
in equity from the time of appointment" U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1991).
292Toga, 28 B.R. at 168. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 506 (West 1991) (determination of secured status).
293Toga, 28 B.R. at 168.
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priority and would have lost the protection of its security interest under U.S.
law.294 Since this discrepancy would have led to a distribution of proceeds not
substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, the court held that Hesse's claim be litigated in Michigan courts under
U.S. law.295
The Toga court focused on "minor substantive differences between Cana-
dian and U.S. law," rather than considering the overall fairness of Canadian
law and the general similarity of Canadian and U.S. law.296 In so doing, the
court espoused a limited view of comity, under which comity should not
be accorded to foreign proceedings unless the foreign country either adopts
the equivalent of U.S. bankruptcy law priority rules or enters into a treaty
with the United States for mutual recognition of each country's bankruptcy
laws.297 In effect, the Toga approach makes recognition of foreign bankruptcy
proceedings almost impossible, even of sister common law jurisdictions, because
no two bankruptcy codes will likely have the same requirements for the
distribution of assets. The court's approach harks back to the earlier paro-
chial approach of the late nineteenth century and ignores the growing trend
in favor of recognizing and cooperating with foreign bankruptcy proceed-
ings. 298 Indeed, it is now widely recognized that comity does not require that
foreign laws be identical to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, but rather that they
need only not be "repugnant to [U.S.] ideas ofjustice."299 Given the great over-
all similarity between Canadian bankruptcy law and the the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, a difference in priority for garnishor/judgment creditors as prescribed
by Canadian bankruptcy law certainly does not appear to be fundamentally
unfair or "repugnant" to U.S. notions of justice.
As noted earlier, the legislative history states that in applying § 304, a court
is to "be permitted to make the appropriate orders under all of the cir-
cumstances of each case, rather than being provided with inflexible rules."300
2941d. The court relied on § 107 of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act and the case, The Canadian Credit
Men's Trust Assoc. v. Beaver Trucking, 1959 S.C.R. 311 (Can. 1959), for the proposition "that funds paid
by garnishee defendant into an escrow account held by [a] court pursuant to a writ of garnishment [do]
not constitute security for the garnishor/judgment creditor:' Toga, 28 B.R. at 168.
29SToga, 28 B.R. at 170.
296Axona, 88 B.R. at 611.
297Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 21 (criticizing the Toga approach). See also Fischer, supra note
5, at 640-49; Goldie, supra note 62, at 326-29. The Toga court noted that the proposed United States
of America-Canada Bankruptcy Teaty (1979), if ratified, would have led the court to grant the Canadian
Trustee's requested relief, but found that "Itlhis treaty has not been ratified and we are not bound by it"
Toga, 28 B.R. at 169.
298See Fischer, supra note 5, at 635, 645, 647; Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 21.
299Culmer, 25 B.R. at 631; accord Axona, 88 B.R. at 611; Gee, 53 B.R. at 904. See also Salen 1, 773 F.2d
at 457 ("the foreign court must abide by fundamental standards of procedural fairness"); Gallagher & Hartie,
supra note 5, at 21; Tautman, supra note 62, at 56. The New York courts have narrowly construed the
exceptions to the comity doctrine. See supra note 235.
30 Legislative history quoted in text accompanying note 191 supra (emphasis added).
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Thus, for the purposes of argument, even if one concedes that Hesse would
not have received a distribution "substantially in accordance' with U.S. law,
in light of all of the circumstances involved in Toga, a single statutory diver-
gence between Canadian bankruptcy law and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code should
not have outweighed all of the other § 304 factors supporting the granting of
the § 304 relief requested by the Canadian trustee, 30' including the following:
(i) Canada was the appropriate jurisdiction for the primary bankruptcy proceed-
ing; (ii) the property in the United States was considered property of the estate
under Canadian law; (iii) the Wayne County Circuit Court had held that the
CIBC's security interest was superior to Hesse's judgment lien; (iv) Hesse would
have received just treatment of its claim in Canadian courts and would have
shared equally under Canadian law with other garnishor/judgment creditors;
(v) Canada and the United States are sister common law jurisdictions with
similar bankruptcy laws; (vi) enforcement of the Canadian law regarding gar-
nishor/udgment creditors would not have been fundamentally unfair or repug-
nant to US. ideas ofjustice; (vii) Hesse would not have suffered discriminatory
treatment or inconvenience in processing its claim in Canada; and (viii) defer,
ring to the Canadian proceeding would have assured an economical and expe-
ditious administration of the debtor's estate.
The interests of U.S. creditors must certainly be protected, but not to the
extent provided in Toga.302 The general rule to be applied in § 304 cases should
be that U.S. creditors are not entitled to the application of U.S. law for all acts
committed prior to the commencement of a primary bankruptcy proceeding
abroad. Rather, in the absence of discriminatory treatment or other fundamen
tally unfair procedures, U.S. creditors should only be entitled to be treated the
same as other similarly situated creditors in the primary bankruptcy proceed-
ing, under the applicable bankruptcy law of the country in which the primary
301See Finister, supra note 62, at 370 ("in a case where the secured status of a creditor is subject to
change under foreign law, this fact should be considered a factor against affording Section 304 relief and
weighed against the remaining factors to determine if, overall, relief should be granted")
3'0 Some commentators disagree with the approach urged here. For instance, Richard A. Gitlin and Evan
D. Flaschen interpret the Toga decision as a "practical solution to the conflict between domestic policy and
principles of comity." Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 62, at 321. They distinguish the results in Toga from
the results in Culmer and Salen Ion the ground that the garnishments obtained in Toga were obtained before
the bankruptcy proceedings were commenced in Canada, unlike the attachments in question in the two
other cases that were obtained after the foreign bankruptcy cases had been commenced. Id. They argue
that, if the foreign representatives in Culmer and Salen I had originally commenced bankruptcies in the United
States, rather than abroad, the attachments in those cases would have been invalid under U.S. law and
therefore the courts were correct in avoiding attachments in deference to foreign law. In contrast, they argue
that, if the foreign representative in Toga had commenced a bankruptcy in the United States, rather than
abroad, the garnishments in question would have been valid under U.S. law, and therefore "ft]o void those
garnishments because the debtor entered bankruptcy proceedings in Canada six months later would run
counter to American public policy and could lead to unnecessary forum shopping by multinational debt-
ors.' Id. I criticize their approach in note 179 supra.
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proceeding occurs.303
The court in the Lineas bankruptcy proceedings also preferred the interests
of U.S. creditors.30 4 This bankruptcy involved the insolvency of an air carrier,
whose stock was owned by the government of Nicaragua and which operated
between Nicaragua and the United States. The provisional trustee of the air
carrier appointed under Nicaraguan law (the "Nicaraguan trustee") sought a
turnover of all of the debtor's property located in the United States (including
office and maintenance equipment, furniture, bank accounts, vehicles and most
importantly, a Civil Aeronautics Board ("C.A.B.") certificate permitting the
debtor to operate scheduled flight service into the United States). The Nica-
raguan trustee also sought injunctive relief to enjoin the commencement or con-
tinuation of all litigation in the United States against the foreign debtor or its
property.
The bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Florida granted partial
injunctive relief. First of all, the court enjoined the commencement of any new
proceedings against the debtor or its property in any federal court, except for
suits commenced in bankruptcy courts. Secondly, the court enjoined all liti-
gants from enforcing or executing on any judgments obtained without first
obtaining the court's leave, but allowed pending actions to continue up to and
through the entry ofjudgment. 3°5 The court also issued a turnover order that
303See Tutman, supra note 62, at 56, 58; Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 21. Thus, in Toga it would
have been fair for a garnishor/judgment creditor in the United States to have lost the benefit of its per,
fected security interest under U.S. law, and to have been treated the same as other garnishor/judgment
creditors in the Canadian insolvency proceeding. In contrast, ordering § 304 relief would be troubling on
the following facts:
A foreign debtor whose principal place of business is in country X files for bankruptcy
in country X. The foreign debtor also does business in the United States and has
U.S employees. The foreign representative files a petition in the United States for
§ 304 relief and satisfies the § 304 threshold requirements. The foreign representa-
tive seeks the turnover of all of the foreign debtor's U.S. assets to country X to be
administered under the law of country X.
Assume that the foreign debtor's U.S. employees would be entitled to priorities in distribution under §
507(a)(3) and (4) in a plenary bankruptcy case under U.S. law. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(3), (4) (West 1991).
Also assume that under the bankruptcy law of country X, only employees employed in country X are enti-
tled to a priority in distribution in bankruptcy cases commenced in country X. (Thus, the U.S. employees
would be treated as ordinary unsecured creditors.) If the U.S. court were to grant the requested § 304 relief,
the U.S. employees would lose their U.S. priority and would be treated worse than would the foreign debt-
or's employees who are employed in country X. Since the U.S. employees would not be treated as well as
similarly situated employees in country X, the equality of distribution principle would be violated, and the
U.S. employees would encounter discrimination and fundamental unfairness in the bankruptcy proceeding
in country X. On these facts, ordering the requested § 304 relief would therefore be inappropriate. A ple-
nary U.S. bankruptcy case (in which the U.S. employees receive their § 507 priorities), in conjunction with
a subsequent suspension/turnover order under § 305, would yield a fairer result. See Part ll.C infra.
3
°
4Lineas II, 13 B.R. 779; Lineas 1, 10 B.R. 790.
303Lineas 1, 10 B.R. at 791.
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was a "turnover in name only";306 the order was issued upon the Nicaraguan
trustees representation that none of the debtor's assets located in the United
States would be removed and that such assets would "be applied primarily to
satisfy the debts owing to the U.S. creditors "3°7 The turnover order further
protected U.S. creditors by prohibiting the Nicaraguan trustee "from in any
way encumbering, assigning or abandoning the debtor's known assets located
in the United States... as well as any additional assets discovered in this coun
try.'30 8 The turnover order, in effect, was not a turnover order at all and was
intended to benefit U.S. creditors at the expense of the debtor's other
creditors-the amount of the undisputed claims of U.S. creditors alone was
greater than the value of the debtor's tangible assets in the United States.309
A few months later the bankruptcy court also ordered the appointment
of an independent co-trustee to prepare a disinterested evaluation of the debtor's
most valuable asset, the C.A.B. certificate, and to present his evaluation to
the C.A.B.310 The co-trustee was appointed to protect the interest of two of
the debtor's U.S. creditors who together held the largest claim against the
debtor. The creditors had asserted that the Nicaraguan trustee had a conflict
of interest, and the court found that the Nicaraguan trustee "presuma
bly ... [had] no interest in preserving the [C.A.B.] certificate for this debtor
and will do all he can to accomplish his government's wish to replace the debtor
by another carrier that has no obligation to the U.S. creditors."311 The court
made this claim even though it also acknowledged that the Nicaraguan trus-
tee, his counsel, and the Nicaraguan government all had "frlly and meticulously
discharged their duties and commitments... land that tihere [wasl no
basis ... for any criticism of any of these parties "' 31 2
In the Lineas court's analysis, "lookling] to Nicaragua for payment [was]
an alternative to be avoided if possible under § 304(c)(2)" 313 This was the court's
only reference to a specific § 304(c) factor. Rather than discussing the § 304(c)
criteria, the court assumed that the case should be administered under U.S.
law. Granted, the Lineas court might well have had legitimate concerns about
the laws of Nicaragua, a nation then in revolutionary flux, and the C.A.B.
certificate appears to have been deserving of U.S. administration. 3 4 These
factors, however, justified the need for a frill U.S. bankruptcy to be commenced
under § 303(b)(4) and not for the transformation of a § 304 case into a full-
306Morales & Deutcsh, supra note 5, at 1589.
'
07Lineas 1, 10 B.R. at 791.
3081d.
3°9Lineas II, 13 B.R. at 780.
311d. at 781.
31hd. at 780.
3121d.
313Id.
314Gallagher & Hartje, supra note 5, at 17.
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blown case under U.S. law, a purpose for which § 304 was not intended. 31-
c. Recent Cases-Attempting to Define the Minimum Necessary Pro-
tection for U.S. Creditors
Recently, the courts in two other cases, In re Papeleras Reunidas, S.A.
("Papeleras")31 6 and Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of M/V Venture Star317
denied requests for § 304 relief. In Papeleras, the first reported § 304 case involv-
ing the recognition of Spanish insolvency law, the court achieved the correct
result, but for many of the wrong reasons, and its analysis included many argu-
ments that subvert the application of the factors in § 304(c).
The Papeleras § 304 proceeding involved a dispute between the Spanish
corporation Papeleras Reunidas, S.A. ("Papeleras") and its major U.S. credi-
tor Republic Tobacco, Inc. ("Republic"), formerly known as Adams Apple Dis-
tributing Company ('Adams"). Papeleras produced paper products sold
worldwide, including the Papeleras "Bambu" cigarette rolling papers (the
"Papeleras papers"). The facts of the case are rather extensive. The trademarks
relating to the Papeleras papers were registered in many countries, including
the United States. In 1975 Papeleras entered into a contract with Adams that
designated Adams as the exclusive distributor of the Papeleras papers in the
United States for five years.
Problems soon arose under the contract, and by early 1976 both parties
stopped performance. Adams sued Papeleras in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois for damages resulting from Papeleras's alleged breach
of their agreement, and Papeleras counterclaimed. In August, 1984 the court
rendered judgment in the amount of US$1,450,973 in favor of Adams, and in
November 1985 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 3 8 With
the award of this judgment, Adams became Papeleras's largest creditor. Mean-
while, Papeleras entered into a replacement exclusive distribution agreement
for the United States with the New York corporation Bambu Sales, Inc.
("Bambu").
While the dispute between Adams and Papeleras was working its way
through the U.S. courts, but before the judgment was entered, Papeleras encoun-
tered financial problems in Spain. On November 7, 1979, the board of direc-
tors of Papeleras petitioned a Spanish court to commence a Spanish insolvency
3151d.
31692 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.). The facts of the case as discussed in the text above are set out in
id. at 586-89.
"3102 B.R. 373 (D.NJ. 1988), appeal dismissed, 878 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1989).
318Adams Apple Distributing Co. v. Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., No. 77 C 868, mem. op. (N.D. 111., October
26, 1984), affti, 773 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1985).
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procedure called "suspension of payments;' and on November 20, 1980, the
Spanish court declared that Papeleras was in suspension of payments.
Papeleras' creditors were given notice of the debtor's suspension of pay
ments procedure through newspaper publication, and shareholders were noti-
fied by mail. Although Adams and its president owned shares of Papeleras's
stock, they stipulated that they never received notice of the suspension of pay-
ments procedure (nor of the subsequent liquidation proceedings), until
Papeleras's counsel informed Adams's counsel in August 1984.
On November 20, 1981 the Spanish court approved a plan of payment
between Papeleras and the majority of its listed creditors. Adams was not a
party to this plan because it was not listed as a creditor in the suspension of
payments proceeding. (Disputed claims are not recognized under Spanish law
until rendered undisputed.) In late 1983 Papeleras failed to make a scheduled
payment, and in March 1984 it ceased operations. The Spanish court directed
that Papeleras be liquidated, and on March 16, 1984, appointed three liqui-
dators (the "Spanish liquidators").
As noted above, in August 1984 Adams was awarded judgment in its breach
of contract action against Papeleras and also learned of the liquidation of
Papeleras. In October 1984 Adams moved to impose a lien on Papeleras's U.S.
trademarks in the district court in Illinois. The Spanish liquidators opposed
the motion, and argued that under Spanish law creditors are not allowed to
seize the assets of a company in liquidation to satisfy their own claims. 319 In
an affidavit filed with the court, the Spanish liquidators' attorney also claimed
that no sale of the trademarks was planned. The court granted Adams's motion
for the imposition of the lien, but agreed to set aside the lien if Papeleras provided
the court with certified English translations of the Spanish law relied on by
the liquidators and if the Spanish proceedings recognized Adams's status as
a creditor.320
The Spanish liquidators never provided the district court with the certi-
fied translations and the lien continued. Despite their attorney's representa-
tions to the contrary, in October 1984 the Spanish liquidators sold the
trademarks to Bambu in Madrid while the motion for the liens was still pend-
ing in the United States. (The district court later discovered that the Spanish
liquidators had been negotiating with Bambu since March, 1984-thus, they
had been negotiating a sale of the trademarks at the very time that their law-
yer had told the district court that no sale was planned.) Three days after the
sale, Bambu recorded its assignment of the trademarks in Washington, D.C.
3'9Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 588.
32Id. According to the Seventh Circuit, the district court was concerned that, since disputed claims
are not recognized under Spanish law, Papeleras' appeal would prevent Adams from having its claim con-
sidered in the Spanish liquidation. Adams Apple Distributing Co., 773 F.2d at 928.
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Adams learned of the transfer of the trademarks from Papeleras to Bambu
when it attempted to record its lien and discovered Bambu's prior registration.
Adams responded by commencing an action in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois alleging that the transfer of trademarks constituted
a fraudulent conveyance under U.S. law. For venue reasons this action was dis-
missed, and an identical action was commenced in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of New York.
In February 1985, the Spanish liquidators commenced a § 304 ancillary
proceeding in an attempt to prevent Adams from seizing the payments due
Papeleras under the transfer of trademarks agreement with Bambu. The
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the § 304
petition and allowed the fraudulent conveyance action under U.S. law to
continue.
The Papeleras court analyzed the § 304(c) criteria in detail. The court first
turned to the requirement in § 304(c)(1) that the holders of all claims receive
"just treatment:' The court noted that Spanish bankruptcy law does not overtly
discriminate against non-Spanish creditors. 321 Nevertheless, the court found
that "[dleferring to the Spanish proceeding [would] not afford just treatment
to Adams"3 22 because Adams' claim, which would have been recognized under
U.S. law, was not recognized under Spanish law. In short, § 101(5) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code includes unliquidated and disputed claims,3 23 and in the
court's opinion this broad definition of claim should also apply to "claims" in
§ 304(c)(1). Under Spanish law, however, "only 'constitutive' or liquidated,
undisputed claims" are recognized.324
This approach by the Papeleras court misconstrued the application of §
304(c)(1), which instead requires the U.S. court to look at the fairness of the
foreign law to ensure the just treatment of all creditors under the application
of the foreign law.325 This section does not require that U.S. creditors receive
the same treatment as they would under U.S. law. Under this well accepted
reading of § 304(c)(1), if the Papeleras court had determined that Spanish law
did not discriminate against non-Spanish creditors (and that Spanish law
provided a comprehensive scheme for the orderly and just treatment of credi-
tors), the court should have found section 304(c)(1) to be satisfied.
32'papeleras, 92 B.R. at 590.
3221d
,323Section 101(5) defines "claim" as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judg-
ment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured" 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West 1991).
314papeleras, 92 B.R. at 590. Under Spanish law Adams' claim could not be recognized until the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed Adams' judgment in November 1985, but by then most of Papeleras's assets had been
liquidated. Id.
325See Finister, supra note 62, at 367-68. See also Culmer, 25 B.R. at 629-30; Gee, 53 B.R. at 903; Toga,
28 B.R. at 168; Axona, 88 B.R. at 612.
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The Papeleras court also erred in its application of § 304(c)(3). Rather than
applying Spanish preferential and fraudulent transfer law, if so applicable, the
court suggested that U.S. avoidance law should be considered. In discussing
preferential dispositions of property; the court acknowledged that "[tlestimony
was presented that Spanish law disallows preferential transfers"326 -the Spanish
liquidators had argued that Spanish preferential transfer law should be applied
so that all creditors in the Spanish proceedings would be treated equally and
that to allow the U.S. creditor to satisfy a judgment obtained after the com-
mencement of the liquidation would benefit the American creditor at the
expense of all other creditors.
The Papeleras court, however, ruled against the Spanish liquidators on this
point. The court found that the application of Spanish law would violate an
important American policy:
Nowhere in the legislative history of the [U.S.] Bankruptcy
Code did the drafters of § 304, as well as § 547 dealing with
preferences, note that the treatment of various types of claims
under the [U.S.] Bankruptcy Code may give rise to the equiva-
lent of preferential transfers if contrary to a foreign country's
laws. 327
In other words, since the holder of a valid judgment lien would be treated as
the holder of a secured claim up to the value of its collateral under U.S.
bankruptcy law, the court would not defer to the application of Spanish prefer-
ence law that avoided such a lien.328 In the court's view, if Spanish preference
law were to be applied "a preference would certainly occur in favor of all the
other creditors"329 from the perspective of the U.S. creditor under U.S. law.
In so finding, the court misconstrued the application of § 304(c)(3), which is
intended to further the principle of universality. For all creditors worldwide
to be treated equally in the foreign proceedings, the preference laws to be applied
must be the preference laws of the foreign jurisdiction (if they have extra-
territorial effect). By judging the fairness of the foreign preference law from
312 Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 591. The applicability of Spanish avoidance powers was the only threshold require,
ment discussed by the court, and even the court's analysis ofthis requirement was incomplete-the court
never inquired as to whether Spanish avoidance law is intended to have extra-territorial effect. It is implicit
in the court's decision that the other threshold requirements had been met. The court should have explic-
ity discussed these factors.
327d.
328The court never addressed the point, however, of why Adams's judgment lien would be treated as
a valid secured claim under U.S. law. If the Spanish debtor or Spanish liquidators had filed for liquidation
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code rather than under Spanish law, at the time of the filing of the petition
Adams (which had not yet obtained ajudgment) would have been treated as an unsecured creditor. In addi-
tion, the automatic stay of § 362(a)(1) would have prevented Adams from continuing its action against
Papeleras, § 362(a)(2) would have prohibited the enforcement of its judgment, and § 362(a)(4) would have
prevented post-petition perfection of its lien. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1991).
329Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 591.
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the perspective of a U.S. creditor, the court vitiated the principle of equality
of distribution in favor of the protection of a local creditor.33
Likewise, in its somewhat confusing discussion of the application of fraudu-
lent transfer law, the court's primary concern was whether the actions of the
Spanish liquidators violated U.S. law, rather than whether Adams's efforts to
satisfy its judgment constituted a fraudulent disposition under applicable Span-
ish law. The Papeleras court acknowledged that deferring to the application
of foreign fraudulent transfer law might be beneficial in some cases and under-
standably went on to argue the following:
However, in cases such as this, where both parties have
taken significant steps over many years to protect their
interests, and the foreign proceedings in particular have all but
been consummated, the parties' acts consistent with the for-
eign law should be examined to determine whether the dis,
position of the property here should be prevented by deferring
to the foreign country.331
Therefore, it would have been justifiable for the Papeleras court to examine
whether fraudulent transfers are avoided under Spanish bankruptcy law and,
if so, whether the Spanish liquidators had actually exercised those powers.332
Instead, however, the court discussed a number of "questionable convey-
ances" in the Spanish proceedings that would contravene U.S. law. For exam-
ple, the court noted that the procedures followed in the sale of the trademarks
by the Spanish liquidators to Bambu-more particularly, the failure to give notice
to creditors and interested international buyers (including Adams, which the
Spanish liquidators knew would bid if given the opportunity to do so), the failure
to obtain the approval of the Spanish court, and the failure to notify the
U.S. court 333 -although passing muster under Spanish law, would violate
U.S. law. The court described several other "questionable conveyances" as
33oSee text accompanying supra notes 173 to 187.
33'Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 592.
332Contra Finister, supra note 62, at 369. Finister argues:
Once a court investigates whether preferential or fraudulent conveyances actually
occurred, it has entered into areas of substantive bankruptcy law. No longer is the
court reviewing foreign law to determine whether it is appropriate to lend assistance
to the foreign proceeding. Rather, the court's application of substantive law will convert
the Section 304 proceeding into a separate bankruptcy case administering United
States assets.
Id. Finister's concerns aside, in determining whether or not to lend assistance to a foreign proceeding it
is only appropriate that the U.S. court have the power to investigate whether the foreign proceeding in
fact utilizes the avoiding powers under foreign law. Such an inquiry need not convert the § 304 proceeding
into a separate bankruptcy case. To hold otherwise would enable a foreign proceeding to gain recognition
based on the existence of, rather than compliance with, avoidance laws. See Axona, 88 B.R. at 613.
3 3Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 592.
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well, 334 and was concerned by the fact that, when the Spanish court approved
the suspension of payments procedure for Papeleras, the debtor's assets exceeded
its liabilities, yet at the time of liquidation over $20,000,000 in claims were
to go unpaid.
Many of these "questionable conveyances" certainly called into question
the overall fairness of the Spanish proceedings and would have justified the
court to seek detailed explanations from the Spanish liquidators, and if satis-
factory responses had not been forthcoming, to dismiss the § 304 petition (in
reliance on § 304(c)(2) and (5)). However, these questionable actions by the
Spanish authorities were not relevant to the application of § 304(c)(3).
Turning to the § 304(c)(2) requirement that claim holders in the United
States be protected against prejudice and inconvenience in processing claims
in the foreign proceeding, the Papeleras court reached the right conclusion but
partially for the wrong reason. In claiming that Adams should have received
notice of the Spanish proceeding, the Papeleras court cited Culmer. In finding
that § 304(c)(2) was satisfied, the Culmer court first noted that under Baha-
mian law and procedure "[a]dequate notice of the Bahamian proceeding is
required"335
The notice issue in Papeleras was more complex than in Culmer, however.
In Culmer notice was given to a U.S. creditor holding a claim recognized under
Bahamian law. In Papeleras notice was not given to a U.S. company that was
not recognized as a creditor under Spanish law. Recall, Adams's disputed claim
could not be recognized under Spanish law until it was rendered undisputed.
Even so, Adams was still entitled to receive notice-Spanish law sets forth cer-
tain procedures for the adding of a creditor, including allowing a putative creditor
to petition the creditors' committee or to commence a lawsuit. 336 For the putative
creditor to avail itself of either of these remedies, it must first receive notice
of the suspension of payments or the liquidation. 337 Thus, Adams as the holder
of a disputed claim should have been given notice and an opportunity to be
heard in the Spanish proceeding. Adams could then have set forth reasons under
Spanish law why it should have been added as a creditor in the Spanish proceed-
ing, and it would have been up to the Spanish court to adjudicate this issue.
Also, Adams was a shareholder of Papeleras and should have received notice
334SCe id. at 592-93.
335Culmer, 25 B.R. at 630.
336Papderas, 92 B.R. at 590 n.14.
33Spanish law also provides that the creditors' committee may add a creditor without the putative creditor
having to petition. But allowing creditors potentially in conflict with the putative creditor to decide whether
the putative creditor should join their committee (and thus share in any distributions made to creditors)
is potentially unfair and could likely cause the creditor to suffer inconvenience and prejudice in the processing
of its claim. Id.
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in that capacity.338
The Papeleras court, however, did not limit its analysis to asserting that
Adams would be subject to inconvenience and prejudice in the processing of
its "claim" by reason of its not receiving notice. Rather, it claimed that "[b]y
reason of its not having been given notice of the Spanish proceeding, Adams
was not recognized as a creditor, thus depriving it of the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the proceeding, prejudicial to its rights:339 The fallacy in this assertion
is that the court assumed that, if Adams had received notice of the Spanish
proceeding, then Adams would have been recognized as a creditor; in fact, even
if Adams had received notice, Adams would not have been recognized as a cred-
itor since its claim was not one recognized under Spanish law.
The Papeleras court thus interpreted § 304(c)(2) as requiring that a claim
holder under U.S. law be treated as a claim holder under foreign law. This
interpretation takes the territoriality principle in § 304(c)(2) too far-the deter-
mination of who is a claim holder in a foreign proceeding should be a matter
to be decided by the foreign court under foreign law.
In addition to the lack of notice to Adams, there were a number of other
factors in the case, discussed by the Papeleras court elsewhere in its decision
(but not in its analysis of§ 304(c)(2)), that demonstrate that Adams had suffered
further discrimination in processing its claims in the Spanish proceeding. For
instance, as noted earlier, the Spanish liquidators' attorney misled the U.S. court
about the intention of the Spanish liquidators to sell the trademarks. In light
of this lack of honesty, the procedures followed by the Spanish liquidators for
their sale of the trademarks also called into question the fundamental fairness
of the Spanish proceeding, 340 as did the many "questionable conveyances" noted
by the court in its discussion of § 304(c)(3).
In finding that section 304(c)(4) was not satisfied because the foreign law
relegated a lien holder to the status of at best an unsecured creditor,341 the
Papeleras court followed an approach similar to that of the Toga court. (Interest-
ingly enough, there is no reference to Toga in the Papeleras opinion.) The
Papeleras court also noted that Adams' status as the holder of an equitable lien
would not be recognized by the Spanish proceeding. The shortcomings of such
an approach that focuses on particular differences in statutory schemes of
distribution, rather than on considering such schemes in the context of the
overall fairness of the foreign law and the general similarity of the foreign law
338The Papeleras court failed to mention this point in its discussion of § 304(c)(2).
339Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 590.
340In and of itself, the lack of notice and a hearing regarding the sale of the trademarks does not demon-
strate the inherent unfairness of the Spanish proceeding. Although notice and a hearing would be required
under § 363(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(b) (West 1991), there is no requirement
in § 304 that the procedural requirements in the foreign proceeding must be a carbon copy of the U.S.
procedures.
34'Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 593.
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and U.S. law, have been discussed earlier.342
Lastly, the court turned to an analysis of comity under § 304(c)(5). The
court rejected the approach in Culmer, Gee and Metzeler, which treated comity
as the focal point of the § 304(c) inquiry, and instead viewed comity as just
one of six factors to be considered. 343 The court found support for its view in
Representative Don Edwards's remarks in the legislative history to § 304 in
which he said, "'Section 304(c) is modified to indicate that the court shall be
guided by considerations of comity in addition to the other factors specified
therein"'344 Notwithstanding this remark, as mentioned earlier, the historical
development of the comity doctrine supports the view taken by Culmer, Gee
and Metzeler.345
The Papeleras decision states that comity is only one of six factors that must
be considered, and the court's meager discussion of comity indicates that it
actually gave comity even less weight than that. Indeed, the court's applica-
tion of comity to the facts of the case constituted a mere two sentences of its
eleven-page opinion:
In light of all of the foregoing facts peculiar to this instant
case, if this court should defer to the Spanish proceeding,
Adams will be prejudiced by the omissions of Spanish law and
the lack of candor by Papeleras and [the Spanish] liquidators.
The principles of comity dictate the dismissal of the ancillary
proceedings. 346
Given the fact that the notion of comity incorporates the other factors listed
in § 304(c), on the facts of the case the court reached the correct conclusion.
But more analysis by the court would have been helpful. There are strong policy
reasons for granting comity to a bankruptcy proceeding in the appropriate forum
when that proceeding adopts the principle of equality of distribution (satisfy-
ing § 304(c)(1)) and disallows preferential and fraudulent transfers (satisfying
§ 304(c)(3)), and granting ancillary assistance to that proceeding would fur
ther the economical and expeditious worldwide administration of the estate.
However, in Papeleras these factors were outweighed by the fact that the criteria
in § 304(c)(2) (and in the court's view, § 304(c)(4)) were not fulfilled. There-
fore, the Papeleras court was justified in denying comity to the Spanish proceed-
ings and in allowing the fraudulent conveyance action to continue under U.S.
law.
342See text accompanying notes 296 to 299 supra.
33Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 594.
34Id. at 594 (quoting Rep. Don Edwards) (emphasis added by court).
'3$See text accompanying supra notes 226 to 227.
34'Papeleras, 92 B.R. at 594-95.
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Thus, although the Papeleras decision reached the correct result, it failed
to grapple with many of the important issues and misapplied many of the criteria
to be considered when ruling upon a § 304 request for relief. Rather than even-
handedly applying the universality and territoriality factors contained in § 304(c)
and attempting to ascertain the overall fairness of the foreign law, the court
instead put its own territoriality-based gloss on the § 304(c) factors and inter-
preted these factors from the perspective of a U.S. creditor seeking the appli-
cation of U.S. law.
The other recent case denying the recognition of a foreign liquidation
proceeding, Interpool, offers an interesting comparison to the Papeleras deci-
sion, for it too denied ancillary assistance on the grounds that the foreign
proceeding had prejudiced the interests of U.S. creditors and subjected them
to unfair procedures. Interpool is the first reported § 304 case to consider Aus-
tralian law and the first reported case since Toga that failed to recognize the
bankruptcy proceedings of a sister common law jurisdiction. 347
This case involved the complicated dealings between KKL Kangaroo Lines
("KKE'), an Australian company that operated a liner service, and Wah Kwong,
which leased ships to KKL. On January 14, 1986, Wah Kwong commenced
involuntary liquidation proceedings in Australia against KKL. On February
17, 1986 the Australian courts ordered KKL to wind up operations and
appointed a liquidator ("the Australian liquidator"). The Australian liquida-
tor then entered into several agreements with Wah Kwong and its subsidiaries.
From the time of the commencement of the involuntary proceedings against
KKL, KKL retained various freight monies in the United States. Several U.S.
trucking concerns had claims against KKL, and various lien creditors seized
assets of KKL in the United States. On February 27, 1986, the Australian liqui,
dator filed a petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey
to commence a § 304 ancillary case. Shortly thereafter, several U.S. creditors
commenced an involuntary chapter 7 liquidation case against KKL in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. The chapter 7 case
was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, and
on April 28, 1987, the § 304 petition was also transferred to the same court.
During the rest of 1987 and 1988, the district court entered several orders
providing for interim relief, including (1) enjoining KKs creditors from pro-
ceeding against KKJ~s assets and (2) collecting and subsequently distributing
outstanding freight monies. In October 1988 the district court confronted
31 7To date U.S. courts in § 304 or related cases have recognized bankruptcy proceedings in the follow-
ing sister common law jurisdictions: Bahamas (Culmer, 25 B.R. 621); the Cayman Islands (Gee, 53 B.R.
891); Bermuda (Lines, 81 B.R. 267); the United Kingdom (Gercke, 122 B.R 621); Canada (Ernst & Young,
129 B.R. 147); and Hong Kong (Axona, 88 B.R. 597)(§ 303(b)(4) case). Also, U.S. courts in non-U.S.
Bankruptcy Code cases have recognized bankruptcy proceedings in the following sister common law juris-
dictions: the United Kingdom (IBB Turnover Orders, supra note 58); Canada (Caddl, 105 B.R. 366; Clarkson,
544 F.2d 624; Cornfeld, 471 F. Supp. 1255).
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the issue of whether (1) to grant the final § 304 petition (and allow U.S. assets
to be administered under Australian bankruptcy law) and dismiss the competing
chapter 7 case, or (2) to deny the section 304 relief and appoint a chapter 7
trustee to administer the assets of KKL in the United States under U.S. law.
The court opted for the latter course of action.348
To understand the court's resolution of this issue, several other facts must
be set out. KKL, organized in 1981, at first was owned by a liner company,
Karlander Australia ("Karlander"). In 1983 KKL became an independent com,
pany. In November 1983 KKL executed a heads of agreement with Karlander
("the heads of agreement"), in which KKL agreed to assume the business of
Karlander and to pay off Karlander's creditors. In turn, in January, 1984
Karlander transferred to KKL its rights (valued at between US$3 million and
$40 million) in an arbitration with Weyerhauser Co. ("the Weyerhauser
arbitration").
Wah Kwong then entered the picture. A subsidiary of Wah Kwong loaned
US$6 million to KKL, and in exchange KKL assigned its rights in the
Weyerhauser arbitration to Wah Kwong. The arrangements between KKL and
Wah Kwong became further entwined. Indeed, their relationship "was described
as a joint venture agreement."349 Wah Kwong's president sat on KK's board
of directors, KKL assigned its earnings to Wah Kwong through a Wah Kwong
subsidiary, and a Wah Kwong representative was required to co-sign all KKL
checks.
However, relations soured between KKL and Wah Kwong and problems
ensued for both parties. In January 1986, a vessel was arrested in Los Angeles.
Wah Kwong then issued a press release claiming that KKL owed it US$10
million and blocked payments to creditors. The creditors responded by short-
ening their credit terms, which caused a shortage of funds for KKL. KKL
asserted that Wah Kwong milked it of funds and therefore was in breach of
their agreement. Wah Kwong claimed that KKL could not meet its obligations
under the agreement. In any case, the result was that KKL ended up in liqui-
dation and Wah Kwong went into receivership.35
In May 1986, three months after the Australian liquidator had petitioned
in the United States for ancillary relief under § 304, an agreement ("the
34BIntt.rpool, 102 B.R. at 380. On appeal the Third Circuit held that, in a § 304 case when a foreign
representative "seeks dismissal of a competing bankruptcy proceeding against the foreign debtor, such relief
is governed by section 305 and the court's decision is nonreviewable. Because this is such a case, we lack
jurisdiction to hear the liquidator's appeal and therefore we will dismiss it" Interpool, 878 F.2d at 115. Because
the appeal was from the district court to the court of appeals, this decision withstands the changes made
to § 305(c) by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (the "Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990"). The facts of the case as discussed in the text above are set out in Intarpool,
102 B.R. at 374-76.
349lnterpool, 102 B.R. at 375.
30Id. at 376.
1992)
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
deed") was concluded in Australia between the Australian liquidator, KKL,
Karlander, and several Wah Kwong subsidiaries. The deed specified that any
proceeds from the Weyerhauser arbitration would be paid to the Australian
liquidator, who in turn would distribute the first US$6 million to a Wah Kwong
subsidiary in satisfaction of the earlier loan to KKL. After paying out some
other distributions from the proceeds, the Australian liquidator would hold
the remainder of the proceeds for the purposes of administering KKL while
in liquidation.
In deciding whether to grant the requested § 304 relief, the Interpool court
noted that it would be guided by the factors enumerated in § 304(c), and espe-
cially by the notions of comity.3-5 However, unlike the courts in cases such as
Culmer and Gee, the Interpool court discussed the other § 304(c) factors only
in passing.
In its discussion of comity, the Interpool court cited Salen I for the require-
ment that "the foreign court must abide by fundamental standards of proce-
dural fairness" for comity to be granted, 352 and for the proposition that "'Ithe
rationale underlying the granting of comity to a final foreign judgment is that
litigation should end after the parties have had an opportunity to present their
cases fully and fairly to a court of competent jurisdiction."' 35 3 In the court's
view, resolving the issue of whether to grant comity to the actions of the Aus-
tralian court was dependent on the following:
a) whether the United States creditors have the ability to pur-
sue their rights in Australian courts; and
b) whether there is enough parity in the essence of the Aus-
tralian Bankruptcy Rules so that the United States creditors
w[ould] be similarly protected in both jurisdictions. 354
In analyzing the first factor, the court noted that Australian law grants
U.S. creditors the right to pursue their claims in Australian liquidation proceed-
ings, and cited various sections from the Companies Code of Australia (the
'Australian Companies Code"355) in support. For instance, § 420(1) allows a
creditor to complain to the court about the conduct of the liquidator in con-
nection with the performance of his duties, and provides that "the Court may
351Id. at 377. It is implicit in the court's decision that the threshold criteria had been satisfied. The court
should have explicitly discussed these factors. Perhaps the court discussed these factors in its earlier § 304
orders.
352Id. (citing Salen 1, 773 F.2d 452).
353Id. (quoting Salen 1, 773 F.2d at 457).
35
4Id.
355At the time Inrerpool was decided, each Australian state had adopted the Australian Companies
Act 1981 (Cth) in its own state code. However, rather than referring to the New South Wales Companies
Code (the "Australian Companies [NSW] Code"), all references herein will instead track the court's refer-
ences to the Australian Companies Code.
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inquire into the matter and take such action as it sees fit' 356 In addition, the
Australian court "may require that the Liquidator answer any inquiry in rela-
tion to the winding up and may direct an examination of the Liquidator. 3.57
Lastly, the court noted that the Australian court "has independent powers to
direct the Liquidator to lodge a report with respect to any matter 358 After
reviewing these sections of Australian law, the Interpool court stated that "[fit
would seem, therefore, that access to Australian courts relating to actions of
the Liquidator is not restricted:"359
Nevertheless the court concluded as follows:
However, from the briefs, affidavits, and testimony of the
[Australian] Liquidator, it appears that the creditors would
not have an opportunity in Australia to petition the Australian
Court to set aside the [Australian] Liquidator's actions in
ratifying the agreement between the [Australian] Liquidator
and Wah Kwong. It appears from the record that winding up
proceedings are essentially ex parte proceedings in Australia,
and as such, do not provide the same recourse as do our
Bankruptcy Rules.360
In reaching this conclusion the Interpool court followed a territoriality approach:
"Protection of United States creditors is of utmost importance to this Court.
Actions taken by a foreign court in a foreign bankruptcy are to be given defer-
ence if, and only if, there would be no substantial violation of the law that would
/Interpool, 102 B.R. at 378 (citing § 420(1)(b) Australian Companies Code). Since Interpool was decided,
Australian company law has been federalized. New insolvency legislation has been enacted in the Aus-
tralian Corporations Act 1989, as amended by the Australian Corporations Legislation Amendment Act
1990 (Cth) and the Australian Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1991 (Cth). This law, in turn,
has been adopted by the Australian states and the Northern Territory and operates Australiawide. It will
be cited as the "Australian Corporations Law. Section 420(1)(b) of the Australian Companies Code has
been replaced by § 536(1)(b) of the Australian Corporations Law.
3 7lnrterpool, 102 B.R. at 378 (citing § 420(3) Australian Companies Code, now § 536(3) Australian
Corporations Law).
3 8'lnterpool, 102 B.R. at 378 (citing § 418(3) Australian Companies Code, now § 533(3) Australian Cor-
porations Law). The Interpool court erroneously cited § 418(2). Also, the court should have added that
the Australian court has this power if it appears to the court that during the winding up of the company
an involved party has been guilty of an offense, that the liquidator has not made a report with respect to
that matter, and that a person interested in the winding up (which would certainly include a U.S. creditor)
had applied to the court or that the court so moves on its own accord. § 418(3) Australian Companies Code,
now § 533(3) Australian Corporations Law. In its initial discussion of Australian insolvency law, the Inter
pool court also cited section 413 of the Australian Companies Code, now section 511 of the Australian Cor-
porations Law. Interpool, 102 B.R. at 378. However, its reliance on this section was inapposite, because
this section applies only to voluntary windings up in Australia and not to windings up by the court. Since
the Interpool decision states that KKL was the subject of involuntary liquidation proceedings filed by Wah
Kwong, it appears that the case involved a compulsory winding up by the court.
355lnterpool, 102 B.R. at 378.
360id.
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be applied in the United States."36' In comparing the protections that the U.S.
creditors had received under Australian law with the protections that they
would have received under U.S. law, the court claimed: "Itjhere is no require-
ment that Australian law and United States law be identical. However, before
a section 304 Petition may be granted, this Court must be convinced that the
foreign Court has or will abide by fundamental standards of procedural fair-
ness. 362 This assertion to the contrary, the Interpool opinion, in effect, sets
forth the requirement that for § 304 relief to be granted, the foreign law must
be identical to the U.S. law.363
Among the protections under U.S. law discussed by the court are that
creditors be notified prior to the ratification of agreements between the
trustee and any creditors364 and that the trustee and the creditors hold a series
of meetings regarding the liquidation of the assets in the debtor's estate. 365
The Interpool court then claimed that under Australian law "Imjatters are dealt
with in a completely different fashion, and notice is not required ... [, and
that] while a creditor may call a meeting, that creditor would have to know
of the proceedings before making such a request."366 The court concluded:
Since, in this case, the creditors were not notified prior
to the date the Court ratified the agreement between the [Aus-
traliani Liquidator and Wah Kwong, and in addition, were not
notified of the original § 304 filing, this Court finds that the
procedural protections available to creditors in the United
States were not given to the United States creditors in Aus-
tralia. This is a serious omission." 367
The court next examined the different substantive treatment that the U.S.
creditors had received under Australian law, and focused on the lack of an
equitable subordination remedy and the role of the court in ensuring that a
fair result is reached:
United States courts have both the power and the duty
to sift through the circumstances surrounding any claims to
361d .
3621d (citation omitted).
36'Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, U.S. Court Declines Recognition of Australian Insol-
vency Proceedings, 2 INT'L CssEnrros' RTs. & INSOLVENCY REP. 4, 5 (1990) [hereinafter Australian Insolvency
Proceedings]. See also Michael R. Hughes, An Australian Perspective on Interpool, 2 INT'L INSOLVENCY & Cast,-
rros' RTS. REP. 32 (1990).
36'Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(a)(3) (West 1991). The Interpool court erroneously cited R. 2002(a)(5), Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, now Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(a)(5) (West 1991). Interpool, 102 B.R. at 378.
365Interpool, 102 B.R. at 378-79.
3661d. at 379.
3671d.
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see that justice is done in the administration of bankrupt
estates. The Court must look to whether the transaction being
scrutinized was entered into in good faith, and not with a view
to the sole benefit of one creditor.368
In short, the court was concerned that the doctrine of equitable subordina-
tion "does not exist in anywhere close to the same form [under Australian law]
as that found in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Nor is there any comparable proce-
dure under Australian law. 369 The court was especially concerned about the
inability of the Australian court to remedy the "substantial allegations of ihsider
machinations" by Wah Kwong.370 The court concluded that:
[tlhe lack of procedural redress in the first instance and sub-
stantive redress in the second instance could significantly affect
creditors' rights and chances for a fair settlement of their griev-
ances and claims against the Australian company.
Both the laws and public policy of the United States
[would] be violated if the case [were] permitted to proceed
under Australian law ... and this Court does not intend to
stand idly by while United States' citizens and creditors are
harmed.37'
These are strong words, fighting words, and closer analysis is necessary to deter-
mine whether the thrust of the court's criticisms of Australian insolvency law
and its denial of the § 304 petition are borne out.
In evaluating the Interpool decision, one must return to some propositions
from Salen I. As mentioned earlier, the Interpool court cited the proposition
from Salen I that "'[tlhe rationale underlying the granting of comity to a final
foreign judgment is that litigation should end after the parties have had an oppor-
tunity to present their cases fully and fairly to a court of competent jurisdic-
tion"' 372 However, the court omitted the second, more pertinent, proposition
from Salen I that:
[t]he extending of comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding,
by staying or enjoining the commencement or continuation of
an action against a debtor or its property, has a somewhat
different rationale. The granting of comity to a foreign
bankruptcy proceeding enables the assets of a debtor to be dis-
persed in an equitable, orderly, and systematic manner, rather
than in a haphazard, erratic or piecemeal fashion. 373
3681d. (citation omitted).
369Id. at 379-80.
3701d. at 380.
3711d
.372Id. at 377 (quoting Salen 1, 773 F.2d at 457).
37 Salen 1, 773 F.2d at 457-58.
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The fact that the Interpool court cited only the first and not the second propo-
sition from Salen I is illuminating-throughout its opinion, the Interpool court
analyzed Australian law through glasses tinted with the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code3 74 and harked on the unfairness of the essentially ex parte nature of the
Australian proceedings and the inadequacy of a few provisions of Australian
law. However, the court failed to mention the much more important similari-
ties between U.S. and Australian law and the provisions in Australian insol-
vency law that promote the "equitable, orderly, and systematic" treatment of
a debtor's estate. If the court had first attempted to discover whether Aus-
tralian law satisfied the § 304(c) universality criteria (such as by adopting the
pari passu principle and avoiding preferential and fraudulent transfers), and then
turned to the issue of whether Australian law and procedure were "fundamen-
tally fair" and would protect U.S. creditors against inconvenience and discrimi-
nation, the Interpool court would have discovered many factors in favor of
recognition. Australian law includes many provisions that offer the very pro-
tection for U.S. creditors that § 304 requires.
Australia is a sister common law jurisdiction that has enacted insolvency
provisions in its companies act that are similar to the insolvency provisions in
the companies acts of other common law jurisdictions whose laws have been
recognized in § 304 cases. 375 Australian insolvency law also adopts the princi-
ple of equality of distribution, and as one commentator states, "One of the main
reasons why a company is wound up, is to ensure the just division among the
creditors, and the distribution among the members, of the assets of the com-
pany."376 Moreover, the Australian Companies Code includes provisions for
avoiding preferential or fraudulent transfers of property that would otherwise
unjustly benefit certain creditors at the expense of other unsecured creditors3 77
Lastly, Australian insolvency law does not discriminate against foreign
creditors-under Australian law "foreign creditors rank equally with local
creditors."378
Since it appears that Australian insolvency law fulfills the § 304(c)(1) and
(3) criteria, the next issue that arises is whether Australian law is funda-
374The court's openly territorial approach is exemplified by its misquoting of § 304(c)(1): "[alddition-
ally, our [U.S.] Bankruptcy Code requires that 'just treatment be accorded United States creditors.'" Inter-
pool, 102 B.R. at 378 (misquoting U.S.C. § 304(c)(1) (1982)). § 304(c)(1) says no such thing; it is not a
territoriality factor. Rather, section 304(c)(1) requires the "just treatment" of all creditors-it is concerned
with the equality of treatment and distribution to all creditors worldwide.
375See supra note 347.
376CCH, LAw oF CoMPAS 1s iN AusTRAu'A (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter "CCH"I, 1287 at 520. See also
id. 1280 at 512 (the object of the rules regarding proof of claims "is to put all unsecured creditors on an
equal basis and to pay them pari passu.")
77See §§ 451, 452, 453 Australian Companies Code, now, respectively §§ 565, 566, 567 Australian
Corporations Law.
378W.E. PATERsoN, H.H. EDoNI, & H.AJ. FoRD, 3 AusTAiN Coms'Ne LAW (3d ed. 1987) § 438/5
at 85,154.
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mentally fair and would properly safeguard the interests of U.S. creditors under
§ 304(c)(2). In addition to the Australian law provisions enumerated by
the Interpool court, several others should be noted. First of all, in a winding
up by the court, the court appoints a liquidator 379 who as "an officer of
the court ... is directly answerable to the court for the manner in which
he discharges his duties: 380 The liquidator "occupies a fiduciary position in rela-
tion to the company, its creditors and contributories."3s5 Among the liquida-
tor's duties are to advertise a date by which all creditors must submit particulars
or formal proof of their claims 3s 2 and to examine (and admit or reject) each
proof.383
The Interpool court was concerned that the U.S. creditors did not receive
notice of the proceeding at which the Australian liquidator entered into the
agreement with Wah Kwong's subsidiary.38 4 This omission certainly is impor-
tant, but its overall importance must be put in perspective. It must be kept in
mind that U.S. bankruptcy law provides for more creditor participation than
do the insolvency laws of many other jurisdictions, including Australia. No
doubt, an approach that encourages participation by creditors is an effective
means of policing against fraud and dishonest dealings in the administration
of bankruptcies, but this does not mean that such participation need be a sine
qua non for recognizing foreign insolvency proceedings under § 304. Thus,
although U.S. creditors should be given notice of the commencement of a
liquidation to enable them to file their proofs of claim (as they were in Interpool),
379§ 372(1) Australian Companies Code, now § 472(1) Australian Corporations Law.
'80CCH, supra note 376, 1242 at 482.
381Id.
3'2The creditors receive notice to submit the particulars of their claims by advertisement in daily news,
papers. Regs. 111(2), 120(2)(a), (b) Australian Companies Regulations, now, respectively, regs. 5.6.39(2),
5.6.48(2)(a) Australian Corporations Regulations; Australian Companies Forms 129, 130, Schedule 2, Aus-
tralian Companies Regulations, now, respectively, Australian Corporations Forms 533, 534, Schedule 2,
Australian Corporations Regulations. See CCH, supra note 376, 1280 at 514. Australian law also requires
that written notice regarding formal proof be given "to every person who, to the knowledge of the liquida-
tor, claims to be a creditor of the company, and whose debt or claim has not been admitted. Reg. 120(2)(c)
Australian Companies Regulations, now reg. 5.6.48(2)(b) Australian Corporations Regulations.
383Regs. 125, 126 Australian Companies Regulations, now, respectively, regs. 5.6.53, 5.6.54 Australian
Corporations Regulations. See CCH, supra note 376, 1281 at 515.
384In Interpool the creditors did not question the notice requirements for filing particulars or proofs
of claim. Rather, the U.S. creditors' arguments focused on their failure to receive notice of both the proceeding
at which the Australian liquidator entered into the arrangements with Wah Kwong's subsidiary and
the § 304 filing. The U.S. creditors would have had a much stronger case if they had failed to receive
newspaper notice of the commencement of the liquidation, as occurred in Papeleras. Given the inherent difficul-
ties of local newspaper notices reaching creditors abroad, Australia and Spain should consider amending
their creditor notification procedures and requiring that all creditors receive written notice of the date
by which to submit the particulars or proofs of their claims. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(a)(8). Such an amend-
ment would increase the likelihood that creditors abroad would receive notice, thereby increasing the likelihood
that insolvency proceedings in those countries would be granted § 304 ancillary assistance.
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beyond that they should be entitled only to the application of fundamentally
fair procedures-which need not necessarily include notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard at each hearing or meeting which they would be entitled to
attend under U.S. bankruptcy law. However, if U.S. creditors do not receive
notice and an opportunity to be heard at such hearings or meetings, to com-
ply with the requirements of§ 304(c)(2) the U.S. court should ascertain whether
the foreign bankruptcy proceedings have other procedures to safeguard the
interests of creditors.
Although Australian procedures for the participation of creditors are not
as comprehensive as those in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Australian law does
provide other means to protect the interests of creditors. For example:
There flows from the fiduciary position of a liquidator a
responsibility ratified by statute to act honestly in the exer-
cise of his powers and the discharge of his duties and gener-
ally to act bona fide in the interests of the company and
particularly the creditors and contributories.
A liquidator should maintain an even and impartial hand
between all the individuals whose interests are involved in the
winding up. This must particularly be the stance of a court-
appointed liquidator, who, as an officer of the court, should
maintain this impartiality. 38 5
It thus appears that Australian insolvency law sets high standards for the per-
formance of a liquidator's duties (which compare favorably with the standards
for trustees or debtors in possession in the United States). Since in practice
some liquidators might not perform up to such high standards, Australian law
also provides for the statutory supervision of liquidators by both the courts
and the Australian Securities Commission (replacing the National Companies
and Securities Commission in existence at the time of Interpool). The Interpool
court noted that section 420 of the Australian Companies Code provides for
scrutiny of the Australian liquidator's actions by the court, but claimed that
this section focuses on misfeasance by the liquidator.386 However, section 420
is not limited to misfeasance -section 420(2) provides that if the court finds
that there was "a misfeasance, neglect, or omission on the part of the liquida-
tor ... the [c]ourt may order the liquidator to make good any loss that the estate
of the company has sustained thereby and make such order or orders as it sees
fit"387 In addition, section 420(1) provides that if it appears to the court "that
3 58CCH, supra note 376, 1245 at 489-90 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
386Interpool, 102 B.R. at 379 n.4 (citing § 420 Australian Companies Code, now § 536 Australian Cor-
porations Law).
387§ 420(2) Australian Companies Code, now § 536(2) Australian Corporations Law (emphasis added).
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a liquidator has not faithfully performed or is not faithfully performing his
duties.., or a complaint is made to the [c]ourt... by any person with respect
to the conduct of the liquidator in connection with the performance of his
duties ... the [c]ourt may take such action as it sees fit.'388 Also, section 420(3)
provides for the court's power to examine the liquidator.38 9
An assortment of other provisions in the Australian Companies Code
should also have protected the interests of U.S. creditors. For example, sec-
tion 377(1) requires "the authority of the [c]ourt, of the committee of inspec-
tion390 or of a resolution of the creditors" for the liquidator to exercise certain
powers, including making any compromise or arrangement with creditors.391
Section 377(5) ensures that all of the powers listed in section 377 are subject
to the control of the court, and grants all creditors the right to apply to the
court "with respect to any exercise or proposed exercise of any of these
powers."3 92 Section 542 grants the court the power to make an order against
liquidators if the court is satisfied that the liquidator is guilty of fraud, negli-
gence, and related offenses. 393 Lastly, it should be noted "that the right to a
winding up is in most cases ... a class right" 394 The Supreme Court of Tas-
mania expressed this principle, in the personal bankruptcy context, in Re Hood395
as follows:
fOInce the machinery of the Bankruptcy Act has been put in
motion by one creditor filing a petition the case is thereafter
affected with the interests of other creditors and the pub-
lic... f, and] it is the duty of the [clourt to exercise a robust
initiative to ensure that the interests of the general body of
creditors and the public are protected. 396
This brief investigation into Australian insolvency law demonstrates that
Australian courts also have the duty, as the Interpool court said about their
U.S. counterparts, to "see that justice is done" and to ensure that transactions
have been "entered into in good faith, and not with a view to the sole benefit
318§ 420(1) Australian Companies Code, now § 536(1) Australian Corporations Law.
319§ 420(3) Australian Companies Code, now § 536(3) Australian Corporations Law.
395Australian law provides that:
[a] committee of inspection is a representative group of creditors and contribu-
tories appointed to superintend the liquidator's administration of the company's prop-
erty and to give him directions... which he is bound to obey. It has been suggested
that a committee of inspection is advisable in all but small windings up.
CCH, supra note 376, 1203 at 455. It cannot be discerned from the facts reported in Interpool whether
or not such a committee was appointed in this case.
391§ 377(1)(c) Australian Companies Code, now § 477(1)(c) Australian Corporations Law.
392§ 377(5) Australian Companies Code, now § 477(6) Australian Corporations Law.
393§ 542 Australian Companies Code, now § 598 Australian Corporations Law.
394Professor E.L.G. Tyler, unpublished teaching outline, University of Hong Kong.
393[1971] A.L.R. 151.
396Tyler, supra note 394 (quoting Re Hood, [1971] A.L.R. at 153).
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of one creditor. 397 Perhaps most importantly, for the Australian liquidator to
have entered into an agreement to compromise Wah Kwong subsidiary's claim
would have required the authorization of the court or of the committee of inspec-
tion, or a resolution of the creditors under § 377(1)(c) of the Australian Com-
panies Code. 398 Certainly the Australian liquidator could not have ratified a
sweetheart deal on his own. Rather, "[tlhe exercise by a liquidator of his powers
(specifically those conferred by sec. 377) is always subject to the control of
the court and any creditor or contributory may apply to the court challenging
the proposed exercise of them"399 Thus, the interests of U.S. creditors should
have been protected, or in the words of an Australian commentator:
[Wihen the liquidator applies to ratify a compromise, it is the
court which considers the interests of creditors and other
interested parties. In situations where there are clearly com-
peting interests, the Australian courts regularly make specific
directions requiring that the liquidator give notice of his appli-
cation to named persons, and entitling them to be joined as
parties. Initially the necessity to apply for directions of this
kind is a matter for the liquidator and his advisors. Ultimately,
however, it is the court's responsibility to ensure that all
interested parties are represented. In this commentator's
experience, it would have been unprecedented for the Supreme
Court of New South Wales to not have positively considered
the interests of the United States creditors before sanction-
ing the agreement between the liquidator and the Wah Kwong
subsidiary.400
397lnterpool, 102 B.R. at 379.
398§ 377(1)(c) Australian Companies Code, now § 477(1)(c) Australian Corporations Law. Section 420(1)
and (2) Australian Companies Code (now § 536(1) and (2) Australian Corporations Law), in conjunction
with § 377(1)(c) and (5) (now §§ 477(1)(c) and (6) Australian Corporations Law) arguably would have enabled
the Australian court to undo the agreement entered into by the Australian liquidator and the Wah Kwong
subsidiary. See CCH, supra note 376, 1242 at 482 ("[W]hilst recognizing that the court has to take cog-
nizance of the conduct of official liquidators (and has the power to confirm, reverse, or modify the decisions
of a liquidator), the court does not exercise its powers in this regard lightly") (emphasis added). However,
it should be noted that prior Australian law was more explicit on this point, for unlike present law, it included
a section that provided that "[a]ny person aggrieved by any act or decision of the liquidator may apply to
the [c]ourt which may confirm reverse or modify the act or decision complained of and make such orders
as it thinks fit' § 279 Australian Uniform Companies Act. See CCH, AusTRALAs_ ComPAN LAw CASE-
BOOK (1986), 1244 at 395-97 (discussing the application of this prior § 279 by the court in Re Mineral
Securities Australia Ltd. (in liq.) [1973] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 207 and noting that the "comments by [the court
in that case] on the principles of review of the [Australian Uniform] Companies [Act] of the liquidator's
actions must now be read with caution for.., there is now no equivalent section in the [Australian] Com-
panies Code to the former sec. 279:' Id. 1244, at 397).
399CCH, supra note 376, 1247, at 497. See also Hughes, supra note 363, at 32.
40'Hughes, supra note 363, at 32.
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Unfortunately, the Interpool court failed to acknowledge the duty of the
Australian court to consider the interests of U.S. creditors. Rather, the court
concentrated on the failure of Australian law to provide for notice prior to the
ratification of the agreement between the Australian liquidator and the Wah
Kwong subsidiary, or to permit equitable subordination of that agreement.
Although it is true "that the doctrine of equitable subordination does not exist
in anywhere close to the same form as that found in the United States Bankruptcy
Code"40 the Australian court had other remedies to protect the interests of
U.S. creditors.
Indeed, even if the Interpool court had found that this lack of an effective
equitable subordination remedy failed to comply with the requirement of
§ 304(c)(4), this factor alone should not have outweighed the many factors that
supported the granting of § 304(c) relief, including the following:40 2 (i) Aus-
tralia was the appropriate jurisdiction for the primary bankruptcy; (ii) the Aus,
tralian laws complied with the requirements of § 304(c)(1) and (3); (iii) although
Australian insolvency laws contain different safeguards than those under U.S.
law, they do not appear to be fundamentally unfair or repugnant to our ideas
of justice, and the U.S. creditors' allegations fell short of the "concrete evidence"
or "concrete facts" necessary to support a finding that the creditors had con-
fronted or would likely confront discrimination or inconvenience in the Aus-
tralian proceedings 403 (thus § 304(c)(2) was satisfied); and (iv) deferring to the
Australian proceedings would have enabled the assets of Interpool to be dis-
persed in an "economical and expeditious" manner. It therefore appears that
comity and ancillary assistance should have been granted to the Australian
winding up.
Compared to the facts of Papeleras, those of Interpool provided a far weaker
case for nonrecognition. For example, the U.S. creditor in Papeleras did not
receive notice of the suspension of payments declaration for forty-five months
or notice of the commencement of the liquidation for five months, and was
thereby prejudiced in its ability to obtain a timely hearing on recognition of
its claim under Spanish law and participation in the insolvency proceedings.
In contrast, in Interpool the U.S. creditors received notice of the commence-
ment of the winding up and instead challenged the lack of notice about an agree-
ment entered into between the Australian liquidator and a major creditor (and
about the lack of notice of the commencement of the § 304 case 404).
4ollnterpool, 102 B.R. at 379.
4o2SeC supra note 301 and accompanying text; Finister, supra note 62, at 370.
403The Interpool court could have required the U.S. creditors to come forward with evidence to sup-
port their allegations of the impropriety of the dealings between the Australian liquidator and Wah Kwong's
subsidiary.
404The court mentioned this factor only in passing. If true, it would raise questions under U.S., not
Australian, law.
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Secondly, in Papeleras the Spanish liquidators and their counsel were not
forthright in their dealings with the U.S. court and the U.S. creditor, and a
number of other "questionable conveyances" had been brought to the atten-
tion of the U.S. court. In Interpool, in comparison, there was no evidence that
the Australian liquidator had discriminated against the U.S. creditors. The U.S.
court asserted that Australian bankruptcy procedures in general were unfair,
and the U.S. creditors alleged that the relationship between the debtor and
a major creditor had prejudiced and would continue to prejudice their interests;
but the court's findings about the unfairness of the Australian law were tenu-
ous at best, and the creditors failed to offer any concrete evidence to support
their allegations.
Interpool stands as the most serious rejection of the Culmer approach since
Toga and "may have a more far reaching effect since it questions in general terms
the notice procedures of Australian insolvency law, thereby suggesting that
Australian proceedings should rarely be recognized by U.S. Bankruptcy
Courts. '" 40 5 The Interpool approach hinders the likelihood of further coopera-
tion in cross-border insolvencies and sends the signal to other jurisdictions that
§ 304 relief will be hard to obtain.
Another recent case, In re Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos,
S.N.C. ("Banobras"), 406 also stresses the importance of protecting the interests
of U.S. creditors, but in the context of the universality approach. In Banobras,
the first reported case to address the difficult issues arising when a collective
bargaining agreement governed by U.S. law is involved in the insolvency of a
foreign debtor, the court reached a compromise: it recognized the foreign insol-
vency proceedings for most purposes (such as for controlling the disposition
of the foreign debtor's estate and the claims against the estate), but held that
the issues involved in adjudicating the claims of union members arising under
the collective bargaining agreements and U.S. labor law were to be adjudicated
in a U.S. court under U.S. law (as long as the U.S. court determined that it
had jurisdiction and that a collective bargaining agreement existed).407 Banobras
is thus the first reported § 304 case since Lineas I and II that has granted limited
recognition to a foreign insolvency proceeding. However, in contrast to the
poorly reasoned and openly territorial approach of Lineas I and II, the Banobras
court offered a thoughtful, balanced solution to a difficult problem.
The Banobras case involved the bankruptcy of Aeronaves, a Mexican com-
pany owned by Mexican government agencies. Aeronaves operated Aeromexico
(Mexico's national airline), which operated in the United States, as well as in
40Glosband & Katucki, Australian Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 363, at 5; Glosband & Katucki,
Current Developments, supra note 62, at 2278.
40691 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1988). The facts of the case are set out in id. at 662-64.
407Id. at 668.
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Mexico. Of Aeromexico's 12,500 workers, 350 in the United States were
represented by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO ("the IAM"). On behalf of these employees, the IAM
entered into two collective bargaining agreements with Aeronaves that became
effective on June 1, 1983, and amendable on May 31, 1986 ("the 1983 agree-
ments"). The IAM alleged that Aeronaves and the IAM entered into another
agreement on March 14, 1987, that modified the 1983 agreements ("the 1987
agreement") by providing that the 1983 agreements were to remain in fill force
and effect, subject to specific amendments including specific wage and bene-
fit reductions to be effective through March, 1990. These reductions were to
be contingent upon Aeronaves obtaining the same reductions from the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters ("the IBT") within 120 days; if those reduc-
tions were not obtained, the wages and benefits of the IAM members were
to "snap-back" to levels as provided in the 1983 agreements.408
In September, 1987 the IAM notified Aeronaves that since Aeronaves had
not obtained the same reductions from the IBT, the wages and benefits for the
IAM should snap-back to the 1983 levels. Aeronaves disagreed and two months
later responded in a letter to the IAM claiming that there was no existing con-
tract between Aeronaves and the IAM.
The disagreement continued, and in March, 1988 the IAM commenced
a suit in the Southern District of New York ("the s.D.N.Y') against Aeronaves
for declaratory and injunctive relief ("the IAM action"). The complaint sought,
inter alia, a declaration that the 1983 agreements were in full force and effect
and a determination of rights pursuant to the 1983 and 1987 agreements. Aer-
onaves's answer, filed on April 13, 1988, denied most of IAM's allegations and
asserted that the district court did not have jurisdiction. 40 9
Two days later, Aeronaves commenced a bankruptcy case under Mexican
bankruptcy law. The filing was precipitated, in great part, by labor problems
in Mexico. On April 21, 1988 Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos,
S.N.C., the bankruptcy trustee of Aeronaves ("the Mexican trustee"), com-
menced a section 304 proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the S.D.N.Y
to restrain "American creditors from pursuing in any court other than the Mex-
ican bankruptcy court or [the Bankruptcy Court for the S.D.N.Y.J claims against
Aeronaves or its property in [the United States]7410 The U.S. bankruptcy court
recognized the Mexican proceeding, and then (with the consent of the debt-
ors major creditors) granted such preliminary injunctive relief and entered a
consent order that stayed the IAM Action.
After the labor contracts between Aeronaves and its unions, including the
IAM, were rejected in the Mexican bankruptcy proceedings, the LAM asked
4081d. at 663.
401ad.
410Md. at 662.
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the U.S. bankruptcy court to modify its previously ordered relief and to per
mit the LAM action to continue. The IAM claimed that the U.S. Railway Labor
Act ("the USRLA"), which "provides a unique regulatory scheme, 4 governed
the JAM action. The IAM sought the application of this U.S. labor law by
a U.S. court to determine whether a collective bargaining agreement between
IAM and Aeronaves had been in force on the date of Aeronaves's bankruptcy
and, if so, to determine the union's rights as well.412 The LAM acknowledged
that it would not be able to execute on any monetary damages award, but argued
that such an award would be "essential to a complete and accurate assessment
of the claims of the American employees against Aeronaves."4'3 The union also
argued that it would be inconvenient and financially onerous for individual U.S.
employees to travel to Mexico to litigate there whether a collective bargain-
ing agreement existed between the LAM and Aeronaves.
The Mexican trustee countered that the Mexican bankruptcy court should
resolve the claims arising from the alleged breach of the collective bargain
ing agreement, and would do so more quickly than would the U.S. court.
The Mexican trustee also asserted that the IAM would not be prejudiced
if its claims were determined by the Mexican court, since the dispute involved
"ordinary principles of contract law" which the Mexican court could apply
correctly. 414
After reviewing an extensive number of cases involving U.S. labor law and
the USRLA, the Banobras court rejected the Mexican trustee's contentions
and held in favor of the IAM. The court claimed that 'American labor law is
an area which is sui generis"415 and cited an earlier case for the proposition that
"'[a] collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract for the pur-
chase of goods and services, nor is it governed by the same old common-law
concepts which control such private contracts."' 416 Rather, Congress had
enacted a "specialized statutory scheme" for common carriers, 417 the heart of
which was "to compel the parties to negotiate their differences in good faith.
If they reach an impasse, they must then follow a series of procedures set forth
by the [USIRLA"418
The court then discussed the amendments made to the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code in the aftermath of NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco419 to demonstrate fur-
41Id. at 664.
4121d. at 663.
413Id.
414Id. at 664.
41SId.
4161d. at 665 (citation omitted).
4171d.
418d
.4N965 U.S. 513 (1984). See 11 US.C. § 1113(c) (West 1991).
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ther the "Congressional concern with the implementation of labor policies' '420
The court also noted that "Itihe 'rule is well-established that technical rules
of contract do not control the question ofwhether a collective bargaining agree-
ment has been reached."'421 Thus, the court determined that the resolution
of the issues involving the collective bargaining agreement would be better
resolved by a U.S. court with the proper expertise.
The court next turned to § 304 to determine if modifying its earlier ordered
relief (to enable the IAM action to continue in the U.S. courts) would be
appropriate, and stated that it would be guided by principles of comity. The
court added, however, that comity would not be granted "if it would result
in forcing American creditors to participate in foreign proceedings in which
their claims w[ould] be treated in some manner inimical to this country's policy
of equality."422 The Banobras court followed a universality-based approach, and
held that:
Mexicds interest in administering Aeronaves's estate must
be balanced against the interests of the union members in hav-
ing the JAM Action proceed in the United States. So long as
the foreign law is not repugnant to our own, the scale will
ordinarily tip in favor of having the foreign tribunal liquidate
claims against the estate, because the equitable and orderly
distribution of the debtor's property can best be accomplished
in a single proceeding. Here, however, there is the added wrin-
le that, to determine the amount of the union members' claims,
the tribunal must first decide whether a collective bargaining
agreement existed and what its terms were[,J issues which turn
on a specialized area of law laced with strong policy consider-
ations. 423
In balancing these interests, the court decided in favor of the union members
and held that "the IAM Action should be tried by a judge fully sensitive to
the unique nature and purposes of the [USIRLA, experienced in the complex
ities of the statutory scheme and familiar with the policies sought to be effec-
tuated by Congress"424 The court was cognizant that its ruling would cause
42
°Banobras, 91 B.R. at 665.
42'1d. (citations omitted).
4221d. at 667 (citing Salen 1, 773 F.2d at 459-60).
4231d. (citation omitted).
4241d. at 668. The court found that the union members would be prejudiced both if they were forced
to litigate their claims individually and if the Mexican bankruptcy court construed and applied specialized
aspects of U.S. labor law. Id. at 667.
Compare Gercke, 122 B.R. at 627, where the debtor and a U.S. creditor entered into a contract and
agreed to a choice of forum clause (choosing the courts of the District of Columbia) and a choice of law
clause (choosing the laws of the District of Columbia). In August, 1989 the U.S. creditor commenced a
breach of contract action in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. In January, 1990 insolvency
proceedings were commenced against the debtor in the Companies Court, Chancery Division of the High
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some prejudice to the Mexican trustee, but found that this prejudice was
minimized by the presence in New York of the trustee's bankruptcy and labor
counsel. The court also suggested that prejudice as to timing could be minimized
through expedited proceedings. 425
According to the Banobras decision, the U.S. district court was to decide
only those issues relating to the collective bargaining agreement. First of all,
the court was to determine whether it had jurisdiction and whether a collec-
tive bargaining agreement existed. If so, then the court was to interpret the
terms of the agreement and to fix the amount of the claims of the union mem-
bers arising under the agreement. However, the Banobras court noted that the
Mexican court was to determine the allowability of such claims under Mexi-
can law, as well as the priority of such claims in the distribution scheme in the
Mexican proceedings. 426 Moreover, the court concluded that, if the district
court were to find that it did not have jurisdiction or that a collective bargain-
ing agreement did not exist, then "the Mexican bankruptcy court, which main-
tains control over the disposition of Aeronaves's estate and all the claims against
it, should be free to make a determination as to where the claims of the
employees [would] be liquidated:'427
In its flexible application of§ 304, the Banobras decision reached a reasona-
ble balance between the principles underlying U.S. labor law and those under-
lying § 304. The court was thus correct in granting recognition of the Mexican
proceedings to resolve all issues other than those involved in fixing the claims
of the U.S. creditors under U.S. labor law. However, in striking this balance
under what appears to be a comity approach,42 the court should have explicitly
discussed the other § 304(c) criteria. For example, in its application of com-
ity, the court considered the possible prejudice and inconvenience to U.S.
Court in the United Kingdom, and in April, 1990 a § 304 petition was filed in the District of Columbia.
The District of Columbia bankruptcy court enjoined further litigation in the superior court. Moreover, the
U.S. court distinguished the case at bar from that 'in Banobras, id., and allowed the Companies Court to
decide when and where to hear the breach of contract action. Id. at 627, 629, 632. The U.S. court stated
that the creditor's claim was "a basic common law claim that the Companies Court is fully capable of adjudicat
ing,' id. at 629, and that "there is no evidence that the Companies Court would fail to interpret the con-
tract under District of Columbia law." Id. at 632. However, like the Banobras court, the Gercke court did
not cooperate completely with the foreign proceeding. Although the court found that the application of
§ 304 criteria supported enjoining further litigation in the superior court, the Gerke court determined that
they did not support extending the injunction to an enforcement of a production order by the superior court.
Thus, the Gercke court issued a limited injunction that enjoined "further litigation in the Superior Court
except to the extent of enforcing the production order, including granting of any appropriate sanctions in
the event of a failure to comply." Id. at 634.
425Banobras, 91 B.R. at 667.
4126Id. at 668 n.7.
4271d. at 668.
42SContra Finister, supra note 62, at 360-61 ("the court disregarded comity in deciding whether to modify
previously granted Section 304 relief. The court recognized that the principle of comity exists and yet seemed
to summarily ignore it. The court chose instead to rely on the principles of prejudice and inconvenience
to decide the case:')
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creditors, yet never mentioned that this factor is contained in § 304(c)(2). 429
To avoid ambiguity, the court should have stated that pursuant to § 304(c)(5)
and (2), it would not recognize the Mexican proceedings for the purpose of
resolving the labor issues.430
The Banobras decision is correct as a matter of law, but it did cause prac-
tical timing problems for the parties. The parties feared that by the time the
IAM action worked its way through the U.S. courts the Mexican insolvency
of Aeronaves would be completed, and they therefore began to negotiate to
settle their differences. On June 30, 1990, the parties executed a settlement
agreement, which was later approved by the U.S. bankruptcy court.43'
B. SECTION 303(b)(4) (INVOLUNTARY CASES COMMENCED
BY FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES)
As mentioned earlier, § 304 is not the exclusive remedy under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code for a foreign representative who seeks to protect the assets
of a foreign debtor that are located in the United States.432 Rather than com-
mence an ancillary case, a foreign representative might decide to commence
a full involuntary case against a foreign debtor, under chapter 7 or chapter 11,
by filing a verified petition with the bankruptcy court under § 303(b)(4).433
429But see id. at 363 (asserting that the Banobras court relied only on § 304(c)(2) and weighed the prej,
udice to U.S. creditors against the prejudice to the Mexican debtor in applying this section).
430Likewise, in deferring to the Mexican proceedings for other purposes, the court should have stated
that Mexican law treats creditors equitably, adopts the equality of distribution principle (satisfying §
304(c)(1)), and prevents preferential and fraudulent transfers of property (satisfying § 304(c)(3)); and is
fundamentally fair and safeguards foreign creditors against discrimination and inconvenience (satisfying §
304(c)(2) and (4)). The court should also have noted that Mexican law was by its own terms applicable
to the assets in the United States and that the other threshold requirements had been satisfied. The court
may not have explicitly discussed these factors because it was amending previously granted § 304 relief,
rather than granting new § 304 relief. See id. at 361 n.120.431The Settlement Agreement and Release by and between International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO and Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C., as Trustee
in Bankruptcy ofAeronaves de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., June 30,1990, NY, NY, USA, approved by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court, S.D.N.Y., August 13, 1990. [hereinafter the "Banobras Settlement Agreement"]. This
agreement provided that the Mexican trustee would pay US$11,500,000 to be distributed to the employees
represented by the IAM who worked for Aeronaves (the "Employees"). In exchange, the IAM and the
employees would execute releases of their claims, and the LAM would, inter alia, discontinue its suits in
the U.S. courts and agree to the Mexican trustees removal of Aeronaves's property from the United States
and to the entry of§ 304 relief on the same terms and conditions as that entered against the other credi-
tors. Banobras Settlement Agreement, at 5-16.4
'
2See text accompanying notes 59 to 61 supra.433Section 303(b)(4) provides as follows:
(b) An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title-
(4) by a foreign representative of the estate in a foreign proceeding concerning
such person.
11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b)(4) (West 1991). See, e.g., Axona, 88 B.R. at 606. See also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1002 (West
1991); id. 1003, 1010, 1011, 1018.
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If filing under chapter 7, the foreign representative must show that the for-
eign debtor meets the eligibility requirements of § 109(a) and (b), or, if filing
under chapter 11, the requirements of§ 109(a) and (d).434 The foreign represen-
tative should also demonstrate that she has been duly appointed in the for-
eign proceeding, that the foreign proceeding has been commenced in the
appropriate forum, and that foreign law authorizes the foreign representative
to commence proceedings in the United States to protect the foreign debtor's
property or to assist in the administration of the foreign debtor's estate. Sec-
tion 1408 of title 28 of the United States Code specifies the proper venue for
the foreign representative's filing of a § 303(b)(4) petition,435 and § 1409 specifies
the proper venue for proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related
to cases under title 11.436
Unlike the filing of a § 304 petition, the filing of a chapter 7 or chapter
11 involuntary petition creates an estate under § 541, comprised of property
"wherever located and by whomever held "437 Also, the filing of a petition under
§ 303(b)(4) operates as an automatic stay under § 362 against a broad range
of creditor actions, including, but not limited to, the following: the commence-
ment or continuation of prepetition actions against the debtor; the enforce-
ment against the debtor or property of the estate of prepetition judgments;
acts to obtain possession of property of the estate; acts to create, perfect, or
enforce liens against property of the estate, or against property of the debtor
to the extent that such liens secure prepetition claims; and creditor collection
efforts against the debtor for prepetition debts.438 The automatic stay, in effect,
gives the debtor a breathing spell from the actions of creditors, and in addi-
tion protects unsecured creditors by preventing the swiftest-acting creditors
from pursuing their own remedies against the debtor or the debtor's property
to the detriment of other unsecured creditors.
Of course, in a chapter 7 case filed by a foreign representative, an interim
trustee is selected by the United States trustee439 and continues to serve
as trustee in the case unless the creditors elect their own trustee.440 It
is doubtful that a foreign representative would be able to fulfill the § 321 require-
ment that the trustee, if an individual, "resides or has an office in the judi-
cial district within which the case is pending, or in any judicial district
adjacent to such district441 or, if a corporation, has "an office in at least
4341 U.S.C.A. § 109(a), (b), (d) (West 1991). The foreign debtor must also be a debtor under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code and thereby satisfy § 101(13). 11 US.C.A. § 101(13) (West 1991).
43528 U.S.C.A. § 1408 (West 1991).
4361d. § 1409.
43711 U.S.C.A. § 541(a) (West 1991).
438ld. § 362. See Axona, 88 B.R. at 606.
43911 U.S.C.A. § 701 (West 1991).
4401d. § 702(d).
4411d. § 321(a)(1).
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one of such districts' 442 Thus, by commencing a chapter 7 case, the foreign
representative risks losing control over the U.S. assets, as well as incurring addi-
tional administrative expense. 443 However, the trustee appointed in the U.S.
case might work in concert with the foreign representative. 444
The current statutory scheme does not offer any guidance as to when it
would be more appropriate for a foreign representative to commence a §
303(b)(4) case, rather than a § 304 case. At first glance it would appear that
a foreign representative should file a petition under § 303(b)(4) if she decides
that a full administration under U.S. law (concurrent with the foreign adminis,
tration) is in the best interests of the debtor and creditors. Perhaps the most
important reason why a foreign representative might decide to file under §
303(b)(4), rather than under § 304, is that in a case filed under § 303(b)(4)
a trustee or debtor in possession may exercise the trustees U.S. Bankruptcy
Code avoidance powers445 or investigative powers.446 However, giving free reign
to a foreign representative to decide whether to seek the application of for-
eign law under § 304 or the application of U.S. law under § 303(b)(4) might
well lead to problems involving "section shopping:' Because this issue might
well arise when a court decides to dismiss a case or suspend proceedings under
§ 305 (as it did in In re Axona International Credit & Commerce Ltd.
('Axona")),4 47 it is addressed in part C below.
C. SECTION 305 (ABSTENTION)
Under the common law a court with jurisdiction over a particular matter
is required to take such jurisdiction. 448 However, § 305 recognizes that there
are cases in which it would be appropriate for the court to decline jurisdiction.449
Section 305 provides as follows:
(a) The court, after notice and a hearing, may dismiss a case
under this title, or may suspend all proceedings in a case under
4421d. § 321(a)(2).
443American Express Intl Banking Corp. v. Johnson [1984] HKLR 372, 377 (discussing disadvantages
of Hong Kong liquidators commencing a chapter 7 case in the United States).
444SCe, e.g., Axona, 88 B.R. 597; IBB, 536 F.2d 509.
44See Axona, 88 B.R. at 600-01, 606. See also 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a) (West 1991) (strong arm powers
as hypothetical lien creditor or bona fide purchaser); id. § 544(b) (trustee as successor to certain actual
unsecured creditors); id. § 545 (statutory liens); id. § 546 (limitations on avoidance powers); id. § 547 (prefer-
ences); id. § 548 (fraudulent transfers); id. § 549 (postpetition transfers).
4 See Axona, 88 B.R. at 607; 11 U.S.C.A. § 704(4) (West 1991); id. § 1106(3). A foreign representa-
tive might also file a § 303(b)(4) petition to avoid the venue problems discussed earlier.'See text accom-
panying note 136 supra; Boshkoff, U.S. Judicial Asistance, supra note 5, at 744.
44788 B.R. 597 (Bankr. s.D.N.Y 1988), affld, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dimissed, 924 F.2d
31 (2d Cir. 1991).
44SH.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 325, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6289; S. RaP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5281.
4491d.
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this title, at any time if-
(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be bet-
ter served by such dismissal or suspension; or
(2)(A) there is pending a foreign proceeding; and
(B) the factors specified in section 304(c) of this title
warrant such dismissal or suspension.
(b) A foreign representative may seek dismissal or suspension
under subsection (a)(2) of this section.
(c) An order under subsection (a) of this section dismissing
a case or suspending all proceedings in a case, or a decision
not so to dismiss or suspend, is not reviewable by appeal or
otherwise by the court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291,
or 1292 of this title [sic] or by the Supreme Court of the United
States under section 1254 of this title [sicl.45o
A few cases involving foreign proceedings have arisen under § 305. For instance,
in In re Gee4-5 the court granted a § 304 petition and dismissed a subsequently
filed competing chapter 11 petition. 452 And in In re Traklman,453 where much
of the relief sought by a foreign representative under section 304 was duplica-
tive of a previously filed related interpleader action in a U.S. district court, the
court suspended the § 304 ancillary proceedings to allow "the district court
and the parties before it in the interpleader action to continue undistracted
in their efforts to resolve the issues before them."45 4
The most thorough analysis of § 305 to date was offered by the court in
Axona,455 the first case in which a court granted an application under § 305(b)
seeking the suspension of a chapter 7 case commenced under § 303(b)(4) and
the turnover of local assets to a foreign representative for administration in the
foreign proceeding. The bankruptcy court in this case closely examined the
interconnectedness of the statutory scheme contained in §§ 303(b)(4), 304,
and 305 and the extent to which this scheme may be used to foster coopera-
tion in the transnational insolvency context.
45011 U.S.C.A. § 305 (West 1991) (emphasis added) (The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 added
the words in italics, but the new title references are incorrect. Sections 158(d), 1291, 1292, and 1254 are
contained in title 28).
45153 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
412Id. at 905. See Gitlin, Flaschen & Grimes, supra note 5, at 87.
45333 B.R. 780 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
4"Id. at 783-84. By suspending, rather than dismissing, the § 304 petition, the court preserved rights
to avoid preferential transfers that had existed as of the day of the petition and fostered judicial economy
for the benefit of the debtor and creditors. Id. See also Interpool, 878 F.2d 111 (discussed in note 348 supra);
In re Goerg, 930 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
01 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff d, 115 B.R. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d
31 (2d Cir. 1991). The facts of the case as discussed in the text above are set out in Axona, 88 B.R. at 599-602.
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This case involved Axona International Credit and Commerce Limited
('Axona"), a Hong Kong registered deposit taking company that operated as
a wholesale bank and had its principal place of business in Hong Kong, and
spawned litigation in both the United States and Hong Kong. Like the debt-
ors in Herstatt, IBB, Finabank, and Culmer, Axona never engaged in the banking
business in the United States, but did have assets located there in the form
of substantial bank deposits amounting to several million dollars. In the wake
of Axona's financial collapse in November 1982, three U.S. banks (collectively
"the attaching creditors") each obtained ex parte attachments of Axona's bank
deposits in the United States. A fourth bank, Chemical, initiated other
maneuvers in an attempt to secure its position. 45 6
On February 2, 1983 a creditor filed a petition with the Supreme Court
of Hong Kong for the compulsory winding up of Axona. On February 4, 1983
the Hong Kong court appointed joint provisional liquidators, and on March
4, 1983 the court ordered the winding up of Axona and continued the two
liquidators as permanent liquidators ("the H.K. liquidators").
On February 8, 1983, the Hong Kong court authorized the H.K. liquida-
tors to file an involuntary chapter 7 petition against Axona under § 303(b)(4)
to avoid preferential transfers and thereby preserve Axona's U.S. assets. The
H.K. liquidators commenced a fill involuntary liquidation under § 303(b)(4),
rather than an ancillary case under § 304, in reliance on their U.S. counsel's
conclusion that it was doubtfil that a foreign representative would be able to
utilize a trustees avoiding powers in a § 304 case. 457 In April 1983 Judge Gal-
gay entered an order for relief over the objections of the attaching creditors. 458
An interim trustee was appointed, and he continued to serve as trustee under
§ 702(d) ("the U.S. trustee"). 459
With the assistance of the H.K. liquidators, the U.S. trustee began to mar-
shal Axona's assets in the United States, and then commenced adversary
proceedings against the attaching creditors to avoid preferential transfers. The
attaching creditors moved to dismiss the chapter 7 case in the United States,
and also initiated proceedings in Hong Kong to challenge the right of the
H.K. liquidators to commence a § 303 case under U.S. law. In the Hong Kong
456Axona, 88 B.R. at 599-600. Axona repaid a thirty-day unsecured time loan that had been made the
day before by Chemical's branch in Hong Kong (and was to be repaid in New York), and Chemical issued
"a new demand loan collateralized by a US$3,000,000 'call account' opened at Chemical's Hong Kong branch"
Id. at 600. Six days later, Chemical's Hong Kong branch "sold" the recently acquired demand loan to Chemical's
New York main office and also transferred the US$3,000,000 cash collateral account to that office. Chemi,
cal's New York office "then 'deemed itself insecure' with respect to the demand loan and offset its claim
against Axona," thereby fully setting off Axona's indebtedness to the bank. Id.
43Id. at 601. For further support of the assertion that a foreign representative may not utilize U.S. avoid-
ance powers in a § 304 case, see text accompanying notes 179 to 187 supra.
4SSJudge Galgay was the judge who issued the IBB Turnover Orders, supra note 58.
41911 US.C.A. § 702(d) (West 1991).
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actions, the attaching creditors sought: (1) declaratory relief that they were
entitled under Hong Kong law to retain the benefit of their attachments in New
York; (2) dismissal of the adversary proceedings and bankruptcy case in New
York; and (3) a summons directing the H.K. liquidators to withdraw all proceed-
ings in the United States.
The Hong Kong court dismissed these applications and upheld the earlier
Hong Kong court decision to authorize and empower the H.K. liquidators to
proceed under § 303(b)(4). The court clearly stated the reasons for its ruling
"so that the U.S. Court [would] know precisely what Hong Kong's views [were]
upon this matter."460 The court first claimed that it appeared that the attach-
ing creditors' motivation for bringing the actions in the Hong Kong courts was
to avoid the application of U.S. preference law. The court noted that, unlike
U.S. preference law, Hong Kong law requires the court to consider "difficult
questions of intention.' 461 In the court's view, having no defense to the prefer-
ence claim in the United States, the attaching creditors "launched into a mas-
sive counter-attack, a massive filibuster" in which they sought a ruling that
under Hong Kong law they were entitled to retain the benefit of their attach,
ments in New York.462
In rejecting the attaching creditors' contentions, the Hong Kong court first
found that, since the H.K. liquidators had sought legal advice and the court's
approval to commence proceedings in the United States, they had not com-
mitted misfeasance or breach of duty.463 Secondly and perhaps most importantly,
the court agreed with the submission by the H.K. liquidators' attorney
and by the Hong Kong official receiver that Hong Kong's companies code is
"a domestic code. It governs domestic executions against goods and lands within
the jurisdiction of the court, or attachments which have occurred in Hong Kong,
and does not extend to matters taking place outside the jurisdiction of this
court:' 464 In the court's opinion, such extra-territorial matters (including the
question of preferences in insolvency) were to be determined by the lex situs,
which in this case was the law of the United States. Applying its territorial
interpretation of Hong Kong law, the court claimed that "you do not produce
equality by seeking artificially to impose one [law] on everybody. The only route
to equality here, is to treat all people equally in their respective jurisdictions
by affording dominance to the laws in those jurisdictions."465 The court went
on to conclude that it therefore was proper for the H.K. liquidators to
460American Express Int'l Banking Corp. v. Johnson 119841 HKLR 372, 380.
4611d. at 378. See § 266, Companies Ordinance (cap 32, LHK 1991); § 49 Bankruptcy Ordinance (cap
6, LHK 1991).
462American Express Intl Banlkng Corp., 119841 HKLR at 378.
463Id. at 379-80.
4641d. at 381, 384.
461Id. at 382.
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have filed a petition under § 303 (rather than under § 304) of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code to take advantage of the broader avoidance powers availa-
ble under U.S. law.
At the end of his opinion, the Hong Kong judge, Justice Hunter, turned
to the "direct attack on the motivation and the bona fides" of the Hong Kong
court and of the H.K. liquidators that the attaching creditors had lodged in
their documents filed in the New York actions466 - allegations that the H.K.
liquidators were discriminating against U.S. creditors and "playing fast and loose"
with the jurisdiction of the U.S. court, in an attempt to gain a favorable forum.467
Justice Hunter strongly denied the charges. First of all, he asserted that the
H.K. liquidators had not "singled out" the attaching creditors, but rather the
attaching creditors had "selected themselves" by engaging in self-help. 468 Sec-
ondly, he stressed that the Hong Kong court and the H.K. liquidators had sought
the assistance of the U.S. court "on behalf of the whole body of creditors, which
include a considerable number of United States creditors"469 Lastly, he claimed
that there had been no forum shopping by the Hong Kong court, and that in
effect it was the attaching creditors that had shopped for a forum-their obli,
gations were "Hong Kong obligations, incurred by Hong Kong companies," but
they chose to sue and grab Axona's assets in New York, thereby making "the
New York Court the dominant court under Hong Kong law."47o
Back in the United States, the attaching creditors withdrew their motion
to dismiss the U.S. case, and eventually the U.S. trustee entered into a settle-
ment agreement with each of them. The U.S. trustee also commenced an adver-
sary proceeding against Chemical, which was also settled.47' These settlement
agreements enabled the U.S. trustee to collect more than US$7,000,000. Mean,
while, the H.K. liquidators had amassed an estate in Hong Kong of over
US$5,000,000.
The H.K. liquidators and the U.S. trustee ("the joint applicants") together
filed a joint application ("the joint application") requesting "in the interests
of comity, equity, and economical and expeditious administration' 472 that the
U.S. bankruptcy court, pursuant to § 305(b), suspend the U.S. proceedings473
and order the turnover of funds in the United States to the H.K. liquidators
to be distributed in the Hong Kong winding up proceedings in accordance
4161d. at 388.
467Id. (quoting documents filed by the Attaching Creditors in New York).
468ld. at 389.
4691d
.
4701d.
471The settlement agreement entered into with Chemical reserved the bank's right to contest thejuris-
diction of the U.S. bankruptcy court to administer Axonas U.S. bankruptcy case. Axona, 88 B.R. at 602.
4721d.
473The joint application chose suspension, rather than dismissal, because a few open matters remained,
including the question of whether the U.S. estate would be required to pay U.S. taxes. Id. at 602 n.7.
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with Hong Kong law. The joint applicants asserted that the chapter 7 case had
achieved its intended purposes and that ordering the requested relief would
not prejudice any creditors.
Chemical alone opposed the joint applicants' request. In defense of its posi-
tion, Chemical raised statutory, jurisdictional, and constitutional arguments.
Some of Chemical's arguments challenged the ability of the H.K. liquidators
to commence a § 303(b)(4) case, and others challenged the propriety of sus-
pending the chapter 7 proceedings and ordering a turnover of assets to the Hong
Kong proceedings. At the heart of Chemical's challenge was its belief that its
1982 maneuvers were a part of a Hong Kong transaction that should be gov-
erned by Hong Kong law, and therefore that the use of U.S. law to avoid that
transaction was inappropriate. The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments.
Chemical's statutory challenge was that it would be inappropriate for the
court to grant a suspension of the proceedings under § 305(a) once the H.K.
liquidators had invoked the U.S. Bankruptcy Codes avoiding powers.474 The
court rejected the bank's "assault on the plain language of the statutory scheme"
relied upon by the H.K. liquidators. 4v7 In so doing, the court discussed the inter-
play among §§ 303, 304, and 305 and stressed the "established goal of U.S.
and international bankruptcy law to preserve assets for equitable jurisdiction
for all creditors wherever located' 476 The court concluded that the clear lan-
guage of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code-supported by the legislative history, earlier
cases such as Finabank and IBB, and recent cases such as Culmer and Salen
I-enables a foreign representative to choose between commencing either a full
case under § 303(b)(4) or an ancillary case under § 304.477
Chemical also argued that this statutory scheme gave the foreign represen-
tative a "unilateral option"' to choose whether to seek the application of for-
eign or U.S. law. The court rejected this argument by noting that, if any of
Axona's creditors had commenced an involuntary case against Axona under
§ 303(b)(1) or (2), "Chemical would have been met with an identical adver-
sary proceeding to avoid the November 1982 'setoff."' 478
In discussing how § 305 fits into the statutory scheme, the court focused
on whether suspension would be appropriate under § 305(a)(2), or more
specifically, whether the criteria in § 304(c) warranted suspension. The court
rejected Chemical's statutory argument, as well as its argument that suspen-
sion should not be ordered on grounds of comity. The court found Chemi-
cal's reading of comity to be "myopic : '479 and instead followed the broad
474d. at 607.
47-1d. at 604.
476 Id.
477d. at 604-06.
4713d. at 606.
479Id. at 608 n.19.
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pro-recognition comity approach of Culmer, Salen I, Salen II, and Gee. The
Axona court paid particular attention to the fact that U.S. courts had granted
comity to other sister common law jurisdictions, like Hong Kong, whose wind
ing up procedures were based on the British Companies Act. 480 It noted that
Hong Kong's "Companies Ordinance is strikingly similar to the [U.S. Bank-
ruptcyl Code and provides a comprehensive procedure for the orderly and
equitable distribution of assets to all creditors" 48 1 The court concluded
this argument by stating that "[c]omity does not require the laws of different
jurisdictions to be identical.... Whether or not Hong Kong law is identical
to American law, Hong Kong law is not repugnant to our ideas of justice,
and is inherently fair and regular. As a result, comity should be accorded
in the instant matter. 482
The court then noted that Chemical had "invited" the court "to determine
whether the 1982 restructuring of its loan would withstand an attack under
Hong Kong law,' but the court refused to do so. 48 3 Instead, the court focused
on Chemical's "flawed analysis" and noted that, although the November 1982
restructuring involved Chemical's New York branch, Chemical had argued that
it was unfair for the H.K. liquidators to utilize U.S. law to undo that trans-
action.484
The court next found that the other criteria in § 304 were satisfied. The
court found that § 304(c)(1) was satisfied because Hong Kong law, like U.S.
law, "provides a comprehensive procedure for the orderly and just treatment
of all Axona's creditors" 48 .5 In addition, most of Axona's debts arose in Hong
Kong, Axona's books and records were located there, and the H.K. liquidators
were "best situated to evaluate creditors' claims fairly and at a minimum
expense.486 Also, the court found that approving the joint application would
ensure an economical and expeditious administration of the estate.
In finding that granting the joint application would not prejudice or incon-
venience U.S. creditors under § 304(c)(2), the court stressed that Hong Kong
law does not discriminate against non-resident creditors. The court also dis-
cussed the procedures available under Hong Kong law to a creditor dissatisfied
with the H.K. liquidators' treatment of its claim. Moreover, since Chemi
cal had a substantial claim against Axona, the cost of processing its claim
4801d. at 610.
4811d
.
4821d. at 610-11 (citation omitted).
483Id. at 611. Chemical and the joint applicants disagreed about whether the restructuring would have
been avoidable under Hong Kong law. Id. at 604 n.12.
4841d. at 611-12. Earlier in the opinion, the court had also noted that "[w]hile Chemical attempted to
characterize the November 1982 restructuring as Hong Kong based, without any U.S. connection, the facts
belie this characterization' Id. at 604 n.11.
4S51d. at 612.
486jd
,
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in Hong Kong would be de minimis in relation to the amount of the claim. 48 7
In finding that § 304(c)(3) was satisfied, the court looked not only to
whether Hong Kong law prohibited preferential or fraudulent transfers, but
also to the fact that the US. trustee and H.K. liquidators had successfully
avoided preferential transfers. 488 Lastly, the court found that the Hong Kong
distribution scheme satisfied § 304(c)(4). 48 9
After demonstrating that all of the criteria contained in § 304(c) had
been satisfied, the court addressed Chemical's jurisdictional challenge. Chemi-
cal asserted that the U.S. court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over
Axona's § 303(b)(4) case, and therefore that Axona's case could only be main-
tained under § 304. The court rejected Chemical's argument and found that
the court did have subject matter jurisdiction. The court correctly noted that
the H.K. liquidators fit into the U.S. Bankruptcy Code's definition of "foreign
representative" and the Hong Kong proceeding, of a "foreign proceeding"
Most importantly, the court rightly found that Axona's substantial U.S. bank
accounts were a "sufficient predicate for subject matter jurisdiction" under
§ 303(b)(4). 490
Lastly, the court turned to Chemical's constitutional challenges. It rejected
Chemical's assertion that giving the foreign representative the unilateral ability
to forum shop to gain the benefit of U.S. preference and setoff law violated
Chemical's fifth amendment equal protection and due process rights. In response
to Chemical's due process challenge, the court found that "Chemical must be
presumed to have been on notice that it would or could be subject to United
States law applicable to its conduct."491 Among the factors noted by the court
were the following: Chemical was a New York bank doing business in New
York, its relationship with Axona involved a longstanding New York account,
and Chemical involved its main office in New York in the November 1982 res-
tructuring.492
After addressing all of Chemical's arguments, the Axona court granted the
relief requested in the joint application, by suspending the U.S. case and proceed-
ings and ordering the turnover of assets to the H.K. liquidators. To protect
4871d. at 613.
488d. Finister criticizes this part of the Axona approach. Finister, supra note 62, at 368-69. For a criti-
cism of Finister's position, see supra note 332.
4S9Axona, 88 B.R. at 613. Elsewhere in its opinion, the court also noted its rejection of the "limited
focus in Toga on the minor substantive differences between Canadian and U.S. law." Id. at 611. See Finister,
supra note 62, at 365, 369. Finister claims that "[in Axona, even the change of a United States creditor's
status from secured to unsecured under the foreign law was held not to violate section 304(c)(4)." Id. at
369 (emphasis added). However, this issue was never addressed by the Axona court. Rather, in Axona
the status of a U.S. creditor was changed from secured to unsecured under US. law.
490Axona, 88 B.R. at 614-15.
491Id. at 617.
4921d.
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the interests of certain U.S. creditors, the court conditioned the turnover order
on the U.S. trustee first paying all administrative expenses and certain priority
claims, and retaining U.S.$500,000 to complete the administration of the U.S.
estate.493 The court also required that, prior to making any distribution to cred,
itors, the H.K. liquidators notify all creditors who had filed a claim in the U.S.
proceedings but had not filed in the Hong Kong proceedings of their right to
file in the Hong Kong proceedings (and of the procedures for doing so), and
that such claims once filed would be administered in accordance with Hong
Kong law.494
On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision "in
all respects."495 In rejecting Chemical's contention that §§ 303(b)(4) and 304
"grant a foreign representative a unilateral option to determine whether U.S.
or foreign avoidance law should apply" 496 the court noted that in fact the
bankruptcy court is delegated this option-it is the bankruptcy court that must
weigh the § 304(c) criteria and decide whether to order relief and whether to
grant comity to foreign bankruptcy laws. 497 Likewise, the court found that decid-
ing whether to suspend proceedings after avoidance powers have been exer,
cised is also "an element that should be considered by the bankruptcy judge
in weighing the factors enumerated in § 304(c) "498
While the Axona case was before the Second Circuit, Congress amended
§ 305(c) as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. The amendment
resolved a jurisdictional matter at issue in Axona, for it provided for review
of a bankruptcy court's orders under § 305(a) by the district court, but limited
further review by the court of appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court.4 99 In light
of the amendment, the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal.5 00
Although the bankruptcy court's decision has been upheld, certain other
difficulties have arisen, and the turnover order has not yet been made. Thus,
although Axona's Hong Kong winding up and U.S. chapter 7 case were com-
menced back in 1983, creditors are still awaiting their distributions as of the
time this article is being written.
The bankruptcy court in Axona was clearly correct in finding that the
foreign representative was authorized to commence a §. 303(b)(4) case under
the current statutory scheme. Likewise, the court was correct in suspending
491Id. at 618. Ordering the payment of administrative expenses and priority claims before allowing the
estate assets to be turned over was clearly correct, given that this was a plenary U.S. bankruptcy case.
491M. at 618-19.
495in re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 115 B.R. 442, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
491d. at 447.
497Id.
4911d. at 448.
1991n re Axona Intl Credit & Commerce Ltd., 924 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1991). See text accompanying
supra note 450. See also Goerg, 930 F.2d 1563 (applying amended § 305).
-°°Axona, 924 F.2d at 36.
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the chapter 7 case and proceedings and ordering the turnover of assets to the
Hong Kong proceeding. However, its analysis offers little guidance about when
it would be better for a foreign representative to commence a plenary case under
§ 303(b)(4), rather than an ancillary case under § 304, to protect the U.S. assets
of a foreign debtor.
The bankruptcy court would have been wise to turn to the Hong Kong
decision of Justice Hunter. As mentioned earlier, he found that it was appropri-
ate for the H.K. liquidators to commence a § 303(b)(4) case in the United States
because the attachments by the three attaching creditors were beyond the juris-
dictional reach of the Hong Kong courts, and Hong Kong law would therefore
defer to the lex situs as governing the transactions. Under this approach, the
application of U.S. bankruptcy law to avoid those attachments was clearly
justified.
Given that two plenary cases-one in Hong Kong and one in the United
States -were warranted, the issue arose as to which transactions each case
should govern. Although the U.S. court unfortunately failed to discuss this
matter in depth,50' it was certainly justified in applying U.S. law to all trans-
actions in the United States. Given that the bankruptcy court found that there
was a strong U.S. connection in Chemical's 1982 restructuring, this restruc-
turing should have been subject to the application of U.S. law.502
The Axona bankruptcy court's decision, the first to order the turnover of
assets under § 305 in a full case commenced under § 303(b)(4), is an impor-
tant addition to the case law regarding the treatment of foreign bankruptcies
under U.S. law. First of all, by enabling a foreign representative to commence
a full bankruptcy case to utilize the avoiding powers set forth in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code and then suspending the case and ordering the turnover of
the debtor's U.S. assets to the foreign proceeding (after ensuring that the
interests of U.S. creditors had been protected), the Axona court built on the
pre-U.S. Bankruptcy Code turnover orders in IBB. Secondly, as mentioned
earlier, the decision offers a thorough discussion of the interplay among §§ 303,
304, and 305. Thirdly, by interpreting the factors contained in § 304(c) for
the purpose of determining whether to suspend a case under § 305(a) simi-
larly to the way in which the courts in Culmer, Gee and Koreag interpreted
them for the purpose of determining whether to order relief in § 304 ancillary
cases, the Axona court further demonstrates the inter-connectedness of the
1011t is also unfortunate that the U.S. court declined Chemical's invitation to determine whether its
1982 restructuring would be avoidable under Hong Kong law. Chemical claimed that it would not be avoidable,
and the joint applicants disagreed. Id. at 604 n.12. Interestingly, there is dicta (albeit, somewhat unclear)
inJustice Hunter's Hong Kong opinion that suggests that the lex situs for the discharge of Chemical's indebt-
edness was the law of New York. American Express Intl Banking Corp., [1984] HKLR at 381-82.
552Chemical would have been able to make a much stronger argument in favor of the application of Hong
Kong law if its 1982 restructuring had completely occurred in Hong Kong and had not involved its main
office in New York.
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statutory scheme contained in §§ 303(b)(4), 304, and 305.
Most importantly, the decision demonstrates the importance of enabling
a foreign representative to commence a plenary case in the United States when
a § 304 case might not be appropriate. However, as noted earlier, further guid-
ance is necessary for assisting foreign representatives in choosing between §
303(b)(4) and § 304-otherwise problems involving section shopping (with
important choice of law consequences) will likely result.
Perhaps the following guidelines would prove helpful. When the principal
insolvency of a foreign debtor occurs in a country that has territoriality-based
insolvency laws that are not applicable abroad, § 304 relief should not be avail-
able to a foreign representative if she seeks the application of foreign avoid-
ance powers to avoid certain transactions in the United States.503 In such cases,
the foreign representative should commence a § 303(b)(4) case to gain the ben-
efits of U.S. law and perhaps should seek the turnover of assets to the prin-
cipal bankruptcy proceeding. However, if the foreign representative does not
seek the application of foreign law, but rather seeks other forms of relief, such
as injunctive relief, discovery or the turnover of assets in the United States
(which are not subject to local attachments or liens), § 304 relief might be avail-
able, and the foreign representative should be allowed to petition for either
§ 304 or § 303(b)(4) relief. In comparison, when the principal insolvency of
a foreign debtor occurs in a country that has insolvency laws with extra-
territorial effect that are applicable in the United States, as a general rule, the
foreign representative should commence a § 304 case.504 To prevent section
shopping, I would propose that courts treat foreign representatives' compliance
with these guidelines as another threshold requirement that must be satisfied
in both § 304 and § 303(b)(4) cases. 505
CONCLUSION
Building on the principles espoused in Gebhard more than a century ago
and demonstrating an increased willingness by the United States to recognize
-"3see supra note 99.
504An exception to this general rule might well occur in cases in which the earlier discussed multi-district
venue problems arise. See text accompanying note 136 supra and accompanying text. Of course, the choice
between §§ 303(b)(4) and 304 becomes more difficult if the foreign proceeding has some laws with extra-
territorial effect and some laws with purely domestic effect. Other difficulties might well arise in cases in
which the foreign debtor's business is "substantially related" to the United States. See supra note 244. In
such cases, the U.S. court will have to decide which course is preferable.
-~'Furthermore, if a foreign representative complies with these section shopping guidelines and com-
mences a § 304 case but some of the foreign debtor's creditors commence a plenary bankruptcy case against
the foreign debtor under § 303(b)(1) or (2), the foreign representative should request the U.S. court to dis-
miss or suspend the competing case or proceedings. Lastly, ifa U.S. court finds that the threshold require-
ments for a § 304 case have been satisfied but later denies the request for § 304 relief or dismisses the §
304 case, the foreign representative should then be allowed to commence a plenary bankruptcy case against
the foreign debtor (unless, as is likely, the foreign debtor's creditors have already done so). See note 303 supra.
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foreign bankruptcies, the statory scheme comprised of §§ 303(b)(4), 304, and
305 is an admirable attempt to foster cooperation in transnational insolven-
cies. Many § 304 cases have followed the Culmer universality approach and
have recognized and assisted foreign bankruptcy proceedings. One of these
cases, Metzeler, has held that the avoiding powers to be applied in a § 304 case
are those powers vested in the foreign representative pursuant to the law of
the jurisdiction in which the primary bankruptcy occurs. Other § 304 cases,
such as Culmer and Koreag, and the § 303(b)(4) Axona case, have ordered the
turnover of assets to foreign proceedings to be administered under foreign law.
Many non-U.S. Bankruptcy Code cases, such as Salen I and Salen II, have also
promoted the universality approach.
Unfortunately, other cases, including Toga and most recently Interpool, have
refused to grant requested § 304 relief to assist foreign bankruptcies, even when
the primary foreign bankruptcies occurred in sister common law jurisdictions.
Instead, these cases have set forth an approach premised on protecting the inter-
ests of U.S. creditors under U.S. law. Implicit in cases such as these is the require-
ment that the foreign laws and procedures be identical to those under U.S. law.
It is time for U.S. bankruptcy judges, lawyers, and creditors to reject the
territoriality approach and acknowledge that the U.S. does not have a monop-
oly over fair bankruptcy procedures. Many other countries have bankruptcy
laws and procedures that, although differing in some respects from U.S. laws
and procedures (such as by setting forth different priority rules or by requir-
ing less creditor participation), are based on similar principles (the most impor-
tant of which is the principle of equality of distribution), are just and fair in
their overall treatment of debtors and creditors, and are deserving of recogni-
tion by U.S. courts.
What John Lowell wrote a hundred years ago is just as appropriate today:
It is obvious that, in the present state of commerce and
of communication, it would be better in nine cases out often
that all settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors
should be made in a single proceeding, and generally at a sin-
gle place; better for the creditors, who would thus share alike,
and better for the debtor, because all his creditors would be
equally bound by his discharge5 °6
Back in the 1880's, Lowell was forced to admit that "[ilt is not so easy to see
how this result is to be reached in actual practice.5' 07 Today, however, with
the existence of§ 304, not only has this result been reached in individual cases,
but it is now possible to make this result the norm in crossborder insolvencies
involving assets in the United States.
SO6Lowell, supra note 11, at 264 (emphasis added).
5071d.
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In this article I have put forth an interpretation of§ 304 which, if adopted,
would increase the likelihood of cross-border cooperation becoming the "norm"
in transnational insolvencies. To summarize, a court should first ascertain
whether the foreign representative has satisfied the following § 304 threshold
requirements: (1) that the foreign proceeding has been commenced in the
appropriate forum (which for a corporate debtor should be where the debtor's
principal place of business is located, and for an individual should be the debt-
or's domicile); (2) that the foreign representative has been duly appointed in
the foreign proceeding; (3) that the foreign debtor qualifies as a debtor under
foreign law; (4) that the foreign law authorizes the foreign representative to
commence proceedings in the United States regarding the foreign debtor's prop-
erty and/or the administration of the foreign debtor's estate and, if need be,
that the foreign substantive law has extra-territoriality effect; (5) that the for-
eign debtor has met at least one of the § 109(a) criteria; (6) if need be, that
the foreign debtor has assets in the relevant district; (7) that venue properly
lies; and (8) that the foreign representative has complied with the guidelines
preventing section shopping that I have suggested above.
Once the threshold requirements have been met, the U.S. court handling
the case should apply the § 304(c) criteria in deciding whether to grant the
requested § 304 relief. In so doing, the court should ask whether comity should
be accorded to the foreign proceeding. (In my view, the standard of comity
should be the standard from Culmer: the court should enquire whether the
foreign laws are repugnant to U.S. ideas of justice.) In considering comity, or
in addition to considering comity (in my opinion, the former approach is prefer-
able), the court should consider the other § 304(c) factors.
In considering the § 304(c) factors, the court should seek answers to the
following questions. First, does the foreign proceeding provide for the "orderly
and equitable" treatment of creditors? More particularly, does the foreign
proceeding apply the equality of distribution principle (thereby satisfying §
304(c)(1))? Does the foreign law provide for the avoidance of preferential and
fraudulent transfers and (if applicable) have those avoidance powers been exer
cised (thereby satisfying § 304(c)(3))? Second, are the foreign laws and proce-
dures fundamentally fair (considering, inter alia, the application ofthe § 304(c)(4)
and (c)(6) factors), and does the foreign proceeding sufficiently safeguard the
interests of U.S. creditors (thereby satisfying § 304(c)(2))? Even if creditors
allege that they have encountered or are likely to encounter fundamentally unfair
laws or procedures, discriminatory treatment or inconvenience in the foreign
proceedings, the court may nonetheless answer the second question affirma-
tively if the creditors fail to produce "concrete evidence" in support of their
allegations. Third, would deferring to the foreign proceeding "best assure an
economical and expeditious administration" of the debtor's estate?
1992)
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If these questions can all be answered affirmatively, then the U.S. court
should grant the requested § 304 relief. Such relief should include applying the
substantive law of the primary proceeding, if it has extra-territorial effect and
extends to transactions in the United States, and ordering the turnover of the
U.S. assets to the foreign proceeding to be administered under the foreign law.
Thus, the Culmer-Metzeler result should become the norm. Noncooperation
with the primary proceeding should be limited to cases in which one or more
of the above criteria are not met, such as Papeleras, in which it was clear that
a U.S. creditor had encountered fundamental unfairness and prejudice in the
foreign proceeding. Where the above criteria are satisfied for some, but not
all, of the requested relief, the court, as in Banobras, should cooperate with
the foreign proceeding as much as possible, but retain U.S. control over those
aspects of the crossborder insolvency as is justified to protect the interests
of local creditors.
The lack of a precise formula in § 304 will hopefully prove to be one of the
section's strengths. Given the recent worldwide recession, many more § 304
cases will likely arise in the near future. The treatment by U.S. courts of these
cases may well determine whether § 304 will survive in its present form or
whether amendments will be necessary to achieve the worthwhile goal of
increased cooperation in transnational insolvencies.
EDITOR'S ADDENDUM
Shortly before publication of this article, the bankruptcy court's decision in In re Koreag, Controle et
Revision S.A., 130 B.R. 705 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) was vacated and remanded by the Second Circuit in
In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341 (1992).
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